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Resumo
Os recentes avanços nas áreas de pesquisa em biometria, forense e segurança da informação
trouxeram importantes melhorias na eficácia dos sistemas de reconhecimento biométricos.
No entanto, um desafio ainda em aberto é a vulnerabilidade de tais sistemas contra ataques
de apresentação, nos quais os usuários impostores criam amostras sintéticas, a partir das
informações biométricas originais de um usuário legítimo, e as apresentam ao sensor de
aquisição procurando se autenticar como um usuário válido. Dependendo da modalidade
biométrica, os tipos de ataque variam de acordo com o tipo de material usado para cons-
truir as amostras sintéticas. Por exemplo, em biometria facial, uma tentativa de ataque é
caracterizada quando um usuário impostor apresenta ao sensor de aquisição uma fotogra-
fia, um vídeo digital ou uma máscara 3D com as informações faciais de um usuário-alvo.
Em sistemas de biometria baseados em íris, os ataques de apresentação podem ser reali-
zados com fotografias impressas ou com lentes de contato contendo os padrões de íris de
um usuário-alvo ou mesmo padrões de textura sintéticos. Nos sistemas biométricos de im-
pressão digital, os usuários impostores podem enganar o sensor biométrico usando réplicas
dos padrões de impressão digital construídas com materiais sintéticos, como látex, massa
de modelar, silicone, entre outros. Esta pesquisa teve como objetivo o desenvolvimento
de soluções para detecção de ataques de apresentação considerando os sistemas biométri-
cos faciais, de íris e de impressão digital. As linhas de investigação apresentadas nesta
tese incluem o desenvolvimento de representações baseadas nas informações espaciais,
temporais e espectrais da assinatura de ruído; em propriedades intrínsecas das amostras
biométricas (e.g., mapas de albedo, de reflectância e de profundidade) e em técnicas de
aprendizagem supervisionada de características. Os principais resultados e contribuições
apresentadas nesta tese incluem: a criação de um grande conjunto de dados publicamente
disponível contendo aproximadamente 17K vídeos de simulações de ataques de apresenta-
ções e de acessos genuínos em um sistema biométrico facial, os quais foram coletados com
a autorização do Comitê de Ética em Pesquisa da Unicamp; o desenvolvimento de novas
abordagens para modelagem e análise de propriedades extrínsecas das amostras biomé-
tricas relacionadas aos artefatos que são adicionados durante a fabricação das amostras
sintéticas e sua captura pelo sensor de aquisição, cujos resultados de desempenho foram
superiores a diversos métodos propostos na literature que se utilizam de métodos tradi-
cionais de análise de images (e.g., análise de textura); a investigação de uma abordagem
baseada na análise de propriedades intrínsecas das faces, estimadas a partir da informação
de sombras presentes em sua superfície; e, por fim, a investigação de diferentes abordagens
baseadas em redes neurais convolucionais para o aprendizado automático de característi-
cas relacionadas ao nosso problema, cujos resultados foram superiores ou competitivos aos
métodos considerados estado da arte para as diferentes modalidades biométricas aborda-
das nesta tese. A pesquisa também considerou o projeto de eficientes redes neurais com
arquiteturas rasas capazes de aprender características relacionadas ao nosso problema a
partir de pequenos conjuntos de dados disponíveis para o desenvolvimento e a avaliação
de soluções para a detecção de ataques de apresentação.
Abstract
Recent advances in biometrics, information forensics, and security have improved the
recognition effectiveness of biometric systems. However, an ever-growing challenge is the
vulnerability of such systems against presentation attacks, in which impostor users create
synthetic samples from the original biometric information of a legitimate user and show
them to the acquisition sensor seeking to authenticate themselves as legitimate users.
Depending on the trait used by the biometric authentication, the attack types vary with
the type of material used to build the synthetic samples. For instance, in facial biomet-
ric systems, an attempted attack is characterized by the type of material the impostor
uses such as a photograph, a digital video, or a 3D mask with the facial information of
a target user. In iris-based biometrics, presentation attacks can be accomplished with
printout photographs or with contact lenses containing the iris patterns of a target user
or even synthetic texture patterns. In fingerprint biometric systems, impostor users can
deceive the authentication process using replicas of the fingerprint patterns built with
synthetic materials such as latex, play-doh, silicone, among others. This research aimed
at developing presentation attack detection (PAD) solutions whose objective is to detect
attempted attacks considering different attack types, in each modality. The lines of inves-
tigation presented in this thesis aimed at devising and developing representations based
on spatial, temporal and spectral information from noise signature, intrinsic properties
of the biometric data (e.g., albedo, reflectance, and depth maps), and supervised feature
learning techniques, taking into account different testing scenarios including cross-sensor,
intra-, and inter-dataset scenarios. The main findings and contributions presented in this
thesis include: the creation of a large and publicly available benchmark containing 17K
videos of presentation attacks and bona-fide presentation simulations in a facial biomet-
ric system, whose collect were formally authorized by the Research Ethics Committee
at Unicamp; the development of novel approaches to modeling and analysis of extrinsic
properties of biometric samples related to artifacts added during the manufacturing of
the synthetic samples and their capture by the acquisition sensor, whose results were su-
perior to several approaches published in the literature that use traditional methods for
image analysis (e.g., texture-based analysis); the investigation of an approach based on
the analysis of intrinsic properties of faces, estimated from the information of shadows
present on their surface; and the investigation of different approaches to automatically
learning representations related to our problem, whose results were superior or compet-
itive to state-of-the-art methods for the biometric modalities considered in this thesis.
We also considered in this research the design of efficient neural networks with shallow
architectures capable of learning characteristics related to our problem from small sets of
data available to develop and evaluate PAD solutions.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
“One can only see what one observes, and one observes only things which are
already in the mind.”
—Alphonse Bertillon, French police officer & biometric researcher (1853–1914)
“A really intelligent nation might be held together by far stronger forces than
are derived from the purely gregarious instincts. A nation need not be a mob of
slaves, clinging to one another through fear, and for the most part incapable of
self-government, and begging to be led; but it might consist of vigorous
self-reliant men, knit to one another by innumerable ties, into a strong, tense,
and elastic organisation.”
—Sir Francis Galton, English sociologist, anthropologist, inventor, mathematician,
statistician, etc. (1822–1911)
THIS thesis addresses a still open problem in a subfield of the biometric researchrelated to security aspects of biometric systems, named as presentation attack de-
tection (PAD), which can be briefly described as the ability of detecting attempted attack
performed by an impostor user that seeks to deceive the authentication system by pre-
senting to the acquisition sensor a synthetic biometric sample of a legitimate user enrolled
in the system.
We organize this thesis as a compilation of articles published (or submitted for publica-
tion) in scientific journals containing proposals of algorithms and methodologies designed
to protect biometric systems against presentation attacks. In this chapter, we discuss the
basic concepts in biometrics and the benefits of its use to a reliable and transparent au-
thentication. Next, we discuss the limitations related to security aspects of such systems,
focusing on the presentation attacks vulnerability, as well as the hypotheses established
in this thesis, the main contributions of this research and their relationships with the
remaining chapters of this document.
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1.1 Basic Concepts in Biometrics
The protection of personal data has become a fundamental requirement of security. Ac-
cording to Tipton [250], information security is concerned with the development of meth-
ods and tools for protecting information and preserving the value it has for an individual
or an organization. For efficient and effective protection, the use of robust authentication
mechanisms is paramount.
Knowledge-based methods (e.g., password, secret question) and token-based methods
(e.g., smart cards, token codes) are probably the most used authentication mechanisms
to date. However, these methods have a critical feature: at the time of authentication,
the system does not verify who is requesting access, but rather what the users know or
possess. This aspect renders the system vulnerable since that knowledge or an object can
be easily lost, shared or manipulated. As an alternative, biometrics is an authentication
mechanism considered more natural and reliable as it focuses on verifying who is the
person requesting the access [109].
Biometrics provides methods to recognize humans automatically based on their behav-
ior, physical or chemical traits, being the fingerprint, face, iris, hand geometry, hand vein
and DNA, the most common traits used for deploying such systems [109]. According to
the nature of the application, we might have one or more traits more suitable to be used
in a biometric system. In forensic applications such as corpse identification, the DNA
might be a better choice to identify a victim due to the natural body’s deterioration. On
the other hand, in government applications (e.g., driver’s license, voting, border control),
face and fingerprint traits might be more suitable for authenticating users of the system
due to the ease in measuring these characteristics. Jain et al. [110] describe seven factors
that could help to determine the suitability of a trait to a biometric system: universality,
uniqueness, permanence, measurability, performance, acceptability, and circumvention.
Independent of the traits used to recognize a person, a biometric system can operate
in two modes, namely verification and identification modes. In the first mode of opera-
tion, the system recognizes a user, recovering the template that was previously extracted
and stored in a database, at the time of enrollment, and compares it with the template
extracted at the time of the authentication claim (query). This comparison is performed
by a matching algorithm that produces a similarity score that indicates whether the user
is who he claims to be, in the case in that the similarity score is higher than a threshold
preset for each user. In the second mode of operation, the system compares the query of
the user with N templates enrolled in the database. In this case, the matching algorithm
produces N similarity scores, such that a higher score indicates the identity of the user.
Figure 1.1 illustrates the architecture of a generic biometric system.
1.2 Presentation Attacks in Biometrics
Although several traits can be used in an authentication process, researchers are con-
stantly looking for biometric traits with low acquisition and storage costs, that are less
invasive, present a high degree of uniqueness and are stable. However, the static nature
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Figure 1.1: Overview of the authentication process in a generic biometric system. The
first stage consists of the enrollment process, in which a biometric sample of the user is
captured by the sensor, and submitted to the pre-processing module for noise removal,
enhancement of the data, among other features. Next, the pre-processed sample is used by
the feature extraction module responsible for extracting the main patterns and features
relevant to the authentication, generating a specific user template which is stored in
the database. In the second stage, when the user tries to authenticate, the template is
submitted to the matching algorithm that compares the input template with the ones
stored in the database. The red points represent some vulnerabilities when the biometric
system is unprotected against such threats (adapted from [202]).
of a stable biometric trait suggests “the paradox of secure biometrics” [167]:
“An authenticator must be stable and distinctive to be considered a good authen-
ticator. But, stability leaves no option for compromise recovery, since users
cannot change their biometric trait if stolen. Moreover, since a biometric clue
is not secret, its information can be learned and copied.”
Despite a stable biometric trait being an ideal authenticator, in practice, its use would
not work if it were learned or copied. Therefore, researchers have striven to develop
methods that detect whether a biometric sample presented to the acquisition sensor is a
replica of the original sample. In the literature, the act of presenting a synthetic biometric
sample of some genuine user to the acquisition sensor in order to authenticate itself as
a legitimate user is known as presentation attack. Figure 1.1 shows a general biometric
authentication system without any protective measure and some points of vulnerabilities.
In point (a), we have a threat resulting from an attack on the biometric sensor, presenting a
synthetic biometric sample (fake). In points (b), (c), (d), and (e), we have threats resulting
from re-submission of a biometric latent signal previously stored in the communication
channel. In (f), it can occur an attack on the matching algorithm in order to produce
a higher or lower score. In point (g), we have a threat on the communication channel
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between the enrollment center and the database (the control of this channel allows an
attacker to overwrite the template that is sent to the biometric database). In (h), we
have a threat on the database itself, which could result in corrupted models, denial of
service to the person associated to the corrupted model, or fraudulent authorization of an
individual. Finally, in point (i), we have a threat that consists of overwriting the output of
the matching algorithm, bypassing the authentication process. Other abuses in biometric
systems can be found in more details in Campisi [34].
Although effective in many situations, a biometric system should have protection
against presentation attacks. Erdogmus et al. [66] evaluated the behavior of a face
biometric system protected with an anti-spoofing solution proposed in [151] and Mi-
crosoft’s Kinect motion sensor under attempted attacks performed with static 3-D masks.
Kose et al. [127] demonstrated that the face verification system is vulnerable to presenta-
tion attacks. In addition, the same authors evaluated the anti-spoofing method proposed
in [151], which was proposed to detect photo-based attacks.
Besides these evidences made in laboratories about vulnerability of biometric systems
against presentation attacks, real cases confirm the problem. In the city of Ferraz de
Vasconcelos, São Paulo state, Brazil, a medical of the SAMU (service of mobile health
care and urgency) was caught red-handed by the police using silicone fingers to bypass the
authentication system and marking presences at work for co-workers [147]. A similar case
it has been investigated by the Federal Police, in which workers of the Paranaguá Harbor,
Paraná state, Brazil, where suspects used silicone fingers to circumvent the biometric
system for registering the worked hours of employees [35]. In Germany, the biometrics
hacking team of the Chaos Computer Club has managed to hack Apple’s iPhone Touch
ID [10], demonstrating that a biometric system without an adequate protection is unsuit-
able as an access control method. Other cases of impostors bypassing surveillance systems
with 3D masks can be found in [210,211].
In face of such overwhelming evidence of the need for more secure biometric systems
and effective detection of attacks, in this thesis, we investigate the presentation attack
problem considering the three different biometric traits: fingerprint, iris, and face. Among
several forms of biometrics, face recognition is of paramount importance with outstanding
solutions presented thus far such as deformable models [262], texture-based representa-
tions [2], and shape-based representations [145]. Although effective in many cases, ac-
cording to Maltoni et al. [153], face, signature and voice are the easiest biometric signals
to be circumvented. For instance, presentation attacks can be successfully accomplished
in a face biometric system if an impostor obtains access by presenting to the acquisition
sensor a photography, a digital video or a 3D model of the target person [109]. Even
with recent advances in biometrics, information forensics and security, the vulnerability
of facial biometric systems against presentation attacks is still an open problem.
Iris-based biometrics is another important modality used to recognize people. The
high accuracy rate and speed of iris-based recognition systems make them a promising
modality [109]. However, such modality is not free of presentation attacks, which are
normally performed using printed iris images [229] or, more interestingly, cosmetic contact
lenses [32, 264]. Finally, in fingerprint-based biometric systems, the most common pre-
sentation attack method consists of using synthetic samples [83] created in a cooperative
28
way, where a mold of the fingerprint is acquired with the cooperation of a valid user and
is used to replicate the user’s fingerprint with different materials, including gelatin, latex,
play-doh or silicone. Latent fingerprints left on a surface may also be used and further
enhanced after acquisition with a digital camera.
1.3 Research Vision: New Insights for the Presentation
Attack Detection Problem
During the production of synthetic biometric data, inevitably, there are noise information
and telltales added to the biometric signal that can be captured and further processed to
pinpoint attacks. In fact, in the manufacturing process of a synthetic sample, there are,
at least, two re-quantization and re-sampling steps of the original biometric signal. For
example, in the photo- and mask-based face presentation attacks, the continuous signal
is quantized and sampled during the digitization process. Then, this digital version is
re-quantized and re-sampled due to the printing process with 2D and 3D printers and
again digitized during the presentation of the synthetic data to the acquisition sensor.
In print-based iris presentation attacks, the process of generation of the synthetic sam-
ples are comparable to the photo-based face attempted attacks and, therefore, we also
may have noise and telltales upon synthetic data. In video-based face presentation at-
tacks, the continuous signal is digitized and recaptured by the acquisition sensor during
an attempted attack. The same reasoning can be applied to the fingerprint-based recog-
nition systems, considering the user cooperation scenario, or by using latent fingerprints.
Examples of artifacts and telltales of presentation attacks added in synthetics biometric
sample include blurring effects, printing artifacts, banding effects, distortions, flickering,
and Moiré patterns. Henceforward, we will refer to the noise and artifacts contained in a
presentation attack sample as a noise signature.
1.3.1 Problems with the Existing Approaches
The existing works in the literature for presentation attack detection basically explore
three lines of investigation: methods based on texture analysis [117,125,139,141,151,152,
181,214,245], based on motion and clues of the scene analysis [8,41,160,176,177,253,267,
274], and methods based on image quality [71,72,74,75].
Approaches based on motion and clues of the scene explore the motion information
inside the face region (e.g., eye blinks, small movements in the face region) and outside
of the face region (e.g., background). These methods estimate the motion information
present in these two regions and analyze them over time. Although this approach achieved
good results to detect photo-based presentation attacks, the constraints made by these
methods (e.g., static background) may render the detection of the video-based attempted
attacks unfeasible, in practice. Moreover, the assumption of a background previously
known can restrict the use of the approach since in many applications (e.g., web and
mobile applications) the data acquisition is performed remotely and, therefore, we cannot
assume that. Besides, motion is easily simulated by rotating or bending the photographs,
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which can potentially deceive the motion detectors. Another disadvantage of approaches
based on motion analysis is that the additional time required to capture some face motions
prevents a fast spoofing detection. For example, a type of motion analysis extensively
explored in the literature is the action of eye blink that occurs once every four or six
seconds. However, this rate can decrease to an average of three to eight every six seconds
due to psychological factors [140]. In this case, at least 20 seconds are required to detect
eye blinking.
Regarding methods based on texture analysis, their main drawback consists of pre-
senting poor results when we consider high-definition attempted attacks such as print-
based images with high-quality printouts and video attacks performed with high-resolution
screens. The attempted attacks performed with low-resolution printed images [36] pro-
duce a considerable amount of artifacts, which can be easily detected via texture analysis
from the original image space. In the video-based attempted attack, these coarse artifacts
are practically absent and, therefore, the proposal of more robust methods for detecting
these artifacts is necessary. This evidence was confirmed in the 2nd Competition for Face
Spoofing Attack [42] and is explored in this thesis.
Although existing PAD algorithms showed good performance results for the intra-
dataset evaluation protocol, in which the training and test partitions are from the same
dataset (i.e., same domain), the main drawbacks of the current PAD algorithms appear
when we consider more challenging protocols and testing scenarios such as inter-dataset
and cross-sensor scenarios. The inter-dataset protocol proposes the validation of a PAD
algorithm considering the training and testing stages in a completely different scenario
by establishing partitions for training and testing whose samples come from different
sources. In this case, we have sets for training and testing built in different conditions
(e.g., different sensors, different environments, without overlapping of identities, different
illumination conditions, different presentation attack instruments (PAI), different attack
types, among others). Similarly, the cross-sensor scenario considers testing sets comprising
data captured with a sensor, or set of sensors, different from those used for capturing
the training data. In this thesis, we also investigate the cross-sensor and inter-dataset
scenarios, since such evaluation protocols are more challenging and suitable for reflecting
a real operating scenario.
1.3.2 Hypothesis Statements
This thesis introduces alternatives for detecting presentation attacks, taking into account
our understanding of limitations of the current approaches and our understanding of the
problem itself. The thesis hypotheses presented in this section reflect directions of new
perspectives to deal with this problem:
Hypothesis 1: Noise signatures extracted of biometric samples contain meaningful tell-
tales for an effective presentation attack detection, in comparison to existing methods, due
to artifacts added to the synthetic biometric samples during its manufacturing process.
Hypothesis 2: Supervised feature learning techniques provide an effective representation
of data for detecting presentation attacks in different biometric modalities, in comparison
with existing techniques published in the literature.
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Hypothesis 3: Facial surfaces estimated with a shape-from-shading technique contain
distinguishable artifacts for a robust presentation attack detection, in comparison to exist-
ing methods, which are added during the manufacture of synthetic samples and magnified
throughout the surface reconstruction.
Hypothesis 4: Shallow Convolutional Neural Networks trained with visual characteri-
zations of the intrinsics properties of facial surfaces (i.e., albedo, reflectance, and depth
maps) provide an effective representation of data for detecting presentation attacks in
cross-domain scenarios, e.g., the inter-dataset scenario, in comparison to existing archi-
tectures published in the literature.
1.3.3 Novelties and Rationales Brought in this Thesis
The rationales that motivate us to formulate these hypotheses came from a careful analysis
of different results from the literature, which will be briefly explained in the next sections
and deeply discussed in the remaining chapters of this thesis.
Investigation of approaches based on temporal and spectral analysis
As mentioned before, synthetic biometric samples inevitably contain noise and artifacts
generated during their manufacture and recapture might be different from any pattern
found in real biometric samples. According to Tan et al. [245] and Määttä et al. [151], there
is a deterioration of the facial information and, consequently, a loss of some high frequency
components during the manufacture of photographs to be used in spoofing attacks. In
our prior work [193], we highlighted the fact that there is a significant increase of the low
frequency components due to the blurring effect added during the recapture process of
the biometric sample displayed in tablets, smartphones and laptop screens. Besides the
blurring effect, other artifacts are added such as flickering, Moiré patterns, and banding
effect [14].
These facts motivated us to propose a solution that takes advantage of the noise
signature contained on such presentation attack samples (Hypothesis 1). Chapters 2
and 3 propose a Fourier analysis of the noise signature to capture the information encoded
in the frequency, phase and amplitude of the component sinusoids [236]. In these chapters,
we use Fourier spectrum to quantify the following artifacts:
• Blurring artifact: In both production and recapture processes, inevitably we have a
decrease in the details of biometric samples due to re-quantization and re-sampling
of the original signal. This reduction of details is reflected in the increase of low
frequency components and can be observed in the Fourier domain;
• Flickering effect: It corresponds to the horizontal and vertical lines equally spaced
that appear during the recapture process of samples shown to the acquisition sensor
with the display device. When this artifact appears in biometric samples, there are
peak lines at abscissa and ordinate axes of the Fourier spectrum when the display
device is aligned with the acquisition sensor;
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• Moiré patterns: They are patterns that can appear when a display device is used to
perform an attempted attack. In general, this effect is generated when two similar
patterns are overlaid with a small difference in rotation from each other. As a result,
we also have the appearance of peaks in different locations in the Fourier spectrum
depending on the frequency and direction of the sinusoid in the spatial domain [236].
The main novelty brought in these studies are two-fold: (i) a new perspective of
using Fourier analysis to detect presentation attacks, which is performed upon the noise
signature extracted from the biometric sample under analysis; and (ii) novel techniques
for describing spectral information over time, which led us to propose some time-spectral
descriptors. Previous attempts of using the Fourier analysis in this problem [139,141,245],
considered its use on the original image representation, which turns this analysis highly
sensitive to illumination conditions and image resolutions [141] since these factors cause
a considerable disturbance in the frequency components of the Fourier spectrum. On the
other hand, our studies demonstrated that the spectral analysis is a powerful mathematical
tool for detecting presentation attacks if we consider the noise signature and discard the
contents of the images under analysis.
Investigation of supervised feature learning techniques for the PAD problem
across different biometric modalities
Inspired by Pinto et al. [196] and Bergstra et al. [21], this research investigated the Hy-
pothesis 2 considering three approaches to building convolutional networks: the archi-
tecture optimization-based approach, filter optimizations, and an interplay between these
two techniques.
The architecture optimization consists of exploring thousands of candidate models by
considering a search space for the parameters related to the architectural aspect (hyper-
parameters) of the networks. To enable a fast evaluation of a set of candidate models, we
skipped the filter learning process to the detriment of using filters with random weights.
In this work, we evaluate two strategies for searching good hyper-parameters, the random
search strategy and the Tree-structured Parzen Estimator Approach (TPE) [21]. On the
other hand, the filter optimization process is a traditional method for building convolu-
tional networks that consists of learning proper weights for the filters of the convolutional
layers.
Chapter 4 aims to investigate shallow convolutional neural networks (CNN) by con-
sidering these two strategies and their combination (Hypothesis 4). This study was
pioneered in exploring CNN for the presentation attack detection problem and the nov-
elty of this work consists of finding a shallow CNN, named SpoofNet, suitable for the three
modalities considered in this thesis (Hypothesis 2).
Finally, Chapter 5 introduces a methodology to adapt the Visual Geometry Group
(VGG) network [233], for automatically learning features for the presentation attack prob-
lem also considering the three modalities examined in this thesis (Hypothesis 2). The
main purpose of this chapter is to investigate the feature learning process, using a deep
CNN architecture, under the intra- and inter-dataset scenarios.
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Investigation of telltales of presentation attacks presented in the facial surface
reconstructed using shape-from-shading method
Chapter 6 presents an investigation of a novel approach to PAD based on the optical
and physical properties of the scene captured by the acquisition sensor (Hypothesis 3).
Our method takes advantage of the depth, reflection and albedo information, associating
them with light properties of the scene to detect an attempted attack. For estimating
these properties, we use a classic technique in computer vision known as shape-from-
shading (SfS) [99], which aims to reconstruct the surface of an object based on the shading
information present in its surface.
The law of refraction [249] (also known as Snell’s law or Snell–Descartes law) establish
an understanding of the physical mechanism of the light refraction, in terms of absorption
and irradiation of the light incident on a surface. Complementary, the reflection’s law
governs the reflection of the incident light and states that the incident ray, the reflected
ray, and the normal to smooth conducting surfaces (e.g., mirror or polished metal) all lie
in the same plane [249]. According to refraction and reflection laws, the beam of light
that affects a flat surface may be absorbed, transmitted, and reflected, and the directions
of the light refracted and reflected can be predicted considering the refraction index of the
material and the roughness of its surface, i.e., the smoothness or texture of the surface.
When a beam of light affects a truly flat surface, each incident ray is reflected at
the same angle that we have between the surface normal and such incident ray, but
on the opposite side of the surface normal. In contrast, when a beam of light affects
rough surfaces, the incident light is reflected in several different directions. An ideal
diffuse reflecting surface that reflects the incident light in all directions is said to exhibit a
Lambertian reflection. These two processes are known as specular and diffuse reflection,
respectively. Although many materials can exhibit both types of reflection, some materials
reflect the light in a way that is more diffuse than specular way (e.g., paper fibers, non-
absorbing powder such as plaster, poly-crystalline material such as white marble, among
others) [70, 116, 165, 252], which makes this property very promising to our problem.
Chapter 6 discusses this and other properties in detail.
The main novelties brought in this line of investigation include: (i) a novel PAD
algorithm able to detect evidence of attempted attacks, taking into account artifacts
present in the reconstructed surface; (ii) the use of the depth information without using
any extra device, which enables the use of our approach in biometric systems equipped
with a single RGB camera; (iii) promising performance results for detection through the
intra- and inter-dataset scenarios; and (iv) a novel shallow CNN architecture for learning
features from the albedo, reflectance and depth maps (Hypothesis 4, which was also an
object of investigation in Chapter 6).
1.4 Key Contributions
Figure 1.2 summarizes the main contributions of this thesis, as well the main challenges
and advancements achieved in each step of this research. The other contributions obtained
along this thesis will be discussed in their respective chapters.
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Contribution 1. A new algorithm that takes advantage of the spectral analysis of the
noise signature of the video under analysis and the summarization technique, namely vi-
sual rhythm, to generate discriminative texture maps able to reveal attempted attacks.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first method published in the literature that
uses noise signature information to detect face presentation attacks, giving new alterna-
tives to solve the problem. We summarize the main progresses obtained in this study in
Advancement 2 and 4, described in Fig. 1.2 (see Chapter 2 for more detail).
Contribution 2. An effective method for face presentation attack detection able to rec-
ognize different types of attacks, including video-, photo- and 3-D mask-based attempted
attacks. We present an effective algorithm based on spectral analysis of the noise sig-
nature that takes advantage of the spectral and temporal information that outperforms
the current state-of-the-art methods to detect face presentation attacks based on tex-
ture and motion analysis. The foremost advance achieved in this work was the design
of an effective time-spectral descriptor, showing that the noise signal analysis is in fact
an important source of evidence for designing new anti-spoofing algorithms. The most
expressive progresses achieved in this study are summarized in Advancement 3 and 4
(see Chapter 3).
Contribution 3. A unified framework able to detect presentation attacks in face-,
fingerprint- and iris-based biometric systems based on deep learning techniques. In this
work, we show effective learning representation strategies for the modalities of biometrics
we consider herein. The proposed unified framework was effective when tested with small
datasets. We proposed three deep feature characterization architectures based on Con-
volutional Neural Networks, one for each modality, that outperform several anti-spoofing
methods published in the literature. We summarized the main progresses obtained in this
study in Advancement 5 and 7 (see Chapter 4 for more details).
Contribution 4. The proposal of an anti-spoofing solution for the three modalities
widely employed to design biometric systems, i.e., face, iris, and fingerprint, based on
VGG network architecture, a popular deep network originally proposed for the object
recognition problem. In this study, we showed a methodology to adapt the VGG network
to the two-class presentation attack problem, which was evaluated by considering the
most challenging scenarios such as classification across different attack types, biometric
sensors, and qualities of samples used during the attacks, besides presenting performance
results for the intra- and inter-dataset scenarios. The main progresses achieved in this
study are presented in Advancement 6 and 7 (see Chapter 5 for more details).
Contribution 5. An effective PAD solution that takes advantage of intrinsic properties
of the objects of interest (in our case, we deal with faces) such as reflectance, albedo
and depth information to a reveal attempted attack. We propose the use of a shape-
from-shading technique to reconstruct facial surfaces in order to highlight telltales of
presentation attacks present in the biometric samples. Our results show that the proposed
algorithm works well for detecting different attack types even considering more challenging
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operation scenarios, simulated with tests considering the multi-sensor scenario and the
inter-dataset protocol evaluation. We summarized the main progresses achieved in this
study in Advancement 8 and 9 (see Chapter 6 for more details).
Contribution 6. An effective shallow CNN architecture suitable for learning mean-
ingful features from the surfaces reconstructed with a shape-from-shading method. A
comparison between the proposed shallow CNN architecture and some popular deep ar-
chitecture that demonstrated the effectiveness of our CNN architecture for learning useful
patterns to our problem, even considering the multi-sensor and inter-dataset scenarios.
The main expressive progresses achieved in this study are summarized in Advancement
10 and 11 (see Chapter 6 for more details).
Contribution 7. The creation of a large and publicly available benchmark consider-
ing several display devices and different acquisition sensors. This dataset contains 808
valid access videos and 16, 268 videos of video-based presentation attacks, all in full high-
definition quality, captured from 404 people1. This is the largest and the first multi
sensor-based dataset to evaluate face anti-spoofing methods, whose valid access and at-
tempted attack videos were captured with six sensors of different manufacturers. This
dataset allowed us to achieve an important conclusion, not yet reported in the literature,
regarding the possible impact/influence of the sensor upon the performance of a presen-
tation attack detection system. We summarized the main progress obtained in this study
in Advancement 1 (see Chapter 2 for more details).
1.5 Thesis Organization
We organized this thesis as a compilation of articles published (or submitted for publica-
tion) in international scientific venues in the area of Information Forensics and Security,
Image Processing and Neural Networks and Learning Systems. In total, we published the
results achieved in this thesis in three journals, one chapter of a book, and one manuscript
submitted for publishing, also in a journal. Chapter 2 presents a proposed method for
face presentation attack detection based on a summarization technique, namely visual
rhythm, which takes advantage of the spectral and temporal information by analyzing
the noise signatures generated by the video acquisition process. Chapter 3 describes an
effective time-spectral descriptor for face presentation attack detection able to character-
ize telltales present in both spectral and temporal domains, which proved to be a very
effective approach to detect attempted attacks performed with different type of attacks
(e.g., printed photos, replay attack and 3D mask). Chapters 4 and 5 present a unified
solution able to detecting attempted attacks in face-, iris- and fingerprint-based biometric
systems, while Chapter 6 introduces a PAD algorithm that takes advantage of intrin-
sic properties of the facial surfaces. Finally, Chapter 7 presents conclusions and final
remarks of the research presented in this thesis.
1The users present in the database formally authorized the release of their data for scientific purposes
(see Appendix A).
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The current public datasets have drawbacks in 
terms of sample size and diversity in sensors. So, 
we built a large and public dataset, with more 
than 17K videos captured with six different 
sensors of 404 identities.
Advancement 1: The release of a large and 
public dataset for evaluating anti-spoofing 
methods for face-based biometrics 
(Contribution 5, Chapter 2).
Investigation of new representation 
techniques for noise patterns, based on visual 
codebook, that incorporates spectral and 
temporal information of the signal under 
analysis.
Advancement 2: The proposal of an effective 
anti-spoofing method for face-based biometric 
systems based on visual rhythm technique 
(Contribution 1, Chapter 2).
Advancement 3: The proposal of a new 
effective strategy for detecting attempted 
attacks in face authentication systems based 
on visual condebooks of spectral temporal 
features (Contribution 2, Chapter 3).
Advancement 4: The achievement of results 
that corroborate the   Hypothesis 1.
The investigation of different approaches to 
designing a Convolutional Neural Network (CNN) 
architecture appropriate for the PAD problem, 
considering the three modalities under 
investigation in this thesis.
Advancement 5: The proposal of a unified 
framework to design PAD solutions based on 
shallow CNN networks, which allow us to find a 
suitable network, the SpoofNet, able to detect 
different attack types on different modalities 
(Contribution 3, Chapter 4).
Advancement 6: A methodology for adapting 
the VGG network to the two-class presentation 
attack problem considering several testing 
scenarios such as different attack types, 
biometric sensors, and the inter-dataset scenario 
(Contribution 4, Chapter 5).
Advancement 7: The achievement of results 
present in Chapters 4 and 5 corroborates the 
Hypothesis 2.
The investigation of a shape-from-shading 
technique to reconstruct the face surfaces in 
order to estimate their properties such as albedo, 
reflectance, and depth information
Advancement 8: The novel face presentation 
attack detection algorithm able to identify 
different attack types, which presented good 
perfomance results even considering the cross-
sensor and inter-dataset scenarios 
(Contribution 5, Chapter 6).
Advancement 9: The achievement of results 
that corroborate the Hypothesis 3.
RQ2: How to model the noise 
signature toward revealing useful 
telltales for detecting a 
presentation attack?
Remark: The main challenge is 
to discover new patterns in the 
noise signal recaptured from 
videos useful for the problem.
New question
Action
Action
New question
RQ4: Can the optical and physical 
properties of the scene allow us  to 
detect differences between 
synthetic faces (e.g., sintetic 
materials) and real ones (e.g., skin 
texture)?
Remark: The main challenge is to 
infer intrinsic properties of the 
scene, 3-D structure of the world 
from 2-D images, in a real problem
RQ3: Is it possible to design an 
effective algorithm or methodology 
using representation learning (RL) 
techniques toward finding a 
holistic solution able to detect 
spoofing attacks in face, iris and fingerprint recognition systems?
Remark: The main challenge is 
how to handle small datasets since 
that RL needs large datasets to 
learn discriminative representa-
tions.
Action
Action
New question
RQ1: What is the influence of the 
biometric sensors upon the 
performance of a system?
Remark: The main challenge is 
how to deal with data from multiple 
sources.
RQ5: How to extract meaningful 
features from the different maps 
obtained from the face surfaces 
reconstruction?
Remark: The main challenge is finding holistic method to deal with 
these different representations.
New question
Action
The investigation of shallow and deep CNN 
architectures for representation learning from 
the albedo, reflectance, and depth maps.
Advancement 10: A novel CNN architecture 
able to learn meaningfull features for the PAD 
problem considering the different maps obtained 
from surface reconstruction process   
(Contribution 6, Chapter 6).
Advancement 11: The achievement of results 
that corroborate the Hypothesis 4.
Figure 1.2: This roadmap shows the main contributions of this thesis, Research Questions
(RQs) driving our research, main challenges and advancements achieved in our work.
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Chapter 2
Using Visual Rhythms for Detecting
Video-based Facial Spoof Attacks
“When you run by yourself, you go fast; But when you run with others, you
can go so far.”
—Maggie MacDonnell, Global Teacher Prize 2017 Winner
“The art and science of asking questions is the source of all knowledge.”
—Thomas Berger, American novelist (1924–2014)
Abstract
Spoofing attacks or impersonation can be easily accomplished in a facial biometric sys-
tem wherein users without access privileges attempt to authenticate themselves as valid
users, in which an impostor needs only a photograph or a video with facial informa-
tion of a legitimate user. Even with recent advances in biometrics, information forensics
and security, vulnerability of facial biometric systems against spoofing attacks is still an
open problem. Even though several methods have been proposed for photo-based spoof-
ing attack detection, attacks performed with videos have been vastly overlooked, which
hinders the use of the facial biometric systems in modern applications. In this paper,
we present an algorithm for video-based spoofing attack detection through the analysis
of global information which is invariant to content, since we discard video contents and
analyze content-independent noise signatures present in the video related to the unique
acquisition processes. Our approach takes advantage of noise signatures generated by
c©2015 IEEE. Personal use of this material is permitted. Permission from IEEE must be obtained
for all other uses, in any current or future media, including reprinting/republishing this material for
advertising or promotional purposes, creating new collective works, for resale or redistribution to servers
or lists, or reuse of any copyrighted component of this work in other works.
Pre-print of article that will appear in T-IFS, vol.10, no.5, pp.1025-1038, May 2015.
The published article is available on http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/TIFS.2015.2395139
See permission to use the copyrighted material in Appendix C.
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the recaptured video to distinguish between fake and valid access videos. For that, we
use the Fourier spectrum followed by the computation of video visual rhythms and the
extraction of different characterization methods. For evaluation, we consider the novel
Unicamp Video-Attack Database (UVAD) which comprises 17,076 videos composed of real
access and spoofing attack videos. In addition, we evaluate the proposed method using
the Replay-Attack Database, which contains photo-based and video-based face spoofing
attacks.
2.1 Introduction
B IOMETRIC authentication is an important mechanism for access control that hasbeen used in many applications. Traditional methods, including the ones based
on knowledge (e.g., keywords, secret question) or based on tokens (e.g., smart cards),
might be ineffective since they are easily shared, lost, stolen or manipulated. In contrast,
the biometric access control has been shown as a natural and reliable authentication
method [107].
Access control can be seen as a verification problem wherein the authentication of a
user is performed by reading and comparing the input biometric data captured by an
acquisition sensor (query) with the biometric data of the same user previously stored in a
database (template). The comparison between the query and the template is performed
by a matching algorithm which produces a similarity score used to decide whether or not
the access should be granted to the user.
Although biometric authentication is considered a secure and reliable access control
mechanism, it becomes an easy target for attacks if protective measures are not imple-
mented. Fig. 2.1 shows a general biometric authentication system without any protective
measure and some points of vulnerabilities. Buhan et al. [33] provide more details about
abuses in biometric systems.
Spoofing attack is a type of attack wherein an impostor presents a fake biometric data
to the acquisition sensor with the goal of authenticating oneself as a legitimate user (this
action can be seen as an impersonation attack), illustrated in Fig. 2.1(a). Depending on
the biometric trait used by the system, this mode of attack can be easily accomplished
because some biometric data can be synthetically reproduced without much effort. Face
biometric systems are highly vulnerable to such attacks since facial traits are widely
available on the Internet, on personal websites and social networks such as Facebook1,
MySpace2, YouTube3. In addition, we can easily collect facial samples of a person with a
digital camera.
In the context of face biometrics, a spoofing attack can be attempted by presenting
to the acquisition sensor a photograph, a video or a 3D face model of a legitimate user
enrolled in the database. If an impostor succeeds in the attack using any of these ap-
proaches, the uniqueness premise of the biometric system or its raison d’être is violated,
making the system vulnerable [107].
1http://www.facebook.com
2http://www.myspace.com
3http://www.youtube.com
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Figure 2.1: General biometric system and its vulnerability points. (a) a threat resulting
from an attack on the biometric sensor, presenting a synthetic biometric data (fake); (b),
(c) and (d) represent threats resulting from re-submission of a biometric latent signal
previously stored in the communication channel; (e) attack on the matching algorithm
in order to produce a higher or lower score; (f) an attack on the communication channel
between the enrollment center and the database (the control of this channel allows an
attacker to overwrite the template that is sent to the biometric database); (g) an attack
on the database itself, which could result in corrupted models, denial of service to the
person associated to the corrupted model, or fraudulent authorization of an individual;
(h) an attack that consists of overwriting the output of the matching algorithm, bypassing
the authentication process.
Several methods have been proposed in the literature to detect spoofing attacks based
on photographs, whereas attacks performed with videos and 3D models have been over-
looked. Many methods aim at distinguishing real from fake biometric data based on the
fact that artifacts are inserted into the printed samples due to printing process, therefore
allowing one to explore attributes related to such artifacts including color, shape and
texture [151, 214, 245]. Since photographs are static, another approach is to detect small
movements in the face [140,176,263]. Recent works [8,177] investigate context information
of the scene (e.g., background information) to detect face liveness.
We believe that the aforementioned approaches are not suitable for detecting video-
based attacks directly, especially in high resolution videos. The difficulty in detecting
spoofing performed by video lies in the fact that it is easier to deceive an authentication
system through a video since the dynamics of the video makes the biometric data more
realistic. Furthermore, the content of a video is less affected by degradations in terms of
color, shape or texture, unlike the printed images. Finally, we have less artifacts generated
during quantization and discretization of the image captured by the imaging sensor in high
resolution videos.
In this paper, we present a method for detecting video-based face spoofing attacks
under the hypothesis that fake and real biometric data contain different acquisition-related
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noise signatures. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first attempt of dealing with
video-based face spoofing using analysis of global information that is invariant to the video
content. Our solution explores the artifacts added to the biometric samples during the
viewing process of the videos in the display devices and noise signatures added during the
recapture process performed by the acquisition sensor of the biometric system. Through
the spectral analysis of the noise signature and the use of visual rhythms, we designed a
feature characterization process able to incorporate temporal information of the behavior
of the noise signal from the biometric samples.
In a previous work [193], we introduced an anti-spoofing solution that was evaluated
in an extended version of the Print-Attack database [8] given that, in the literature,
there was no specific database to video-based face spoofing attacks. Originally, the Print-
Attack database was developed to be used in the evaluation of photograph-based spoofing
attack detection. As our aim in that work was also at video-based spoofing detection, we
simulated attempts of spoofing attacks using 100 videos of valid access in six monitors,
generating 600 attempted attack videos. We reported near-perfect classification results
(AUC ≈ 100%). That is due to the low resolution of original videos, which favored the
high performance of our method, since noise signal was the main information used in it.
Furthermore, in a more realistic attack, an impostor probably would create fake biometric
samples with the highest quality possible in order to minimize the differences between real
and fake biometric samples.
To contemplate a more realistic scenario, this work extends upon our previous work [193]
and also introduces the Unicamp Video-Based Attack Database (UVAD) 4, specifically
developed to evaluate video-based attacks in order to verify the following aspects:
• The behavior of the method for attempted attacks with high resolution videos;
• The influence of the display devices in our method;
• The influence of the biometric sensor in the proposed method;
• The best feature characterization to capture the video artifacts;
• Comparison with one of the best anti-spoofing methods for photo-based spoofing
attack of notice.
Such verifications can be accomplished due to the diversity of the devices used to create
the database which comprises valid access and attempted attack videos of 404 different
people. Each user was filmed in two sections in different scenarios and lighting conditions.
The attempted attack videos were produced using seven different display devices and six
digital cameras from different manufacturers. The database has 808 valid access videos
and 16, 268 videos of video-based attempted spoofing attacks, all in full high definition
quality.
In summary, the main contributions of this work are:
4This database will be make public and freely available. Users present in the database formally
authorized the release of their data for scientific purposes (see Appendix A).
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(i) An efficient and effective method for video-based face spoofing attack detection able
to recognize attempted attacks carried out with high-resolution videos;
(ii) The evaluation of the video characterization process considering different image
features such as the Gray-Level Co-occurrence Matrices (GLCM), Histograms of
Oriented Gradients (HOG) and Local Binary Patterns Histogram (LBP) feature
descriptors;
(iii) The creation of a large and publicly available benchmark to evaluate anti-spoofing
methods performed with videos considering several display devices and different
acquisition sensors;
(iv) A detailed study of the video-based spoofing attack problem that yielded important
conclusions that certainly will be useful for the proposition of new anti-spoofing
methods for video-based attacks not only in the biometric domain but also in other
applications analyzing video recapture footprints.
We organize the remainder of this paper into five sections. Section 2.2 discusses
state-of-the-art methods for detecting spoofing attacks to face biometrics. Section 2.3
presents the proposed method. Section 2.4 gives details regarding the proposed video-
attack database while Section 2.5 shows and discusses the experimental results. Finally,
Section 2.6 presents the conclusions obtained with this work.
2.2 Related Work
According to Pan et al. [175], there are four major categories of anti-spoofing methods:
data-driven characterization, user behavior modeling, user interaction need, and the pres-
ence of additional devices. Solutions that require extra devices are limited due to their
high cost, which can prevent large-scale use (e.g., deployment of an anti-spoofing solution
on all ATMs of a banking network). The user cooperation during the biometric authen-
tication can also be used to facilitate spoofing attack detection, however, this procedure
lessens the transparency and inserts an additional time in the authentication process. Fi-
nally, the user behavior modeling approach (e.g., eye blinking, small face movements) has
been considered in the literature for photo-based face spoofing detection, nevertheless,
this approach might not work well for video-based spoofing attack detection due to the
high dynamics present in video scenes. Solutions based on data-driven characterization
explore biometric data by thoroughly searching for evidence and artifacts useful to detect
attempted attacks.
In this section, we review the literature on user behavior modeling and data-driven
characterization methods, since such methods are preferable in practice because they are
non-intrusive and do not require extra devices or human interaction. Therefore, they are
easily integrable with existing face recognition systems. In this category, there are several
methods for photo-based spoofing attack detection that explore clues such as motion and
frequency analysis, scene information, and texture. Before going any further, however, we
first present some available face-related spoofing databases in the literature since most of
the methods use one or some of such reference benchmarks.
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2.2.1 Existing Databases
NUAA Database
The NUAA Photograph impostor database [245] comprises 5, 105 valid access images and
7, 509 fake images collected with a generic webcam. The images of valid access were
collected of 15 identities in three sections in different places and illumination conditions,
all with 640 × 480 pixel resolution. The production of the fake samples were done by
taking high resolution photographs of 15 identities with a Canon digital camera. The
authors simulated two attack modes: (1) printing photographs on photo paper; and (2)
printing the photographs on A4 paper using an HP color printer.
Print-Attack Database
The Print-Attack database [8] contains short videos of valid access and photo-based spoof-
ing attacks of 50 identities. The valid access videos were generated in controlled and un-
controlled illumination conditions. All videos are in 320× 240 pixel resolution, 25 frames
per second (fps) and 15 seconds of duration. The attempted attack videos were generated
by taking two high resolution photographs with a Canon PowerShot digital camera of the
50 identities printed on common A4 papers. The attempted attack videos were produced
showing the photographs to a webcam considering two attack modes: (1) hand-based
attacks wherein the impostor user presents the photographs using her own hands; and
(2) fixed-support attacks in which the photographs were glued on a wall so that they
do not move during the attempted attacks. In total, 200 access valid videos and 200
attempted attack videos were generated.
CASIA Database
The CASIA database [274] comprises 600 video clips of 50 identities. The videos were
filmed in a natural scene with three cameras: a new and an old USB camera both with
640 × 480 pixel resolution and a Sony NEX-5 digital camera with 1, 920 × 1, 080 pixels
of resolution. The database contains three attack modes: (1) warped photo attack; (150
640×480-attempted attack videos); (2) cut photo attack (150 640×480-attempted attack
videos); and (3) video playback using an iPad (150 1, 280×720-attempted attack videos).
Some limitations of this database include: the authors failed to prevent the downsizing
of the videos shown during the simulation of the video-based spoofing attacks. Such
downsizing adds artifacts to the attempted attack videos that are not present in the valid
access videos, creating an artificial data separability. Furthermore, the small amount of
data and the use of only one device in the creation of the video-based spoofing attacks
prevent more refined investigations.
Replay-Attack Database
The Replay-Attack database [41] contains short video recordings of valid access and at-
tempted attacks of 50 identities. Similar to the Print-Attack [8], the videos were generated
with a low resolution webcam with 320 × 240 pixel resolution, 25 fps and 15 seconds of
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duration and the video capture process is the same as described in [8]. However, different
from [8], two other attempted attack modes are considered: (1) mobile attacks where the
impostor user displays photographs and videos in an iPhone screen produced with the
same iPhone; and (2) high-definition attacks where the impostor user shows high resolu-
tion photographs and videos produced with a Canon PowerShot digital camera using the
screen of a 1024× 768-pixel resolution iPad.
2.2.2 Motion Analysis and Clues of the Scene
Motion analysis of the face region was an early approach used to detect the liveness of
biometric samples. In [176], Pan et al. investigated the action of eye blinking to detect
attacks performed with photographs. The authors proposed the use of the undirected
conditional random field framework to model the action of opening and closing eyes.
Tests were performed in a database with 80 videos and 20 identities using a webcam. The
authors reported a false alarm rate smaller than 1%. Similarly, Li et al. [140] proposed
a method for detecting a person’s eye blink based on the fact that edges vary homo-
responsively to the behavior of eye blink over some scales and orientations. Analyzing the
trends of Gabor response waves in multi-scale and multi-orientation, the authors choose
the five most homo-responsive Gabor response waves to the behavior of eye blink.
In [263], Xu et al. proposed a method for detecting the eye states formulated as
a binary classification problem in which the closed state represents the positive class
and the open state the negative class. The authors scan the region of the eyes with N
blocks of different sizes for each biometric sample. For each block, three different feature
vectors were extracted by using variants of the Local Binary Pattern Histogram method,
generating three sets with N feature vectors. The authors collected 11, 165 images from
which 5, 786 were used in the training stage. The best reported detection rate was 98.3%.
Tronci et al. [253] explored the motion information and clues that are extracted from
the scene considering static and video-based analyses. A static analysis consists of cap-
turing spatial information of the still images using different visual features as color and
edge directivity descriptor, fuzzy color and texture histogram among others. The analysis
is motivated by the loss of quality and by the addition of noise in the biometric samples
during the manufacturing process of the photographs. Video-based analysis is performed
as a combination of simple measures of motion such as eye blink, mouth movement, facial
expression change among others. In the end, a classifier is trained for each feature with
the aid of a fusion scheme for determining spoofing attacks.
Pan et al. [177] extended upon [176] by including context information of the scene. The
authors analyzed clues such as eye blink in the face region. They extracted a set of key
points and calculated a Local Binary Pattern Histogram (LBP) around such points and
used . the χ2 distance function to compare histograms to reference patterns previously
calculated.
Anjos et al. [8] proposed a database and a method for photo-based spoofing attack
detection assuming a stationary facial recognition system. In this case, the intensity of
the relative motion between the region of the face and the background can be used as a
clue to distinguish valid access of attempted attacks. The authors calculate a measure of
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motion for each video frame obtaining a one-dimensional signal, which is described by the
extraction of five measures to form a feature vector. The authors validated the method
through the Print-Attack database (c.f., Sec. 2.2.1).
Yan et al. [267] proposed a method for liveness detection based on three scene clues in
both spatial and temporal spaces. According to the authors, the non-rigid facial motion
and the face-background consistency incorporate temporal information that can help the
decision-making process regarding the face liveness. The authors seek a pattern of non-
rigid motion in the face region using the batch image alignment method. The face-
background consistency is based on the fact that if the face is real, its motion must be
totally independent of the background and is performed by separating the region of the
face from background and analyzing the motion. Finally, the authors perform a banding
artifact analysis, which are treated as additive noise. For that, the authors calculated
the first order wavelet decomposition of the image. The authors validated the method
through the Print-Attack database (c.f., Sec. 2.2.1) as well as others created by them.
Good results were reported.
2.2.3 Texture and Frequency Analysis
Li et al. [141] proposed an anti-spoofing method for photo-based attempted attacks under
the assumption that the faces present in photographs are smaller than the real faces and
that the expressions and poses of the faces in the photographs are invariant. The detection
of an attack through photographs is performed by analyzing the 2-D Fourier spectrum of
the samples and calculating the energy rate of the high frequency components, which is
used as a threshold to decide whether the biometric sample came from a fake face or not.
In [245], Tan et al. dealt with printed photographs attacks by assuming that the surface
roughness of real and photo-attack classes are different. The authors proposed the use of
the Variational Retinex-based and Logarithmic Total Variation methods for estimating
the luminance and reflectance of an input image, respectively. The authors modeled
the detection problem as a binary classification problem and evaluated the use of the
Sparse Logistic Regression and Sparse Low Rank Bilinear Logistic Regression methods for
classifying the luminance, reflectance, and Fourier spectrum images previously estimated.
The authors validated the method through the NUAA Photograph impostor database
(c.f., Sec. 2.2.1). Peixoto et al. [181] extended upon [245] by incorporating methods
for dealing with different illumination conditions. The reported results showed that the
proposed extension reduced the misclassification in more than 50% to attempted attacks
with high resolution photographs of the NUAA database.
Määttä et al. [151] proposed a method for photo-based spoofing based on the fact that
real and fake biometric facial samples differ: (1) in how these objects reflect light (human
faces are 3D objects while printed faces are planar objects); (2) in the pigmentation; and
(3) in the quality due to printing defects contained in the photographs. The authors used
the LBP method for capturing micro-texture information. Thet evaluated the algorithm
through the NUAA database (c.f. Sec. 2.2.1), obtaining an AUC of 99%. In [152], the
same authors extended their algorithm for considering Histogram of Oriented Gradient
(HOG) and the Gabor wavelet descriptors.
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Schwartz et al. [214] proposed an anti-spoofing solution for photo-based attacks ex-
ploring different properties of the face region (texture, color and shape) to obtain a holistic
face representation. Considering only the face region, for each frame of the video con-
taining the facial information, we generate a feature vector formed by combining different
low-level feature descriptors as Histogram of Oriented Gradients (HOG), Color Frequency
(CF), Gray Level Co-occurrence Matrix (GLCM), and Histograms of Shearlet Coefficients
(HSC). Then, the feature vectors are combined into one feature vector containing a rich
spatial-temporal information of the biometric sample and fed to a Partial Least Square
classification technique.
In [117], Kim et al. explored two key observations: (1) the difference in the existence
of 3D shapes leads to the difference in low frequency regions which is closely related to
the luminance component; and (2) the difference between real and fake faces generates a
disparity in the high frequency information. The motivation for using texture information
lies in the fact that printed faces tend to loose the richness of texture details. Their method
extracts a feature vector from each biometric sample by transforming the images to the
frequency domain and calculating their respective Fourier spectrum on logarithmic scale,
from which average values of the energy of 32 concentric rings are extracted.
Recently, Zhang et al. [274] proposed a simple algorithm for detecting photo-based at-
tempted spoofing attacks based on the fact that fake faces present lower quality compared
with real faces. For a given image captured by the acquisition sensor, four Difference of
Gaussian filters (DoG) with different values of σ were used to extract high frequency
information, generating four new images that were concatenated and used as input of a
binary classifier trained using the Support Vector Machine (SVM) technique.
In [41], Anjos et al. conducted a study to investigate the potential of texture de-
scriptors based on Local Binary Pattern (LBP), such as LBPu23×3, transitional (tLBP),
direction-coded (dLBP) and modified LBP (mLBP). From the histograms generated from
the descriptors mentioned above, the authors evaluated a simple manner to classify them
based on histogram comparisons through χ2 distance. A set of classifiers was considered,
such as Linear Discriminant Analysis (LDA) and Support Vector Machine (SVM) with a
radial basis function as kernel. Evaluations were performed on the NUAA, Print-Attack,
and Replay-Attack databases (c.f., Sec. 2.2.1).
2.2.4 Other Approaches
Optical flow analysis has also been considered in the literature for photo-based spoofing
attack detection. Bao et al. [13] proposed an anti-spoofing solution based on the analysis
of the characteristics of the optical flow field generated for a planar and 3D object.
Unlike the faces contained in photographs, which are regular planar objects, real faces
are irregular and 3D objects, which lead to a differentiation between the optical flow fields
generated for real and fake faces. In [123], Kollreider et al. analyzed the trajectory of
three parts of the face: the region between eyes and nose, left ear, and right ear. Using
optical flow patterns and a model based on Gabor decomposition, the authors note that,
in real faces, these parts of the face move differently from fake faces.
Marsico et al. [62] proposed an anti-spoofing solution based on the theory of 3D pro-
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jective invariants. By the fundamental theorem of the invariant geometry, it is possible
to show that the cross ratio of five points on the same plane are invariant to rotations if
and only if the these points satisfy specific collinearity or co-planarity constrains. Thus,
six cross-ratio measures are computed to different configurations of points located in non-
coplanar regions of the face (e.g. center of eyes, nose tip and chin). If a pose of the face
located in front of the acquisition sensor changes, but the computed cross ratio remains
constant, the points must be coplanar (i.e., they belong to a planar fake face).
Finally, recent works have been developed in order to evaluate spoofing attacks in
multi-modal biometric systems including [3, 4, 25, 26, 157]. In these works, the authors
investigate robust fusion schemes for spoofing attacks considering face and fingerprint
biometric traits.
2.2.5 Problems with the Existing Approaches
Approaches based on clues of the scene have strong constraints that make sense only to
photo-based spoofing attacks. In the case of attacks performed by video, such constraints
certainly will fail due to the dynamic nature of the scene in this type of media (e.g.,
motion). The static background assumption made in some works described earlier is
limited since the face moves independently of the background in a video-based attempted
spoofing attack. Moreover, the assumption of a background previously known restricts
the use of the method since in many applications (e.g., web and mobile applications)
the data acquisition is performed remotely in an environment and, therefore, we can not
assume a previously known background. Finally, we can easily change the background of
an image through image manipulation.
In approaches based on optical flow and motion analysis, motion is easily simulated
by rotating or bending the photographs. Moreover, such methods should be evaluated
by considering video-based attempted spoofing attacks since these media carries motion
information and, therefore, has potential to deceive such methods. Another disadvantage
of approaches based on motion analysis is that the additional time required to capture
some face motions prevents a fast spoofing detection. For example, a type of motion
analyses extensively explored in the literature is the action of eye blink that occurs once
every four or six seconds. However, this rate can be reduced to an average of three to
eight every six seconds due to psychological factors [140]. In this case, at least 20 seconds
are required to detect eye blinking.
Finally, methods based on texture analysis should consider attempted attacks per-
formed with high resolution videos. Photo-based spoofing attacks have a characteristic
that facilitates the detection of this type of attack, which is absent in video-based spoof-
ing attacks: the decrease of quality of the biometric sample due to the printing process,
since printers have limitations both in terms of resolution and number of colors that can
be produced, which directly influence the texture of the biometric sample, being easily
captured by texture information.
Finally, the method proposed in this work aims at overcoming such difficulties by
capturing acquisition-related noise information features generated by the video recapture.
As the noise signal is independent of the image signal, our method explores this fact by
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isolating the noise, so it tends to be less dependent of the video content. Furthermore,
our method requires only 50 frames (≈ 2 seconds) for detecting an attempted attack.
2.3 Proposed Method
Here, we present an algorithm for video-based attempted spoofing attack detection. Our
solution relies on the fact that the addition of a noise pattern in the samples is inevitable
during the acquisition step of the facial biometric samples.
The acquisition process is performed by a camera that has an imaging sensor with
thousands of photosensitive transducers that convert light energy into electrical charges,
which are converted into a digital signal by an A/D converter. In [150], Lukäs et al.
define two types of noise that can be present in an image: the fixed pattern noise (FPN)
and the noise resulting from the photo-responsiveness of non-uniform light-sensitive cells
(PRNU). The noise pattern has been widely explored in digital document forensics as in
the problem of identifying the specific camera that acquired a document [150,215].
During a video-based spoofing attack, we have the insertion of artifacts in the biomet-
ric samples captured by the acquisition sensor, such as distortions, flickering, mooring,
and banding effect [14]. Such artifacts, loosely referenced in this paper as noise, are added
during the generation and viewing process of the attack video frames in display device
screens. Thus, the biometric sample extracted from an attack video will probably contain
more noise than the real biometric samples. With this in mind, we design a feature char-
acterization process based on noise signatures along with video summarization methods
that are used by a classification algorithm to find a separation decision boundary between
real and fake biometric data. Fig. 2.2 summarizes the steps of the proposed method,
which are explained in detail in the following sections.
Figure 2.2: Proposed method. Given a training set consisting of videos of valid accesses,
video-based spoofs and a test video, we first extract a noise signature of every video
(training and testing) and calculate the Fourier Spectrum on logarithmic scale for each
video frame and then summarize each video by means of its visual rhythm. Considering
the training samples, we train a classifier using a summarized version of the visual rhythms
obtained by the estimation of the gray level co-occurrence matrices, as features. With a
trained classifier, we are able to test a visual rhythm for a given video under investigation
and point out whether it is a valid access or a spoof.
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2.3.1 Calculation of the Residual Noise Videos
The first step of the algorithm is to isolate the noise information contained in the videos
that were captured by the acquisition sensor, hereinafter referred to as input video ν. A
video ν in the domain 2D+ t can be defined as a sequence of t frames, where each frame
is a function f(x, y) ∈ N2 of the brightness of each pixel in the position (x, y) of the scene.
The extraction of the noise signal of the input video ν is performed as follows. The
frames in video ν are converted into gray-scale and an instance of νGray is submitted
to a filtering process using a low-pass filter in order to eliminate noise, generating a
filtered video νFiltered. Then, a frame-by-frame subtraction between the νGray and νFiltered
is performed, generating a new video that contains, mostly, the noise signal in which
we are interested, hereinafter named as Residual Noise Video (νNR), as formalized in
Equation 2.1. 
ν
(t)
Filtered = f(ν
(t)
Gray)
ν
(t)
NR = ν
(t)
Gray − ν(t)Filtered ∀ t ∈ T = {1, 2, . . . , t},
(2.1)
where ν(t) ∈ N2 is the t-th frame of ν and f a filtering operation.
2.3.2 Calculation of the Fourier Spectrum Videos
The analysis of the noise pattern and possible artifacts contained in the biometric samples
is performed by applying a 2D discrete Fourier transform to each frame of the Noise
Residual Video (νNR) using Equation 2.2. Next, the Fourier spectrum is computed on
logarithmic scale and with origin at the center of the frame (Equation 2.3). As a result
of this process, we end up with a video of the spectra, further on in this document
referred to as Fourier Spectrum Videos νFS. Fig. 2.3(a) and 2.3(b) depict the logarithm
of the Fourier spectrum of a video frame obtained from a valid access video and from an
attempted attack video, respectively.
F(v, u) =
M−1∑
x=0
N−1∑
y=0
νNR(x, y)e
−j2pi[(vx/M)+(uy/N)] (2.2)
|F(v, u)| =
√
R(v, u)2 + I(v, u)2
νFS(v, u) = log(1 + |F(v, u)|) (2.3)
2.3.3 Calculation of the Visual Rhythms
In order to capture the temporal information contained in the Fourier Spectrum Videos
(νFS) and summarize their content, we employ the visual rhythm technique [45]. Visual
rhythm is a simplification of a video content in a 2D image obtained by sampling regions
of the video. Applications of this concept can be found in the work by Chun et al. [44]
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(a) Valid video. (b) Attack video.
Figure 2.3: Example of a video frame of the spectra generated from (a) a valid video and
(b) an attack video.
that use visual rhythms for fast text caption localization on video, and Guimarães et
al. [89] who propose a method for gradual transition detection in videos. The use of
visual rhythm in our work is crucial since it allows us to capture patterns that are present
in the Fourier Spectrum Videos providing an effective way of viewing a video as a still
image.
Considering a video ν in the 2D+ t domain with t frames of dimensions W ×H pixels,
the visual rhythm IνR is a representation of the video ν, in which regions of interest of
each frame are sampled and aggregated to form a new image, called visual rhythm. The
regions of interest must be carefully chosen to capture the patterns contained in νFS.
Formally, a visual rhythm IνR of a video ν can be defined by
IνR(z, t) = ν(x(z), y(z), t), (2.4)
where x(z) and y(z) are functions of the independent variable z. The visual rhythm is a
two-dimensional image whose vertical z axis consists of a certain group of pixels extracted
from video ν and the samples are accumulated along the time t. Therefore, according
to the mapping of x(z) and y(z), we can generate several types of visual rhythms [45].
For instance, the sampling of the central vertical pixels can be performed by applying
IνR(z, t) = ν(x(
W
2
), y(z), t). Similarly, the central horizontal pixels can be extracted by
applying IνR(z, t) = ν(x(z), y(
H
2
), t).
Given that the lower responses are mainly concentrated at the abscissa and ordinate
axes [236] of the Fourier spectrum (see Fig. 2.3), initially we consider two regions of
interest in the frames that form the spectrum video in the construction of two types of
visual rhythms: (i) the horizontal visual rhythm formed by central horizontal lines and
(ii) the vertical visual rhythm formed by central vertical lines. In both cases, we can
summarize relevant content of the spectrum video in a single image. Fig. 2.4 depicts
the visual rhythms generated by two regions of interest considering a valid (Fig. 2.4(a)
and 2.4(c)) and an attack video (Fig. 2.4(b) and 2.4(d)).
Even though the visual rhythms are different for valid and attack videos, their con-
struction disregards the highest responses that are not at the abscissa and ordinate axes
and, in some cases, such information is important to make a better distinction between
valid access and attempted attack videos, as shown in Fig. 2.5. With this in mind, we
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(a) Valid video. (b) Attack video. (c) Valid video. (d) Attack video.
Figure 2.4: Visual rhythms constructed from (a)-(b) central horizontal lines and from
(c)-(d) central vertical lines. Note that the visual rhythm obtained from horizontal lines
has been rotated 90 degrees for visualization purposes.
extract a third type of visual rhythm by traversing along the frames of Fourier Spectrum
Videos (νFS) in a zig-zag scheme. Fig. 2.6 shows the zig-zag visual rhythm generated for
a valid access video and an attempted attack video.
(a) Valid video. (b) Attack video.
Figure 2.5: Examples of spectra whose highest responses are not only at the abscissa and
ordinates axes.
(a) Valid video. (b) Attack video.
Figure 2.6: Examples of visual rhythms constructed in a zig-zag traversal.
2.3.4 Feature Extraction
Once the visual rhythms are computed, we can use machine learning techniques to train
a classifier to decide whether a biometric sample is fake or not. However, if the intensity
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of the pixels composing the visual rhythms are directly considered, the dimensionality of
the feature space will be extremely high and most of the traditional classification methods
will not work properly. Therefore, we need to extract a compact set of feature descriptors
that best discriminate the visual rhythms generated from the fake and valid videos.
In this work, we evaluate the use of three feature descriptors: Gray Level Co-occurrence
Matrices (GLCM) [93], Local Binary Patterns (LBP) [168] and Histogram of Oriented
Gradients (HOG) [56]. The choice for using GLCM and LBP descriptors is motivated
by the fact that the visual rhythms can be interpreted as texture maps (see Fig. 2.4).
Moreover, if we consider the intensity values of the pixels of the visual rhythms as height
and edge artifacts represented along the maps, we see (Fig. 2.6) that such images have
different edge forms, a property that can be reasonably explored by the HOG descriptor.
GLCM It is a structure that describes the frequency of gray level occurrence between
pairs of pixels. When normalized, the co-occurrence matrix becomes an estimation of joint
probabilities between pairs of pixels at a distance d in a given orientation θ. After calcu-
lating the co-occurrence matrix for four different orientations, we extracted 12 measures
to summarize the textural information of each matrix: angular second-moment, contrast,
correlation, variance, inverse difference moment, sum average, sum variance, sum entropy,
entropy, difference variance, difference entropy, and directionality.
LBP The LBP operator [168] provides a robust way to describe local binary patterns.
Basically, a window of size 3 pixels is thresholded by the value of the central pixel. The
pixel values are then multiplied by binomial weights and summed to obtain an LBP
number to this window. Thus, LBP can produce up 28 = 256 different texture patterns,
and a histogram with 256 bins is calculated and used as a texture descriptor.
HOG The basic idea of this descriptor relies on the fact that the local appearance of the
objects and shape can be well characterized by the distribution of local intensity gradients
or edge directions, even without precise knowledge of the corresponding gradient or edge
positions. Basically, the image is divided into small spatial regions, referred to as cells,
and for each cell is calculated a histogram of gradient directions. A set of cells is grouped
into a block and the concatenation of the descriptors extracted from each cell followed by
a normalization results in the HOG descriptor.
2.3.5 Learning
We evaluate the proposed characterization process using two machine learning techniques:
Support Vector Machine (SVM) and Partial Least Square (PLS) that are used in the
construction of a binary classifier to decide whether a sample is fake or not.
The SVM algorithm [50] uses either a linear or a non-linear mapping, depending on
the type of space used to transform the original data onto a higher dimensional one.
PLS regression method [100] is based on the linear transformation of a large number
of descriptors to a new space based on a small number of orthogonal projection vectors.
In other words, the projection vectors are mutually independent linear combinations of
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the original descriptors. These vectors are chosen to provide maximum correlation with
the dependent variables, which are the labels of the training classes.
2.4 Database Creation
This section presents the Unicamp Video-Attack Database (UVAD) specifically built for
evaluation of the video-based spoofing attack detection methods. The UVAD contains
valid access and attempted attack videos of 404 different identities. All videos were
created at Full HD quality, with 30 frames per second and are nine seconds long.
The generation of valid access videos was performed by filming each participant in
two sections considering different backgrounds, lighting conditions, and places (indoors
and outdoors). As each person is recorded by only one camera, then there is no identity
overlap between video from different camera. In total, 808 videos that represent valid
accesses were generated with six different cameras: a 9.1 megapixels Sony CyberShot
DSC-HX1, a 10.0 megapixels Canon PowerShot SX1 IS, a 10.3 megapixels Nikon Coolpix
P100, a 14.0 megapixels Kodak Z981, a 14.0 megapixels Olympus SP 800UZ, and a 12.1
megapixels Panasonic FZ35 digital camera. We used a tripod to avoid disturbance in the
videos during the recordings. The generated videos were cropped to maintain a resolution
of 1, 366× 768 and allow the faces to be positioned at the center of the video frame. No
resampling was performed whatsoever.
The attempted attack videos were generated by using the same digital cameras utilized
to generate the valid access videos and seven different display devices with a 1, 366 ×
768 pixel resolution. The valid access videos were displayed on seven display devices
and recaptured with the same digital cameras used previously. Each display device was
positioned in front of each camera at a distance of 90 ± 5cm supported in a tripod, so
that to ensure each video with 1, 366× 768 resolution after cropping.
As the valid access videos were cropped to maintain a 1, 366 × 768 resolution, we
guarantee that there was no scaling transformations during their exhibition. In total,
we have generated 16, 268 attempted attack videos and 808 valid access videos. Fig. 2.7
and 2.8 depict real and fake video frame examples, respectively.
Figure 2.7: Examples of valid access video frames for outdoor (first and second images on
the left) and indoor (three images on the right) scenes.
Table 2.1 shows a comparison between the proposed UVAD database and some other
reference benchmarks in the literature. The diversity of display devices and acquisition
sensors used in the generation of UVAD is an important characteristic that is not found
in the other databases, which was essential to a better comprehension of the problem and
for a precise evaluation of the methods as we will show in Section 2.5.
52
Figure 2.8: Examples of attempted attack video frames for outdoor (first and second
images on the left) and indoor (three images on the right) scenes using Sony (first and
second columns), Canon (third and fourth columns) and Nikon (last column) cameras.
Table 2.1: Comparison of the proposed UVAD database and other available reference
benchmarks in the literature.
Number of Number Number Number Number of devices
Database subjects of valid of attacks of attacks used to create
accesses by photo by video the attack videos
NUAA [245] 15 5, 105 7, 509 − −
Print-Attack [8] 50 200 200 − −
CASIA [274] 50 150 300 150 3 cameras and 1 display device
Replay-Attack [41] 50 200 200 800 2 cameras and 2 display devices
UVAD (proposed) 404 808 −− 16, 268 6 cameras and 7 display devices
2.5 Experimental Results
In this section, we show the details of the experiments and performance evaluations of the
developed method. We first consider the UVAD database which was introduced in Sec-
tion 2.4 (Experiments I-IV). The diversity of devices used allows us to answer important
questions regarding some strengths and limitations of the proposed method. In addition,
we also evaluate the proposed method with respect to the literature (Experiment V) and
through the Replay-Attack Database (c.f., Sec. 2.2.1) (Experiment VI).
2.5.1 Protocols for the UVAD Database
In this section, we define appropriate protocols for each experiment.
Protocol I. The aim of this protocol is at finding the best configuration of the proposed
method. In this protocol, we divide the dataset into two sets, hereintofore referred to as
training and test sets. During partition, we guarantee that there is no overlap of data
from the same capture and display devices between training and test sets, so that we have
a proper comparison without experimental bias.
The valid access videos from six cameras were divided into two subsets, A and B . The
valid access videos in set A were again divided to form two sets of valid access videos:
(i) real training set, composed of videos generated by three cameras chosen arbitrarily
(Sony, Canon, and Kodak) and (ii) real test set, composed of videos generated by the
remaining three cameras (Nikon, Olympus, and Panasonic).
In sequence, the valid access videos in set B were used to generate two sets of attempted
attack videos: (i) the fake training set, in which videos in B generated by the Sony, Canon,
and Kodak cameras were displayed on three display devices and recaptured by the same
three cameras, and (ii) the fake test set, whose videos in B generated by the Nikon,
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Olympus, and Panasonic cameras were displayed on the remaining three display devices
and recaptured by the same cameras.
Protocol II. The aim of this protocol is at checking the influence of the biometric sensor
on the proposed method. Similarly to the previous protocol, we divide the dataset into
two sets, training and test sets. However, we create nine training and test sets, changing
the cameras that compose such sets. Again, we guarantee that there is no overlap of data
from the same cameras and display devices. Our goal with these partitions is to train
a classifier with videos from three cameras and test it with the videos from other three
cameras that never were used or seen by the classifier.
Protocol III. The aim of this protocol is at checking the influence of the display devices
over the detection method. In this protocol, we divide the videos from each camera
into two sets, A and B. Set A contains attempted attacks performed with three display
devices and set B comprises attempted attacks performed with the three complementary
display devices. The partition considering different display devices for both attack sets
was carried out to avoid that a classifier takes biased conclusions regarding videos coming
from devices already seen during the training step. The classification results are given in
terms of mean of the results obtained in two rounds of experiments by using the set A to
train a classifier and B to test it, and vice versa.
2.5.2 Parameters for the Filtering Process, Visual Rhythm Anal-
ysis and Classification
To extract signal noise signature of the videos, as Equation 2.1 shows, we consider the
use of spatial linear and non-linear filters: a Gaussian filter with µ = 0, σ = 2, and
size 7 × 7 and a Median filter with size 7 × 7, respectively. These parameters were
obtained empirically in [193] on a different dataset.
After calculating the noise signature using Equations 2.2 and 2.3, we extract the visual
rhythms (horizontal and vertical) of each video considering the first 50 frames and a block
of either 30 columns (vertical) pixels or 30 lines (horizontal). Since the visual vertical and
horizontal rhythms of each video carry different temporal information, we evaluate the
two types of visual rhythms along with their combinations. The horizontal visual rhythms
(H) are in a dimensional space of 1, 366 × 1, 500-d while the vertical visual rhythms (V)
are in 768 × 1, 500-d. To generate the zig-zag visual rhythms (Z), we also consider the
first 50 frames of the Fourier Spectrum transformed videos. We extract block lines of 30
pixels through the traversal of the frames, from left to right, top to bottom. Thus, we
obtained visual rhythms that are in a dimensional space of 17, 482× 1, 500-d.
The high dimensionality and large amount of visual rhythms prevent us from using
pixel intensities directly as features. Therefore, we consider the visual rhythms as tex-
ture maps and calculate their texture patterns using different characterization methods.
For instance, for the standard configuration, we considered the GLCM descriptor with
directions θ ∈ {0o, 45o, 90o, 135o}, distance d = 1 and 16 bins. Table 2.2 shows the dimen-
sionality information of each feature. In order to evaluate the robustness of the extracted
features, we can use them to train a classifier and generate a model capable of distinguish-
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Table 2.2: Number of features (dimensions) using either the direct pixel intensities as
features or the features extracted by image description methods.
Descriptor Dimensionality
Name
V H Z
Pixel Intensity 1, 152, 000 2, 049, 000 26, 223, 000
LBP 256 256 256
GLCM 48 48 48
HOG 36 36 36
ing valid and attack videos, and test the model effectiveness. In this paper, we use two
classification techniques: SVM and PLS. For SVM, we use the LibSVM [38] implementa-
tion and we analyze the radial basis function kernel, whose parameters were found using
LibSVM’s built-in grid search algorithm. For PLS, we use the DetectorPLS method [225]
and we analyze different numbers of factors. The factors are latent variables that give us
the best predictive power and they are extracted from a set of independent variables and
are used to predict a set of dependent variables. The interested reader may refer to [225]
for more details on factor choices in PLS.
2.5.3 Experiment I: Finding the Best Configuration
The objective here is to find the best configuration of our method and to evaluate the
classifiers, visual rhythm setups and filters through the analysis of variance to assess which
of these parameters present higher in influence. In addition, we evaluate other important
feature characterization methods found in the literature, namely Local Binary Pattern
Histogram (LBP) and Histogram of Oriented Gradient (HOG) descriptors. Although we
have considered the visual rhythms as texture maps, it is worth analyzing the use of
shape descriptors such as HOG as well. With this experiment, it is possible to discover
whether considering the visual rhythms as texture maps is the best choice. We carried
out these experiments using the Protocol I and considering the sets of attacks with videos
recaptured by all cameras.
After performing statistical analysis with ANOVA and Tukey’s HSD (Honestly Sig-
nificant Difference) test in the results shown in Table 2.3, the following conclusions can
be drawn: (1) GLCM descriptor performance is statistically different from its HOG and
LBP counterparts, as shown in Fig. 2.9. As it outperforms the other descriptors with
statistical significance, we can conclude that GLCM was able to extract the most discrim-
inative information from the visual rhythms as texture maps better than its counterparts;
(2) both Gaussian and Median filters used in this work to generate Noise Residual Videos
(νNR) did not produce statistically different results (figure now shown here); (3) meth-
ods for building the visual rhythms did not present results with differences statistically
significant (See Fig. 2.10); and (4) with respect to the classification algorithm used in
this work, we do not find statistical differences between the use of the SVM and PLS
algorithms (figure not shown here). It is noteworthy that both ANOVA and TukeyHSD’s
tests allow us to reject the hypothesis of equality between comparisons, but not accept
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the hypothesis that they are equal, in cases that no statistical differences were found.
Therefore, the best configuration considered is the one using Median filter, Horizontal
and Vertical visual rhythms combined, GLCM descriptor to extract texture information
from visual rhythms, and the PLS classification algorithm.
Table 2.3: Results (AUC) of the experiment in which we find the best configuration of
our method considering all possible setups.
PLS SVM
Desc. V. Rhythms Gaussian Median Gaussian Median
GLCM
V 59.65% 84.33% 68.57% 74.86%
H 76.27% 86.29% 76.09% 72.55%
V + H 77.74% 91.43% 74.90% 65.28%
Z 90.92% 80.23% 83.22% 63.59%
V 61.21% 72.29% 56.06% 65.95%
H 62.75% 63.55% 70.02% 67.76%
V + H 64.61% 70.81% 70.97% 73.44%
LBP
Z 67.44% 55.70% 64.65% 57.36%
HOG
V 68.75% 54.68% 67.86% 67.90%
H 54.68% 64.76% 50.61% 66.88%
V + H 57.73% 73.72% 66.96% 73.54%
Z 65.54% 65.54% 52.35% 52.35%
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Figure 2.9: Differences in mean levels of the results obtained by the different descriptors
used in this work and their confidence intervals for 95% family-wise confidence level.
There are statistical difference between the comparisons whose confidence intervals do
not include zero.
2.5.4 Experiment II: Influence of the Biometric Sensors
This experiment aims at checking whether the presented method works well in different
facial biometric systems (biometric sensors). Experiments performed with only one kind
of biometric sensor does not guarantee a broad evaluation of our method. Although
56
−10 −5 0 5 10
Z − V+H
Z − V
V+H − V
Z − H
V+H − H
V − H (
(
(
(
(
(
)
)
)
)
)
)
l
l
l
l
l
l
Figure 2.10: Differences in mean levels of the results obtained by the visual rhythms
considered in this work and their confidence intervals for 95% family-wise confidence
level. There are statistical difference between the comparisons whose confidence intervals
do not include zero.
this is not a common practice in the literature, we believe that experiments with several
biometric sensors is an essential practice to evaluate countermeasure methods, because
the artifact levels inserted into the biometric samples depend, among other factors, on the
quality of the acquisition sensor. Using the Protocol II, we evaluate the proposed method
in its best configuration (see Table 2.4).
Table 2.4: Results (AUC) of the experiment analyzing the influence of the biometric
sensors using a PLS Classifier and Median Filter.
Sony Sony Sony Sony Sony Sony Canon Canon Canon
Canon Canon Canon Kodak Kodak Olympus Olympus Olympus KodakTraining
Kodak Panasonic Olympus Panasonic Olympus Panasonic Panasonic Kodak Panasonic
Nikon Nikon Nikon Nikon Nikon Canon Sony Sony Sony
Olympus Olympus Kodak Canon Canon Kodak Kodak Nikon NikonTest
Panasonic Kodak Panasonic Olympus Panasonic Nikon Nikon Panasonic Olympus
AUC 91.43% 90.48% 86.89% 89.66% 96.12% 91.85% 81.07% 86.84% 84.25%
When we vary the cameras used in the training, we have a variation in the method
generalization. For instance, considering the best and worst results shown in the Table 2.4,
we have a relative error reduction of 79.50%. Though it is evident the in influence of
the biometric sensor with this variation in the classification results, we performed the
Wilcoxon Signed Rank test to prove this influence, with which we obtained a p-value of
0.0039 and hence confirmation that the values shown in Table 2.4 are indeed statistically
different.
2.5.5 Experiment III: Influence of the Display Devices
The aim of this experiment is to check whether the presented method is able to detect
attacks with different display devices, that is, whether the display devices produce different
amounts of display artifacts (the main artifacts produced are flickering, mooring and
banding effect). This is an important question to be answered because if the method is
not robust to different devices, learning techniques considering an open scenario could be
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considered [222], given that in this case the classifier should be able to recognize attacks
with display devices for which it has no prior knowledge.
Considering Protocol III, this experiment was performed in two rounds: firstly, we
train a classifier with attacks performed with three display devices and tested it with the
other three display devices to evaluate the model found by the classifier. Secondly, we
switch the sets and redo the analysis. In both cases, we considered the best configuration
of our method. The results reported in Table 2.5 correspond to the average (x) and stdev
(s) of the results obtained in the two rounds for each configuration of the method.
Table 2.5: Results (AUC) of the experiment analyzing the influence of the display devices
using a PLS Classifier and Median Filter.
Sony Canon Nikon Kodak Olympus Panasonic
X 7 7 X 7 X
p–value = 0.0 p–value = 1.0 p–value = 1.0 p–value = 0.0 p–value = 0.574 p–value = 0.015
x = 92.70% x = 99.34% x = 98.61% x = 96.42% x = 84.57% x = 97.53%
s = 0.23% s = 0.91% s = 1.36% s = 0.76% s = 14.33% s = 2.81%
The influence of the display devices are evidenced when the results obtained in the two
rounds of experiments are discrepant or whether they are statistically different, indicating
that the method was not able to detect attempted attacks performed with unknown
display devices. To verify whether the differences in the results are statistically significant,
we carried out a hypothesis test for two unpaired or independent samples. Once the sample
values are nominal, the most appropriate statistical test is χ2 test for two samples whose
values are also shown in all tables, considering a confidence level of 95%. The p-value
produced for the χ2 tests evaluate whether two samples are statistically different (p-value
< 0.05). According to results shown in Table 2.5, we have obtained a p-value lower than
α = 0.05, for some cameras. In these cases, the differences were statistically significant,
which leads us to the conclusion that the display device plays an important role in the
spoofing detection task.
2.5.6 Experiment IV: Comparison to a State-of-the-Art Method
for Photo-Based Spoofing Attack Detection
In the final round of experiments concerning the UVAD database, we compare our method
to the one proposed in [214]. We considered the Protocol I to compare both methods. It
was not possible to run the algorithm by Schwartz et al. by using the same parameters
described in [214] due to the high dimensionality of the data their method produces, even
on a machine with 48GB of RAM. The dimensionality of the feature vector generated by
the original algorithm is higher than five million dimensions for each video frame.
In order to reduce the dimensionality of the feature vectors, we applied the HOG
descriptor with blocks of sizes 16 × 16 and 32 × 32 with strides of 16 and 32 pixels,
respectively. The other parameters were set as described in [214]. With this, we were
able to reduce the feature vector dimensionality to 8, 880 dimensions. Table 2.6 shows
the results obtained by using the algorithm in [214] and our method, considering the
configuration that yielded the lowest classification error. Furthermore, the computational
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time spent by the algorithm in [214] was ≈ 237 hours to process all the data, whereas
the method proposed in this work spent ≈ 72 hours. According to McNemar statistical
test, the result obtained by the methods are statistically different. All experiments were
conducted on an Intel Xeon E5620, 2.4GHz quad core processor with 48GB of RAM under
Linux operating system.
With this experiment, we can conclude that our method better characterized video-
based attacks while being more efficient and suitable for different classification techniques,
once it provides more compact feature representations.
Table 2.6: Comparison between Schwartz’s approach and the method proposed in this
work in its best setup (using combined visual rhythm, Median filter and a PLS Classifier).
AUC (%)
Schwartz et al. [214] 90.52%
Our method 91.43%
Error Reduction 9.60%
2.5.7 Experiment V: Evaluation of the Method in the Replay-
Attack Database
In this experiment, we evaluate our method on the Replay-Attack database (c.f., 2.2.1)
which contains photo-based and video-based spoofing attacks. The goal of this experiment
is to verify the effectiveness of our method on these several types of attacks. We use the
experimental protocol described in [41], whose results are shown in Table 2.7. Although
our method is designed for video-based spoofing attack detection, we have obtained a
promising AUC of ≈ 93%. For reference, in [41], the authors reported a Half Total
Error Rate (HTER) of 34.01% and 15.16%, using a χ2 and SVM classifier, respectively,
to classify LBPu23×2 features, while our method yields an HTER of 14.27%. We use a
Gaussian filter with µ = 0, σ = 0.5 and size 3 × 3, and a Median filter with size 3 × 3.
These parameters were empirically obtained by using the Replay-Attack Database. With
this experiment, we can conclude that the proposed method is able not only to detect
video-based spoof attacks but also video print-attacks.
Finally, one can notice that, in particular, the zig-zag characterization method does
not lead to the best result in this dataset. We believe the reason is that the Replay-
Attack [41] is a dataset based on print photograph recaptures (still image attacks) which,
when recaptured, tend to concentrate visual information in the center of the Fourier trans-
formed domain as depicted in Fig. 2.11. This tends to favor the vertical and horizontal
visual rhythms as they concentrate on these areas. The contrary happens with video at-
tacks since the peaks in the Fourier transformed domain will be more spatially spread over
each frame, as shown in Fig. 2.5. Result obtained by the TukeyHSD’ test confirm that
difference between V+H and Z visual rhythms are statistically significant (p-value=0.03).
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Table 2.7: Results (AUC) for the test set of the Replay-Attack database
PLS classifier SVM classifier
Visual Rhythms
Median Gaussian Median Gaussian
V 83.99% 89.01% 86.26% 91.56%
H 81.98% 85.66% 80.67% 73.36%
V + H 90.69% 92.98% 92.01% 91.81%
Z 78.39% 85.35% 86.56% 77.72%
(a) (b)
Figure 2.11: Example of a video frame of the spectra generated from (a) a valid access
video of the Replay-Attack database and (b) a video of an attempted attack of the same
dataset. Note a concentration of information on the center rather than spread over as for
the videos case shown in Fig. 2.5.
2.6 Conclusions and Future Work
Biometric authentication systems have been shown to be vulnerable to spoofing attacks
in the sense that impostors can gain access privileges to resources as valid users. Spoofing
attacks to a face recognition system can be performed by presenting it a photograph, a
video, or a face mask of a legitimate user.
This paper proposed and evaluated a spatio-temporal method for video-based face
spoofing detection through the analysis of noise signatures generated by the video ac-
quisition process, which can be used to distinguish between valid and fake access videos.
Noise properties are captured using Fourier spectrum for each frame of the video. A
compact representation, called visual rhythm, is employed to detect temporal informa-
tion in the Fourier spectrum. Three different video traversal strategies were considered
to form the visual rhythms, of which horizontal and vertical combined was shown to be
the most effective. Features were extracted from the visual rhythms through GLCM,
LBP and HOG descriptors to allow a proper distinction between fake and real biometric
data. The GLCM method was shown to be the most discriminative and compact feature
representation for visual rhythm description.
An extensive data set, containing real access and spoofing attack videos, was created
to evaluate the proposed method, as well as the state-of-the-art approaches. Through the
conducted experiments, it is possible to conclude that the display devices and biometric
sensors play an important role in the spoofing detection task. These findings are very
important in making the future anti-spoofing methods more effective and guiding the
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development of new databases which must be more realistic, as the UVAD Database
proposed in this paper. The proposed anti-spoofing method provided competitive or even
superior results in the tests when compared to state-of-the-art approaches.
Although this paper represents a step toward solving the spoofing problem, it makes
it clear that the problem is not fully-solved yet and poses new questions on future
methods regarding how to better handle and tackle with new attacks due to the ever-
growing market of acquisition and display devices such as hight quality monitors, hand-
held and smartphone devices. In this sense, the dataset provided in this paper will be
available at the IEEE Information Forensics and Security Technical Committee website
(http://tinyurl.com/pas4t9r) and also registered with a proper DOI through FigShare
(http://figshare.com/) in order to advance the frontier of research in spoofing detec-
tion.
Future research efforts branch out into devising other spatio-temporal descriptors that
capture motion telltales associated with the recapture process as well as verifying other
liveness detection problems other than face recognition such as video recapturing, piracy
detection, among others [22].
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Chapter 3
Face Spoofing Detection Through
Visual Codebooks of Spectral Temporal
Cubes
“Profound study of nature is the most fertile source of mathematical
discoveries.”
—Joseph Fourier, French mathematician and physicist (1768–1830)
“If you want to find the secrets of the universe, think in terms of energy,
frequency and vibration.”
—Nikola Tesla, Serbian-American inventor, electrical engineer, physicist, etc.
(1856–1943)
Abstract
Despite important recent advances, the vulnerability of biometric systems to spoofing at-
tacks is still an open problem. Spoof attacks occur when impostor users present synthetic
biometric samples of a valid user to the biometric system seeking to deceive it. Consider-
ing the case of face biometrics, a spoofing attack consists in presenting a fake sample (e.g.,
photograph, digital video or even a 3D mask) to the acquisition sensor with the facial
information of a valid user. In this paper, we introduce a low-cost and software-based
method for detecting spoofing attempts in face recognition systems. Our hypothesis is
that during acquisition there will be inevitable artifacts left behind in the recaptured
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biometric samples allowing us to create a discriminative signature of the video generated
by the biometric sensor. To characterize these artifacts, we extract time-spectral feature
descriptors from the video, which can be understood as a low-level feature descriptor that
gathers temporal and spectral information across the biometric sample and use the visual
codebook concept to find mid-level feature descriptors computed from the low-level ones.
Such descriptors are more robust for detecting several kinds of attacks than low-level ones.
Experimental results show the effectiveness of the proposed method for detecting different
types of attacks in a variety of scenarios and datasets including photos, videos and 3D
masks.
3.1 Introduction
NOWADAYS, the protection of personal data has become a fundamental requirementof security. According to Tipton [250], information security is concerned with the
development of methods and tools for protecting information and preserving the value it
has for an individual or an organization. For an efficient and effective protection, the use
of robust authentication mechanisms is paramount.
Knowledge-based methods (e.g., password, secret question) and token-based methods
(e.g., smart cards, token code) are probably the most used authentication mechanisms
to date. However, both methods have a critical feature: at the time of authentication,
the system does not verify who is requesting access, but rather what the users know
or possess. This renders the system vulnerable, since that knowledge or an object can
easily be lost, shared or manipulated. As an alternative, biometrics is an authentication
mechanism considered more natural and reliable as it focuses on verifying who is the
person requesting the access [109]. Biometrics provides methods for recognizing humans
automatically based on behavior, physical or chemical traits, being fingerprint, face, iris,
hand geometry, hand vein, voice and DNA, the most common traits used [109].
Although there are several traits that can be used to perform user authentication, re-
searchers are constantly looking for biometric traits with low acquisition and storage costs,
that are less invasive, present a high degree of uniqueness and are stable. However, the
static nature of a stable biometric trait suggests “the paradox of secure biometrics” [167]:
“An authenticator must be stable and distinctive to be considered a good authen-
ticator. But, stability leaves no option for compromise recovery, since users
cannot change their biometric trait if stolen. Moreover, since a biometric clue
is not secret, its information can be learned and copied.”
Although a stable biometric trait is an ideal authenticator, in practice, its use would
not work if it were learned or copied. Therefore, researchers have striven to develop
methods that detect whether a biometric sample presented to the acquisition sensor is
a replica of the original sample. In the literature, the action of presenting a synthetic
biometric sample of some valid user to the acquisition sensor in order to authenticate
itself as a legitimate user is known as spoofing attack.
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Among several forms of biometric, face recognition is of paramount importance with
outstanding solutions presented thus far such as deformable models [262], texture-based
representations [2], and shape-based representations [145]. Although effective in many
cases, according to Maltoni et al. [153], face, signature and voice are the easiest biometric
signals to be circumvented. For instance, spoofing attacks can be successfully accom-
plished in a face biometric system if an impostor obtains access by presenting to the
acquisition sensor a photography, digital video or a 3D model of the target person [109].
Even with recent advances in biometrics, information forensics and security, the vulnera-
bility of facial biometric systems against spoofing attacks is still an open problem.
During the production of the synthetic biometric data, inevitably, there are noise in-
formation and telltales added to the biometric signal that can be captured and further
processed to pinpoint attacks. In fact, in the manufacturing process of a synthetic sample,
there are, at least, two re-quantization steps of the original biometric signal. In photo-
and mask-based face spoofing attacks, the continuous signal is quantized during the dig-
itization process. Then, this digital version is re-quantized due to the printing process
with 2D and 3D printers and again digitized during the presentation of the synthetic data
to the acquisition sensor. In video-based face spoofing attacks, the continuous signal is
digitized and recaptured by the acquisition sensor during the attack.
Recent works [151, 193, 245] show that noise and artifacts such as blurring effects,
printing artifacts, banding effects, and Moiré patterns are added to the synthetic bio-
metric samples during their manufacture and recapture. In this paper, we propose a
spatio-temporal algorithm that captures such effects along time to provide an effective
discriminative signature for valid access and spoofing attempts. In summary, the main
contributions of this paper are:
• a new method for extracting temporal and spectral information from face biometric
samples, referred to as time-spectral descriptors;
• evaluation of the visual codebook model, also referred to as Bag-of-Visual-Word
model, for creating a mid-level representation from time-spectral descriptors, re-
ferred to as time-spectral visual words; and
• a low-cost solution for spoofing detection, illustrated in Figure 3.1, that does not
rely on the user interaction or on extra hardware (e.g., infrared, motion or depth
sensors) to detect different types of synthetic samples or attacks (e.g., photos, videos
and masks) and is amenable to be implemented in computational devices such as
PCs, handheld, and embedded systems.
We organize the remaining of this paper as follows. Section 3.2 discusses state-of-
the-art methods for face spoofing attack detection. Section 3.3 presents our method for
spoofing attack detection. Section 3.4 shows and discusses the experimental protocol and
the obtained results. Finally, Section 3.5 concludes the paper and discusses possible future
work.
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Visual Codebook Generation (c.f., Sec. III-B1)
Visual Codebook Selection of the  Time-SpectralVisual Words
Parameter Estimations for  the 
Classification Model
Classification (c.f., Sec. III-C)
Low-Level Descriptor Extraction (c.f., Sec. III-A)
Time-Spectral 
Descriptors
Fourier Spectrum
Videos
Residual Noise
Videos
Mid-Level Descriptor Extraction (c.f., Sec. III-B2 and Sec. III-B3)
Coding Process
Pooling Process
Training
Set
Classification
Model
Mid-Level Descriptor
Extraction
Low-Level  Descriptor
Extraction
Testing
Video
Prediction
Figure 3.1: Main steps of the proposed method. Given a training set consisting of valid
access and attempted attack videos, and also a testing video, we first extract a noise
signature from every training video, generating a residual noise video, and calculate its
spectrum video. Then, we extract time-spectral descriptors from spectrum videos (low-
level representation), which are used to generate a visual codebook. With the visual
codebook at hand, we transform the low-level descriptors in time-spectral visual word
descriptors (mid-level representation). Finally, these mid-level descriptors are used to
find parameters of the classification model, which are employed to predict whether a
given testing video is an attempted attack.
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3.2 Related Work
The existing techniques for detecting spoofing on face recognition methods can be roughly
categorized into four groups: user behavior modeling, user cooperation, methods that
require additional hardware and methods based on data-driven characterization. The
first aims at modeling the user behavior with respect to the acquisition sensor (e.g., eye
blinking or small head and face movements) to decide whether a captured biometric sample
is synthetic. Methods based on user cooperation can be used to detect spoofing by means
of challenge questions or by asking the user to perform specific movements, which adds
extra time and removes the naturalness inherent to facial recognition systems. Techniques
that require extra hardware (e.g., infrared cameras or motion and depth sensors) use the
additional information generated by these sensors to detect possible clues of an attempted
attack. Finally, methods based on data-driven characterization exploit only the data
captured by the acquisition sensor looking for evidence and artifacts that may reveal an
attempted attack.
In [140,176,263], the authors proposed a solution for detecting photo-based attacks by
eye blinking modeling under the assumption that an attempted attack with photographs
differs from valid access by the absence of movements. Bao et al. [13] and Kollreider et
al. [123] proposed a method based on the analysis of the characteristics of the optical flow
field generated for living faces and photo-based attacks. As a living face is a 3D object
and a photograph is a planar object, these methods analyze sequential images to detect
facial movements, facial expressions or parts of the face such as mouth and eye. Pan et
al. [177] extended upon [176] including contextual information of the scene (clues outside
of the face) and eye blinking (clues inside the face region).
Methods that use extra hardware have also been considered in the literature. Sun
et al. [237] proposed a solution based on thermal IR spectrum modeling the face in the
cross-modality of thermal IR and visible light spectrum by canonical correlation analysis.
Recently, Erdogmus et al. [66] evaluated the behavior of a face biometric system protected
with anti-spoofing solutions [42,151] and the Microsoft’s Kinect under attempted attacks
performed with static 3D masks. Although these approaches were successful, techniques
requiring extra hardware devices have the disadvantage of not being possible to implement
in computational devices that do not support them, such as smartphones and tablets.
Turning our attention to the data-driven characterization methods, we can identify
three different approaches explored in the literature: methods based on frequency anal-
ysis [139, 141, 193], texture analysis [117, 125, 151, 152, 181, 214, 245], and the ones based
on motion and clues of the scene analysis [8, 41, 253, 267, 274]. We shall briefly review
these approaches in the next sections. For further reading on the problem, we recommend
Galbally et al.’s survey [73] and Marcel et al.’s handbook [158].
3.2.1 Frequency-based approaches
Li et al. [141] explored the fact that faces in photographs are smaller than the real ones
and that the expressions and poses of the faces in the photographs are invariant to devise
a method for detecting photo-based attempted attacks.
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Pinto et al. [193] proposed a method for detecting attacks performed with videos using
visual rhythm analysis. According to the authors, in a video-based spoofing attack, a noise
signature is added to the biometric samples during the recapture of the videos of attacks.
The authors isolated the noise signal using a low-pass filter and used the visual rhythm
technique to capture the temporal information of the video.
Lee et al. [139] proposed a method based on the frequency entropy of image sequences.
The authors used a face verification algorithm to find the face region, normalized the RGB
channels using z-score technique, and applied the independent components analysis (ICA)
method to remove cross-channel noise caused by interference from the environment. Fi-
nally, the authors calculated the power spectrum and analyzed the entropy of the channels
individually. Based on a threshold, the authors decide whether a biometric sample is syn-
thetic or real.
3.2.2 Texture-based approaches
Tan et al. [245] proposed a solution for detecting attacks with printed photographs mo-
tivated by the difference of the surface roughness of an attempted attack and a real
face. The authors estimate the luminance and reflectance of the image under analysis
and classify them using Sparse Low Rank Bilinear Logistic Regression methods. Their
work was further extended by Peixoto et al. [181] by incorporating measures for different
illumination conditions.
Määttä et al. [151] explored micro textures for spoofing detection through the Local
Binary Pattern (LBP). To find a holistic representation of the face, able to reveal an
attempted attack, Schwartz et al. [214] proposed a method that extracts different infor-
mation from images (e.g., color, texture and shape of the face). Results of both techniques
were reported in the Competition on Counter Measures to 2D Facial Spoofing Attacks [36],
with an HTER of 0.00% and 0.63%, respectively, upon the Print Attack Database [8].
Chingovska et al. [41] investigated the use of different variations of the LBP opera-
tor used in [151], such as LBPu23×3, tLBP , dLBP and mLBP. The histograms generated
from these descriptors were classified using χ2 histogram comparison, Linear Discriminant
Analysis and Support Vector Machine.
Face spoofing attacks performed with static masks have also been considered in the
literature. Erdogmus et al. [65] explored a database with six types of attacks using fa-
cial information of four subjects. To detect attempted attacks, the authors used two
algorithms based on Gabor wavelet [262, 273] with a Gabor-phase based similarity mea-
sure [90].
Similarly to Tan et al. [245], Kose et al. [128] evaluated a solution based on reflectance
to detect attacks performed with masks. To decompose the images into components of
illumination and reflectance, the Variational Retinex [5] algorithm was applied.
Pereira et al. [184] proposed a score-level fusion strategy for detecting various types of
attacks. The authors trained classifiers using different databases and used the Q statistic
to evaluate the dependency between classifiers. In a follow-up work, Pereira et al. [69]
proposed an anti-spoofing solution based on the dynamic texture, a spatio-temporal ver-
sion of the original LBP. Results showed that LBP-based dynamic texture description
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has a higher effectiveness than the original LBP, which reinforces the idea that temporal
information is of prime importance to detect spoofing attacks.
3.2.3 Motion-based approaches
Tronci et al. [253] explored the motion information and clues that are extracted from the
scene by combining two types of processes, referred to as static and video-based analysis.
The static analysis consists in combining different visual features such as color, edge,
and Gabor textures, whereas the video-based analysis combines simple motion-related
measures such as eye blink, mouth movement, and facial expression change.
Anjos et al. [8] proposed a method for detecting photo-based attacks assuming a sta-
tionary facial recognition system. According to the authors, the intensity of the relative
motion between the face region and the background can be used as a clue to distin-
guish valid access of attempted attacks, since that motion variations between face and
background regions exhibit greater correlation in the case of attempted attacks.
In contrast with the methods described in this section, we present in this work a new
anti-spoofing solution based on a temporal characterization of the frequency components
from the noise signal extracted from videos. Furthermore, to the best of our knowledge,
this was the first attempt of dealing with visual codebooks to find a mid-level represen-
tation useful for face spoofing attack detection.
3.3 Proposed Method
In this section, we introduce a method for detecting different forms of face spoofing
attacks. The method comprises three main steps: low-level descriptor extraction, mid-
level descriptor extraction, and classification. Fig. 3.1 illustrates these steps, which we
explain in details in the following sections.
We designed the algorithm based on the fact that synthetic biometric samples contain
noise and artifacts generated during their manufacture and recapture that are different
from any pattern found in real biometric samples. According to Tan et al. [245] and
Määttä et al. [151], there is a deterioration of the facial information and, consequently,
a loss of some high frequency components during the manufacture of photographs to be
used in spoofing attacks. In our prior work [193], we highlighted the fact that there is
a significant increase of the low frequency components due to the blurring effect added
during the recapture process of the biometric sample displayed in tablets, smartphones
and laptop screens. Besides the blurring effect, other artifacts are added such as flickering,
Moiré patterns, and banding effect [14].
These facts motivated us to propose a solution that takes advantage of the noise and
artifacts contained on such fake biometric samples, which heretofore we refer to as a noise
signature. We perform a Fourier analysis of the noise signature to capture the information
encoded in the frequency, phase and amplitude of the component sinusoids [236]. In this
paper, we use Fourier spectrum to quantify the following artifacts:
• blurring artifact: In both the production and recapture processes, inevitably we
have a decrease in the details of biometric samples due to re-quantization of the
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original signal. This reduction of details is reflected in the increase of low frequency
components and can be observed in the Fourier domain;
• flickering effect: It corresponds to the horizontal and vertical lines equally spaced
that appear during the recapture process of the samples shown to the acquisition
sensor with the display device. When this artifact appears in biometric samples,
there are peak lines at abscissa and ordinate axes of the Fourier spectrum when the
display device is aligned with the acquisition sensor;
• Moiré pattern: They are irregular patterns that can appear when a display device
is used to perform an attempted attack. As a result, we also have the appearance
of peaks in different locations in the Fourier spectrum depending on the frequency
and direction of the sinusoid in the spatial domain [236].
The novelty of our solution is in the two-tier low and mid-level characterization scheme,
called time-spectral visual words, that captures patterns present in such noise signatures
useful to reveal spoofing attacks. For this, we extract temporal-spectral descriptors from
the noise signature transformed to the frequency domain and create a mid-level repre-
sentation for them using the concept of visual codebooks [12, 235]. Visual codebooks are
a method for constructing mid-level representations widely employed in several applica-
tions in pattern recognition and computer vision, such as object recognition [254], gesture
recognition [96], and information retrieval [182], among others. However, unlike existing
methods, we obtain visual informative features from the noise signature present in the
videos instead of their raw pixels or from objects in the scene.
3.3.1 Low-Level Descriptor Extraction
In our previous work [193], we found that the noise signal is an important source for low-
level discriminative features for spoofing detection. When working with the noise signal
and discarding the video content, we minimize possible negative impacts on the method
performance. Next, we present the steps of the proposed method to compute the low-level
descriptors.
Calculation of the Residual Noise Videos
The low-level representation of the videos is computed through the spectrum analysis of
the noise signal in the frequency domain. To isolate the noise signal of a given video V ,
we filter a copy of V using a Gaussian filter with mean µ, std. σ, and kernel size k× k to
remove the high frequency components, generating a filtered video. Then, we perform a
subtraction operation between the input video and its filtered version, generating a new
video, called Residual Noise Video (VRN):
V
(t)
RN = V
(t) − h(V (t)) ∀ t ∈ T = {1, 2, . . . , t}, (3.1)
where V (t) ∈ N2 is the t-th frame of V and h is a filter whose impulse response is a
Gaussian function.
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Calculation of the Fourier Spectrum Videos
After calculating the residual noise videos, we can analyze the noise pattern and possible
artifacts contained in the biometric samples by applying the 2D Discrete Fourier Trans-
form to each frame of the VRN using Eq. 3.3. In this work, we evaluate two important
characteristics of the noise signal in the frequency domain, the magnitude and phase of
the signal. The analysis of these two characteristics is performed by calculating the mag-
nitude spectrum (Eq. 3.5) and phase spectrum (Eq. 3.6), with the origin at the center of
the frame. In both cases, the result is a Fourier spectrum video.
F(VRN(x, y)) ≡ F (v, u) (3.2)
F (v, u) =
M−1∑
x=0
N−1∑
y=0
VRN(x, y)e
−j2pi[(vx/M)+(uy/N)] (3.3)
|F (v, u)| =
√
R(v, u)2 + I(v, u)2 (3.4)
VMS(v, u) = log(1 + |F (v, u)|) (3.5)
VPS(v, u) = arctan
( I(v, u)
R(v, u)
)
(3.6)
From the Fourier spectrum video, we can extract spectral and temporal information
relevant to the spoofing attack detection. In the case of the spectral information, we need
to capture peaks present in the central region caused by artifacts that reduce some details
in the scene (e.g., skin marking, edge information) such as blurring effect, defocus, and
printing artifacts and peaks present in the peripheral region of the frame caused mainly by
artifacts such as the banding effect and Moiré pattern, which appear during the recapture
of the biometric information during an attack.
Figs. 3.2 and 3.3 show an attempt to depict the temporal disturbances added to the
biometric samples during attacks. In this example, we extract the first ten consecutive
frames of an attack video and of a valid video for the same client, and calculate their
respective magnitudes spectra from the residual noise video. In addition, Fig. 3.4 shows
examples in which we have frames extracted from valid access videos (a) and spoof attack
videos (b-c). In this figure, we aim at showing the Moiré and blurring effects found in
attempted attacks performed with a mobile device. The blurring effect is present in the
magnitude spectrum with an increase of the low frequency components, whereas the Moiré
effect is present in the magnitude spectrum with peaks in the horizontal center region of
the frames. It is hard to find a direct mapping of the effects to the phase spectra, but we
can see clearly that there are disturbances in the phase spectra calculated from attempted
attack frames when compared to phase spectra extracted from valid access frames.
It is important to remark that we are not proposing a method for capturing each
of the artifacts separately. We believe that the presence of one or more artifacts causes
disturbances in the frequency components in the Fourier domain and the proposed method
aims at describing and capturing this disturbance in space and time.
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(a)
(b)
(c)
Figure 3.2: (a) Original frames extracted from a valid access video, (b) their respective
residual noise frames and (c) magnitude spectra.
(a)
(b)
(c)
Figure 3.3: (a) Original frames extracted from an attempted attack video, (b) their
respective residual noise frames and (c) magnitude spectra.
Computation of the time-spectral descriptor
Due to the dynamics involved in the appearance of artifacts and noise in the synthetic
biometric samples and the spectral information, the temporal information becomes im-
portant to detect spoofing attacks. Therefore, we design a feature descriptor that gathers
temporal and spectral information from an input video. We extract n temporal cubes of
size of w× h× t (blocks of size w× h of t frames) from the Fourier spectrum video. The
idea of temporal cubes has been somewhat explored to quantify temporal information in
other tasks in computer vision [6,119,209]. In all cases, it always boils down to designing
important discriminative features for capturing the event of interest. In this paper, we
design new ideas for spoofing detection.
The computation of the measure over temporal cubes can be performed on each frame
separately, hereinafter referred to as spatial measures, or between consecutive frames,
hereinafter referred to spatio-temporal measures. Examples of spatial measures that can
be used are energy and entropy of the signal, which quantify the signal size and amount
of information, respectively. As examples of spatial-temporal measures, we can mention
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(a) Examples of a frame extracted from valid access video
(b) Examples of frames extracted from a mobile-attack videos. We highlighted the Moiré effect with
yellow circle in the original image and its respective residual noise frame. The arrows on the magnitude
spectrum indicate the effect of the Moiré effect over Fourier spectrum
(c) Examples of frames extracted from a mobile-attack videos. In this frame, we show a blurring effect
in the original image and its effect in the residual noise frame. The arrows on the magnitude spectrum
show the impact of this effect over Fourier spectrum
Figure 3.4: Examples of valid access and attempted attack videos. The first column shows
the original frame extracted from a video and the second column shows the residual noise
frame calculated from the original frames. Finally, the third and fourth columns show
the magnitude and phase spectrum, respectively. Note that the phase spectra calculated
from valid access frames are different from attempted attack frames.
correlation and mutual information, which are applied to measure dependence between
consecutive frames. At the end of this process, we have a set of n time-spectral descriptors
of t dimensions, for each video. As spatio-temporal measures are applied on consecutive
frames, this process yield n time-spectral descriptors of (t− 1) dimensions each.
3.3.2 Mid-Level Descriptor Extraction
To find a robust representation for the low-level feature descriptors, with less sensitivity to
the intra- and extra-class variations, we use the Bag-of-Visual-Word (BoVW) model [235],
which maps the low-level features onto a more discriminative mid-level representation.
Methods based on the BoVW model can be understood in the following steps: visual
codebook generation, coding, and pooling.
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Visual Codebook Generation
The generation of the visual codebook consists in the selection of time-spectral descriptors
that are more frequent and representative considering all descriptors extracted from train-
ing videos. The selected descriptors, called time-spectral visual words, form the visual
codebook. The selection can be performed using two strategies: (1) random selection,
whereby all descriptors are pooled and m visual words are randomly chosen using a uni-
form distribution; or (2) selection via clustering (e.g., k-means) whereby all descriptors
undergo a clustering process and the m centroids found by the algorithm are used to form
the visual codebook. In both cases, we end up with a single visual codebook, which is
used to encode the low-level time-spectral descriptors from videos.
Instead of pooling all descriptors extracted from videos into a training set to build
a single visual codebook, we can build class-based visual codebooks. When creating
class-based visual codebooks, we consider the use of valid access and attempted attack
video descriptors separately in order to find codebooks in each class. For each class-
based codebook, we use the same procedures described above for a single visual codebook
creation. The two visual codebooks are concatenated to create the final codebook.
Coding
The coding process performs a pointwise transformation of the low-level descriptors into
another representation [31]. There are several strategies for coding being the hard and
soft assignments the most common. Given a visual codebook and a low-level descriptor,
the hard assignment transforms such descriptor into a binary vector with only one nonzero
coefficient representing the visual word closest to it. The soft assignment [80], in turn,
gives a real valued vector that represents the descriptor as a linear combination of the
visual words of the codebook, whose coefficients give an associativity degree between the
descriptor and the visual words of the codebook [146]. In this paper, we evaluate these
two strategies for coding the low-level descriptors.
Pooling
The pooling process aims at summarizing the information contained in the set of n mid-
level feature descriptors extracted from an input video into only one feature descriptor
to obtain its final representation. In the literature, we have two common techniques to
do that, known as sum-pooling (Eq. 3.7) and max-pooling (Eq. 3.8). In this paper, we
evaluate these two strategies, as well.
v
(j)
i =
n∑
i=1
u
(j)
i ∀ j ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,m} (3.7)
v
(j)
i = maxiu
(j)
i ∀ j ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,m} (3.8)
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3.3.3 Classification
After finding a new space representation for the videos in the database, we use machine
learning algorithms to find a classification model to decide whether a sample is an at-
tempted attack or a valid access. In this paper, we evaluate the Partial Least Square
(PLS) [101] and Support Vector Machine (SVM) [50] algorithms.
3.4 Experiments and Results
In this section, we present and discuss the experimental results and the validation of the
proposed method. Section 3.4.1 shows details of the datasets used in the experiments while
Section 3.4.2 describes the experimental protocols employed in this work. Section 3.4.3
shows the experimental setup of the proposed method regarding its parameters. The
experiments in Section 3.4.4 aim at validating our method and choosing its best parameter
setup. In addition, Section 3.4.4 addresses important questions regarding the low- and
mid-level descriptor extraction procedures: (1) the best characteristic extracted from
Fourier spectrum (e.g., magnitude or phase spectrum); (2) the best measure for spectrum
summarization (e.g., energy, entropy, correlation, mutual information, etc); and (3) the
visual codebook size most appropriate for the problem; among others. The remaining
subsections compare the proposed method with the best methods reported in the literature
including a challenging cross-dataset protocol, whereby we train our method using a
dataset and test it with another dataset.
3.4.1 Datasets
In this work, we consider four datasets:
• Replay-Attack Dataset [41]: This dataset comprises videos of valid accesses
and attacks of 50 identities. The videos were generated with a webcam with a
resolution of 320× 240 pixels and 25 frames per second (fps). This dataset contains
200 valid access videos, 200 print-based attacks, 400 mobile-based attacks using an
iPhone, and 400 high-definition attacks using an iPad screen with 1, 024× 768 pixel
resolution.
• CASIA Face Anti-Spoofing Dataset [274]: This dataset contains videos of
valid accesses and attacks of 50 identities and considers different types of attacks
such as warped photo attacks and cut photo attacks, besides the photos and video
attacks. It also considers attacks performed with different image/video quality:
(1) low-quality videos captured by a long-time-used USB camera with 480 × 640
pixel resolution; (2) normal-quality videos captured with a new USB camera with
480× 640 pixel resolution; and (3) high-quality videos captured with a Sony NEX-5
camera with 1, 920 × 1, 080 pixel resolution. In total, it comprises 150 valid access
videos and 450 video spoofing attacks.
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• UVAD Dataset [190, 191]1: This dataset contains valid access and attempted
attack videos of 404 different people, all created at Full HD quality, 30 fps, and
nine seconds long. It contains 16, 268 attempted attack videos and 808 valid access
videos. Seven different display devices were used to simulate the attempted attacks
performed upon three acquisition sensors of different manufacturers: a 9.1 megapixel
(MP) Sony CyberShot DSC-HX1, a 10.0-MP Canon PowerShot SX1 IS, a 10.3-MP
Nikon Coolpix P100, a 14.0-MP Kodak Z981, a 14.0-MP Olympus SP 800UZ, and a
12.1-MP Panasonic FZ35 digital camera. Figs. 3.5 and 3.6 illustrate some examples
of this dataset.
Figure 3.5: Examples of valid access video frames for outdoor (first and second images on
the left) and indoor (three images on the right) scenes.
Figure 3.6: Examples of attempted attack video frames for outdoor (first and second
images on the left) and indoor (three images on the right) scenes using Sony (first and
second columns), Canon (third and fourth columns) and Nikon (last column) cameras.
• 3DMAD Dataset [66]: This dataset comprises valid access and mask attack
videos of 17 different subjects, whose faces were recorded by a Microsoft Kinect
sensor. To build a synthetic biometric sample, the authors used frontal and profile
face images to make the facial reconstruction. Afterwards, the authors used a 3D
printer to build a mask containing facial information of the target person. Spoofing
attack simulations were performed by presenting the 3D masks to the same Mi-
crosoft Kinect sensor. In total, the authors generated 85 valid access videos and 85
attempted attack videos.
3.4.2 Experimental Protocol
We use two measures for performance evaluation: the area under the curve (AUC) and the
half total error rate (HTER). While the former quantifies the overall ability of a classifier
to discriminate between attempted attacks and valid accesses, the latter combines the
false acceptance rate (FAR) and false rejection rate (FRR) in a specific operating point
of the ROC curve into a single measure. HTER is commonly calculated in the operating
1This dataset is freely available through FigShare (http://figshare.com/articles/visualrhythm_antispoofing/1295453).
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point in which the FAR is equal to the FRR, known as the Equal Error Rate (EER). We
use the freely available toolbox Bob [9] to calculate the AUC and HTER values. Finally,
the employed evaluation protocols follow the ones proposed by the authors of the Replay-
Attack, CASIA, UVAD and 3DMAD datasets. The source code of all proposed methods
are freely available.2
Protocol I
In this experimental protocol, we use the Replay-Attack dataset, which is divided into
three subsets: a training set with 300 attack videos and 60 valid videos; a development
set with 300 attack videos and 60 valid access videos; and a test set with 400 attempted
attack videos and 80 valid access videos. The training set is used to fit a classification
model, the development set to find the EER, whereas the test set is used to report the
final error rates.
Protocol II
In this protocol, we use CASIA dataset, divided into two disjoint subsets: training and
test sets. Due to the absence of a development set to estimate a threshold to be applied
in the test set and afterwards to calculate the HTER, the official protocol of this dataset
recommends to use the training set to build a classifier and then use the test set to report
the EER value. To report the results in terms of HTER, the original training set was
divided into two subsets, named as training and development sets, in the proportion of
80% and 20%, respectively. We use the new training set to find the classification model
and the development set to estimate the threshold that gives us the EER, whereas the
official test set is used to report the final results in terms of HTER.
Protocol III
In this protocol, we use the UVAD dataset, which contains six subsets comprising valid
access and attempted attack videos. Each subset considers attacks against one acquisition
sensor: Sony, Kodak, Olympus, Nikon, Canon and Panasonic. Here, we train a classifier
using the sensors Sony, Kodak and Olympus, and we test it with videos (valid access
and attempted attacks) from three other different manufacturers: Nikon, Canon and
Panasonic.
Protocol IV
Here, we use the 3DMAD dataset to evaluate spoofing detection of attacks using 3D masks.
The dataset contains 85 RGB videos that represent valid access and 85 RGB videos that
represent attempted spoofing attacks. As this dataset does not contain explicit subsets,
we randomly partitioned the data into three subsets: training, development and testing,
and we use Protocol I for testing.
2The source code is freely available for scientific purposes on GitHub
(https://github.com/allansp84/spectralcubes), along with this article.
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Table 3.1: After the statistical analysis, we have found that the factors highlighted with
† are the ones that did not present statistical significance when configuring our method,
whereas the levels highlighted in bold are the chosen levels.
Factor Levels Description
LGF C, and W Strategies for extracting the low-level features from video of phase spec-
trum or video of magnitude spectrum: extraction considering a central
region (crop) in each frame (C) and the entire/whole frames (W).
M PE, PH, ME, MH,
PMI, MMI, PC,
and MC
Characteristics of the frequency spectrum evaluated that can be the phase
(P) or magnitude (M) and the measures used for summarizing the spec-
tral information that can be energy (E), entropy (H), mutual information
(MI), or correlation (C).
CS R, and K Mode of selection of the visual words that compose the visual codebooks:
Random (R) or using k-means clustering algorithm (K).
SDD† S and D Strategies for generating the visual codebooks: a single visual codebook
(S) and class-based visual codebooks (D), one for each data class (spoofing
vs non-spoofing).
DS† 80, 120, 160, 200,
240, 280, 320, and
360
Visual codebook sizes. This is an important parameter because the visual
codebook size gives us visual codebooks with different degrees of specifici-
ties because large visual codebooks can incorporate small clusters of data
that appear sometimes in specific cases.
CP hardsum, hardmax
and softmax
We evaluate the combination of two strategies in the coding process (hard-
assignment and soft-assignment) and two strategies in the pooling process
(max-pooling and sum-pooling).
C SVM and PLS Classification algorithms.
3.4.3 Method Parameterization
For reproducibility purposes, this section discuss the parameters whose values are constant
in the setup of our method.
We extract the noise signature from RGB videos using a Gaussian filter with µ =
0, σ = 0.5, and kernel size 3 × 3 (Eq. 3.1). These values were obtained empirically
in [193]. Next, we extract cuboids of size 32 × 32 × 8 from the Fourier spectrum videos
(Eqs. 3.5 and 3.6), whose spatio-temporal location is chosen randomly based on a uniform
distribution.
The use of spatial measures produces low-level 8-dimensional descriptors per chan-
nel, whereas the use of spatio-temporal measures produces low-level 7-dimensional de-
scriptors per channel, which gives us a final low-level descriptor of 24-dimensional and
21-dimensional, respectively. Finally, the number of cubes extracted from videos is deter-
mined by dividing the volume of the video with respect to the cube.
Regarding the mid-level descriptors, the only parameters with constant values are the
ones that define the Gaussian kernel used in the soft-assignment coding technique, whose
values are µ = 0 and σ = 0.04. Finally, the SVM parameters are found through grid
search in the training data.
3.4.4 Experimental Design and Analysis
To find the best method configuration, we performed a factorial experiment with replica-
tion (N = 3) followed by an analysis of variance (ANOVA) [257]. Each experimental unit
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is represented as a tuple of n objects, each one with a level of a factor. Considering the
replications, we have a total of 9, 216 tuples, which are used to instantiate the proposed
method. The instances of the proposed method are evaluated through the measurement of
the value of the system response variable, the AUC value, after running such instances us-
ing the Replay-Attack dataset and Protocol I, using the development set. Next, we collect
obtained AUC values and then we performed an ANOVA test to analyze the significance
of the effects of the parameters on the classification results.
With this approach, we can discover which parameters significantly affect the system
response variable and also the best configuration of the method [94]. Henceforth, the
method parameters are referred to as factors and their values as levels. Table 3.1 shows
a brief description of the factors and their respective levels we consider herein.
Low-Level Descriptor Extraction Parameter Analysis (LGF and M)
The low-level feature extraction has two important parameters: the frequency charac-
teristics of the signal (phase or magnitude), and the function used to summarize the
information of the temporal cubes extracted from a video. In this work, we evaluate
measures that describe spatial information of the temporal cubes (energy an entropy),
and measures that describe the temporal behavior of the cubes (mutual information and
correlation across time).
To find which levels are statistically different for each factor, we perform the Tukey’s
HSD test (see Fig. 3.7). In Figs. 3.7(a)-(b), the pairs in comparison whose confidence
intervals do not intercept the zero value are statistically different. Considering the top-
5 method configuration obtained in this experiment, we conclude that the whole frame
for extracting features is more interesting than any cropped region in the center of the
frame. In addition, the characteristic extracted of the Fourier spectrum and the summa-
rization measure used to generate the low-level feature descriptors have a great impact in
the method discriminability (Fig. 3.7(b)), as several comparisons in pairs of features are
statistically significant.
Mid-Level Descriptor Extraction Parameter Analysis (CS, SDD, DS, and CP)
To construct a discriminative visual codebook, we need to choose the best strategy for
selecting the words that compose the visual codebooks (CS) as random or clustering-
based, the visual codebook size (DS), the policy to create the visual codebooks (SDD) as
single or class-based, and the pooling and coding strategies (CP).
Fig. 3.8 shows the results of the post-hoc test with Tukey’s HSD. In Fig. 3.8(a), we
have the results of the statistical analysis for DS parameter (dictionary size), to which
was not found statistical significance. Therefore, we recommend that dictionary size
parameter to be optimized according to the application of interest. In turn, Fig. 3.8(b)
shows that different pooling and coding processes causes statistically significant impacts
on the response variable, and softmax is the recommended choice.
In addition, Fig. 3.8(c) shows that the method used to select the words that compose
the visual codebook (random vs. clustering-based selection) also presents results that
are statistically significant with k-means being the recommend choice due to the high
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(b) M refers to summarization measure and the video of spectra
used to generated the low-level descriptors.
Figure 3.7: Confidence interval on the differences between the means of the levels of the
factors (a) LGF, and (b) M. For each comparison, the Tukey’s HSD test provides an
estimation of the differences between mean pairs and their respective confidence intervals,
as well the p-value for each comparison. All comparisons whose confidence intervals do not
contain zero value have a p-value lower than 0.05 and, therefore, are statistically different
with a 95% confidence level. (See Table 3.1 to see the description of levels.)
performance achieved by models built with visual codebooks generated using k-means,
during this experiment. Finally, Fig. 3.8(d) shows that the visual codebook creation
strategy (single visual codebook vs. class-based codebooks) does not present statistical
difference and, therefore, should also be considered in a future optimization process during
the implementation of the method in a real application.
Classification Step Parameter Analysis (C)
The SVM classifier outperformed PLS classifier with a statistically significant difference
(p-value = 0.00). We believe that this happened because of the non-linearity of the data
as we use a non-linear version of SVM the a linear version of PLS.
Analysis of Interaction Effects and Choice of the Best Configuration
After analyzing each factor in isolation, we examine whether there is significant interaction
between factors. In this case, if a small p-value is obtained in the interaction effect analysis
between two factors, then we can conclude that these factors do not operate independently
of each other [94]. Otherwise, there is no evidence of an interaction effect.
First of all, we can see that there is a relationship between the region from which
the low-level time-spectral features are extracted (factor LGF) and the spectral infor-
mation used in the generation of time-spectral descriptors (factor M). When analyzing
the magnitude spectrum of the Fourier transform, we see that there is a concentration
of low frequency components in the abscissa and ordinate axes. Fig. 3.9 shows that this
interaction between factors LGF and M exists. In addition: (i) we have an increase in
the mean of AUC values for measures MH, PH, PE and PMI, when these measures
are calculated in the center region of the frames; (ii) we have a decrease in the mean of
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Figure 3.8: Confidence interval of the differences between the means of the levels of the
factors (a) DS, (b) CP, (c) CS and (d) SDD. All comparisons whose confidence intervals
do not contain zero value have a p-value lower than 0.05 and, therefore, are statistically
different with a 95% confidence level as it is the case for the comparisons indicated on the
(a) x axis and (b-d) y axis. (See Table 3.1 for the description of levels.)
AUC for measure PC; and (iii) we have very small changes in mean values of AUC for
MC and MMI when we compare the two strategies for feature extraction.
Finally, the form of selecting the visual words (factor CS) and the method of coding
and pooling used in the construction of the dictionaries (factor CP) also presents an
interesting interaction. Both factors significantly influence the results, but not in isolation.
Fig. 3.9(b) shows that the results obtained with hardmax, hardsum and softmax are worse
when the visual words are chosen randomly instead of through clustering.
3.4.5 Summary After Analyzing Different Factors and Levels
The proposed method presents better results using time-spectral features extracted from
magnitude spectrum videos considering the whole frames of a video and using the corre-
lation measure from time-spectral features for generating the time-spectral descriptors.
The class-based codebooks outperform the single codebook and the selection strat-
egy of the visual words that best fits to the spoofing detection problem is the k-means
clustering. The most appropriate size for codebooks is 320 visual words and the soft-
max outperformed the other coding and pooling strategies. With this configuration, we
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Figure 3.9: Interaction plots between pairs of factors (a) LGF×M and (b) CS×CP. The
factor LGF denotes the region in the frame considered for extracting the low-level features,
while factor M denotes the statistical measures considered for describing the information
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and pooling process. (See Table 3.1 to see the description of levels.)
obtained an AUC of 99.46% and an HTER of 2.75%, considering the test set of the
Replay-Attack dataset [41]. Next, we show experiments and results for this method using
this final configuration.
3.4.6 Results
This section compares the proposed method with others in the literature for the Replay-
Attack [41], CASIA [274] and 3DMAD [65] datasets. In all experiments, we used the best
configuration of the proposed method as discussed in the last section. The parameters that
did not present statistical significance (DS and SDD), were fine-tuned for each dataset.
Replay-Attack Dataset
We first consider the validation Protocol I (c.f., Sec. 3.4.2) and the Replay-Attack dataset.
Table 3.2 shows the results for the three types of attacks available in this set. Fig. 3.10(a)
shows that attacks performed with high-quality samples are more difficult to detect
(HTER of 5.94%). This result was expected as high-quality fake samples usually con-
tain less artifacts revealing an attack.
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Figure 3.10: Results obtained on Replay-Attack dataset for each type of attack using
fixed-support (a) in contrast with hand-based attacks (b).
In turn, video-based and photo-based attacks were easily detected (HTER of 0.63%).
Note that video-based spoofing attacks are more susceptible to blurring effects, whereas
the photo-based attacks show a large amount of flickering effects due to printing defects.
Fig. 3.10(b) shows results obtained considering fixed-support and hand-based attacks,
separately. We believe that hand-based attacks are easier to be detected given that small
movements of the impostor user during the attack generate more artifacts in the biometric
sample causing more disturbances in the frequency components.
Table 3.2: Performance results for the Replay-Attack Dataset.
Dataset FAR FRR HTER AUC
High-definition attack 10.63 1.25 5.94 98.77
Mobile attack 0.00 1.25 0.63 99.95
Print attack 0.00 1.25 0.63 99.86
Hand-based attack 1.00 1.25 1.13 99.87
Fixed-support attack 7.50 1.25 4.38 99.03
Overall test set 4.25 1.25 2.75 99.46
CASIA Face Anti-Spoofing Dataset
In this experiment, we evaluate the proposed method using the Protocol II (c.f., Sec. 3.4.2)
and CASIA dataset.
Table 3.3 shows the results obtained for the seven scenarios of attacks available in this
dataset. Fig. 3.11(a) shows that video-based and warp-photo spoofing attacks are easier to
be detected by the proposed method (HTER of ≈ 8%). On the other hand, the cut-based
spoofing attacks are more difficult to be detected (HTER of 22.22%). One possible reason
for cut-based attacks to be more difficult for detecting is that during an attempted attack
based on cut-photos, the photographs are practically in the same position during all the
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time, generating fewer artifacts along time, whereas for the attempted attacks based on
warped-photos, the photographs are bent during the attack to simulate facial motion. In
addition, we believe that video-based attacks were easier to be detected because of the
inevitable downsize of the high-resolution samples by the screen device used during attack,
as also reported by CASIA’s authors [274]. In this case, many evidences of attempted
attacks are generated and added to the fake sample.
As for the quality of the acquisition (Fig. 3.11(b)), the proposed method showed
better results for attacks carried out with low-quality videos. An interesting result is the
best performance of the method to deal with high-resolution videos than normal quality
videos. We believe that any conclusion would be precipitous because many factors can
influence the noise level of a sensor such as sensor imperfections (e.g., appearance of hot
pixels, dead pixels, as well as pixel traps under different acquisition conditions). Several
works in the literature have explored these issues. For instance, thermal action has a
considerable impact over pattern noise of a digital camera and appearance of defective
pixels [39, 150, 216]. As we do not assure that the captures/recaptures happened under
similar acquisition conditions, it is wiser only to point out the existence of classification
differences in this case.
Table 3.3: Performance results for the CASIA dataset.
Dataset FAR FRR HTER AUC
Low quality 10.00 10.00 10.00 98.11
Normal quality 17.78 20.00 18.89 87.67
High quality 13.33 13.33 13.33 95.04
Warp photo attack 7.78 8.89 8.33 96.05
Cut photo attack 22.22 22.22 22.22 87.27
Video attack 8.89 8.89 8.89 96.41
Overall Attack 14.07 14.44 14.26 93.25
3DMAD Dataset
We now turn our attention to evaluate the proposed method for mask-based spoofing
attack detection using the Protocol IV (c.f., Sec. 3.4.2). Using the official dataset protocol,
the proposed method obtained an AUC of 96.16% and an HTER of 8.0%.
Erdogmus et al. [66] reported an HTER of 0.95% using block-based LBP features
(local features) and the Linear Discriminant Analysis (LDA) classifier. This performance
difference is somewhat explained due to the different validation protocol used. Erdogmus
et al. used an 1000-fold cross validation method and, in each fold, the clients from the
dataset were randomly assigned into training, development and test sets. In our case, we
randomly divided the clients from dataset and assigned them into training, development
and test set only once. Even so, the proposed method outperforms other techniques using
global LBP, whose HTERs reported by Erdogmus et al. were all above 10.0%.
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Figure 3.11: Results obtained on CASIA dataset for the three type of attacks (a) and for
the three quality of attack (b).
UVAD Dataset
In this experiment, we evaluate the proposed method using the Protocol III (c.f., Sec. 3.4.2)
and UVAD dataset. We also evaluate the proposed method considering LBP-based and
motion-based countermeasure methods.
According to Pereira et al. [184], the correlation method presents an HTER of 11.79%
on Replay-Attack. In turn, LBPu28,1 [41] was effective to characterize the artifacts embed-
ded in the attack videos on Replay-Attack obtaining an HTER of 15.16%. In the UVAD
dataset, however, both methods obtained a more modest performance as Table 3.4 shows.
With respect to LBPu28,1 method, for instance, the proposed method reduces the classifi-
cation error in about 36%.
Table 3.4: Comparison among LBP-based approach, motion-based approach and the
proposed method on the UVAD dataset.
Methods FAR (%) FRR (%) HTER (%)
Correlation (motion-based approach) [8] 81.60 14.56 48.06
LBPu28,1 [41] 27.41 66.04 46.72
Proposed Method 44.73 15.00 29.87
Comparison with State-of-the-Art Methods for CASIA and Replay-Attack
Datasets
In this section, we compare the proposed method with others available in the literature
for Replay-Attack and CASIA datasets. Table 3.5 shows results for the Replay-Attack
Dataset. The proposed method outperforms the ones based on texture analysis [41,69,151]
and also methods based on motion analysis [8]. It was also more effective than methods
84
based on fusion schemes reported by Pereira et al. [184] and Komulainen et al. [124], with
a relative error reduction (RER) of 67.69% and 46.18%, respectively.
Table 3.5: Comparison among the existing methods. The first column shows the HTERs
reported by the authors, whereas the second column shows the Relative Error Reduction
(RER) obtained with the proposed method. The reported HTERs were obtained using
the original Replay-Attack Dataset protocol. The results highlighted with † and ‡ were
reported by Chingovska et al. and Pereira et al., respectively.
Methods HTER (%) RER (%)
Chingovska et al. [41] 15.16 81.86
Allan Pinto et al. [190] 14.27 80.73
Määttä et al. [151] 13.87† 80.17
Anjos and Marcel [8] 11.79‡ 76.68
Pereira et al. [184] 8.51 67.69
Pereira et al. [69] 7.60 63.82
Komulainen et al. [124] 5.11 46.18
Proposed Method 2.75 0
Table 3.6 shows a comparison among the proposed method and others reported in the
literature for CASIA dataset. The proposed method is on par with the best ones in the
literature.
Table 3.6: Comparison among the proposed method and others available in the literature.
According to the authors of the proposed methods, EERs reported were obtained using
the original CASIA Dataset protocol.
Methods EER (%)
DoG Baseline. [274] 17.0
LBPu28,1. [69] 16.0
LBP-TOPu28,8,8,1,1,1. [69] 10.0
Proposed Method 14.0
Analysis of the Minimum Detection Time
We now analyze the impact of the video length over the method discriminability for
CASIA, Replay-Attack and 3DMAD datasets. This experiment evaluates: the minimum
number of frames required for the method to operate; and the method stability, in terms
of HTER(%), for the three different datasets.
Fig. 3.12 indicates that HTER values vary only slightly when we change the video
length for the three datasets and that the proposed method uses about two seconds to
detect an attempted attack, thus not compromising the transparency of the authentication
process.
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Figure 3.12: Results in terms of HTER (%) of the proposed method for different video
input length for Replay-Attack, CASIA and 3DMAD datasets.
Cross-Dataset Evaluation
In this section, we discuss the performance of the proposed method considering a more dif-
ficult scenario (cross-dataset), in which the proposed method is trained with one dataset
but it is tested on a different dataset with different acquisition conditions. In this ex-
periment, all datasets used during the training were randomly divided into training and
development sets in a proportion of 80% and 20%, respectively. The development set is
used to estimate the EER threshold that is necessary to calculate the HTER during the
test.
Table 3.7 shows the results using the cross-dataset protocol. The results indicate that
the proposed method presents better generalization when trained with CASIA, with a
mean HTER of 40.17%. We believe this occurred due to more variability of the type
of attacks and video quality in the CASIA dataset, which enriches the training. This
dataset contains warped-, cut- and video-based attacks performed with spoofed samples
of different quality: low, normal and high quality. Such characteristics enables a better
generalization of the method when CASIA is used for training.
In turn, the best performance when testing the CASIA and 3DMAD datasets was
obtained when training with UVAD dataset, another rich dataset for training. Although
this dataset contains only video-based spoofing attacks, it has comprises different sensors
(for capturing and recapturing the biometric samples) and display devices used during
the attempted attacks. We believe that such variability adds different sensor-intrinsic
noise levels to the training samples, which contribute to build a more robust classification
model.
With regard to the more modest generalization presented during the test of the
3DMAD dataset, we believe that it is due to the absence of some artifacts that are
commonly found in samples from photo-based and video-based attacks (e.g., blurring,
flickering effects) that were not found in the attempted attack video from 3D masks. In
addition, spoofing attacks performed with masks are less likely to add temporal distur-
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bances similar to those added when the impostor presents the fake samples, by hand,
using a monitor or a photo.
Finally, Table 3.8 shows a comparison among the obtained results reported in the lit-
erature. Except for the correlation method, all others present a better performance when
they are trained with CASIA. Once again, we believe that our method performs better
when training with CASIA because such dataset is more heterogeneous than Replay-
Attack. The Correlation [8] and LBP-TOP [41] methods aim to characterize temporal
information, similarly to the proposed method, and the results of both methods empha-
size the difficulty in characterizing such information completely. In this protocol, besides
handling data from different sensors, all methods have to deal with different lighting
conditions and background.
Table 3.7: Results obtained with the cross-dataset protocol and using the overall test sets
of each dataset.
Train Test FAR (%) FRR (%) HTER (%) Mean HTER (%)
3DMAD 88.00 4.00 46.00
Replay-Attack 32.50 36.25 34.38CASIA
UVAD 38.61 41.67 40.14
40.17%
3DMAD 52.00 44.00 48.00
CASIA 0.00 100.0 50.00Replay-Attack
UVAD 5.74 83.33 44.54
47.45%
3DMAD 84.00 4.00 44.00
CASIA 13.70 63.33 38.52UVAD
Replay-Attack 79.25 6.25 42.75
41.76%
3.5 Conclusions and Future Work
In this paper, we proposed an algorithm for detecting spoofing attacks that takes advan-
tage of noise and artifacts added to the synthetic biometric samples during their manu-
facture and recapture. We showed that the analysis of the behavior of the noise signature,
in the frequency domain, is proper to reveal spoofing attacks. For this, we proposed the
use of time-spectral features as low-level descriptors, which gather temporal and spectral
information in a single feature descriptor. To handle several types of attacks and to obtain
a feature descriptor with a suitable generalization, we also proposed the use of the visual
codebook concept to find a mid-level representation from time-spectral descriptors.
The experimental results showed that the magnitude is an important characteristic
from a signal, in frequency domain, for spoofing attack detection. We also showed how
to use the visual codebook concept effectively in order to find a more robust space repre-
sentation to the different kinds of attacks and with a good generalization. The obtained
results demonstrated the effectiveness of the proposed method in detecting different types
of attacks (photo-, video-, and 3D-mask-based ones).
We believe that the frequency-based approach used is effective because we have a de-
crease in low frequency components due to information loss caused during manufacture
of the fake samples (e.g., information loss during printing) and recapture (e.g., blurring
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effect) and an increase in some high frequency components in the fake samples during re-
capture due to some artifacts added to the fake samples (e.g., printing artifacts, banding
effect, noise added by the imaging sensor). Moreover, these disturbances in the composi-
tion of the components of frequencies are best characterized as we analyze the biometric
sample in the frequency domain rather than spatial domain and along time instead of on
isolated frames or still images.
Table 3.8: Comparison among different anti-spoofing methods considering cross-dataset
protocol.
Methods Train Test HTER (%)
Proposed Method
Replay-Attack CASIA 50.00
CASIA Replay-Attack 34.38
Replay-Attack CASIA 48.28
Correlation
CASIA Replay-Attack 50.25
LBP-TOPu28,8,8,1,1,1
Replay-Attack CASIA 61.33
CASIA Replay-Attack 50.64
Replay-Attack CASIA 57.90
LBPu28,1 CASIA Replay-Attack 47.05
Regarding the important cross-dataset validation, the performed experiments demon-
strated that the proposed method and other approaches available in the literature still
have modest generalizations. This is of particular importance for the research community
as it shows that the problem is still far from solved and cross-dataset validation must be
considered from now on when designing and deploying spoofing detection techniques.
As discussed earlier, we observed that different biometric sensors present different
properties. Therefore, it is important to train a classifier considering this variability.
UVAD dataset comes in hand for this purpose and will surely serve the community in this
regard with more than 15k samples of hundreds of clients and diverse sensors.
Finally, it is worth mentioning that we do not claim to introduce the best method
out there for spoofing detection. On the contrary, our very objective in this paper was to
show that capturing spatio, spectral and temporal features from biometric samples can
be successfully considered in the spoofing detection scenario. That being said, it is likely
that the proposed approach, when combined with existing ones in the literature, may
as well boost the performance since they will likely rely on complementary features for
solving the problem.
Directions for future research include the investigation of new approaches to trans-
forming low-level descriptors into mid-level descriptors as Fisher vectors [186] and Bossa
Nova [12]. These strategies for finding mid-level representations could also be exploited
by methods that use texture-based descriptors. In such cases, the goal would be to in-
vestigate whether the representation space found by the texture descriptors used in the
literature for detecting face spoofing attacks (e.g., LBP, LBP-TOP, and their variants)
could be transformed in a new representation space better adapted to the face spoofing
problem in a scenario with different types of attacks.
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Chapter 4
Deep Representations for Iris, Face,
and Fingerprint Spoofing Detection
“The mediocre teacher tells. The good teacher explains. The superior teacher
demonstrates. The great teacher inspires.”
—William Arthur Ward, American administrator, writer, pastor, and teacher
(1921–1994)
“Persistence can change failure into extraordinary achievement.”
—Matthew Nicholas Biondi, American swimmer
Abstract
Biometrics systems have significantly improved person identification and authentication,
playing an important role in personal, national, and global security. However, these
systems might be deceived (or “spoofed”) and, despite the recent advances in spoofing
detection, current solutions often rely on domain knowledge, specific biometric reading
systems, and attack types. We assume a very limited knowledge about biometric spoofing
at the sensor to derive outstanding spoofing detection systems for iris, face, and fingerprint
modalities based on two deep learning approaches. The first approach consists of learning
suitable convolutional network architectures for each domain, while the second approach
focuses on learning the weights of the network via back-propagation. We consider nine
biometric spoofing benchmarks — each one containing real and fake samples of a given
biometric modality and attack type — and learn deep representations for each benchmark
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by combining and contrasting the two learning approaches. This strategy not only pro-
vides better comprehension of how these approaches interplay, but also creates systems
that exceed the best known results in eight out of the nine benchmarks. The results
strongly indicate that spoofing detection systems based on convolutional networks can be
robust to attacks already known and possibly adapted, with little effort, to image-based
attacks that are yet to come.
4.1 Introduction
B IOMETRICS human characteristics and traits can successfully allow people identifi-cation and authentication and have been widely used for access control, surveillance,
and also in national and global security systems [108]. In the last few years, due to the
recent technological improvements for data acquisition, storage and processing, and also
the scientific advances in computer vision, pattern recognition, and machine learning, sev-
eral biometric modalities have been largely applied to person recognition, ranging from
traditional fingerprint to face, to iris, and, more recently, to vein and blood flow. Simul-
taneously, various spoofing attacks techniques have been created to defeat such biometric
systems.
There are several ways to spoof a biometric system [204,205]. Indeed, previous studies
show at least eight different points of attack [76, 203] that can be divided into two main
groups: direct and indirect attacks. The former considers the possibility to generate syn-
thetic biometric samples, and is the first vulnerability point of a biometric security system
acting at the sensor level. The latter includes all the remaining seven points of attacks
and requires different levels of knowledge about the system, e.g., the matching algorithm
used, the specific feature extraction procedure, database access for manipulation, and also
possible weak links in the communication channels within the system.
Given that the most vulnerable part of a system is its acquisition sensor, attackers have
mainly focused on direct spoofing. This is possibly because a number of biometric traits
can be easily forged with the use of common apparatus and consumer electronics to imitate
real biometric readings (e.g., stampers, printers, displays, audio recorders). In response
to that, several biometric spoofing benchmarks have been recently proposed, allowing
researchers to make steady progress in the conception of anti-spoofing systems. Three
relevant modalities in which spoofing detection has been investigated are iris, face, and
fingerprint. Benchmarks across these modalities usually share the common characteristic
of being image- or video-based.
In the context of irises, attacks are normally performed using printed iris images [229]
or, more interestingly, cosmetic contact lenses [32,264]. With faces, impostors can present
to the acquisition sensor a photography, a digital video [41], or even a 3D mask [66] of a
valid user. For fingerprints, the most common spoofing method consists of using artificial
replicas [83] created in a cooperative way, where a mold of the fingerprint is acquired with
the cooperation of a valid user and is used to replicate the user’s fingerprint with different
materials, including gelatin, latex, play-doh or silicone.
The success of an anti-spoofing method is usually connected to the modality for which
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it was designed. In fact, such systems often rely on expert knowledge to engineer features
that are able to capture acquisition telltales left by specific types of attacks. However,
the need of custom-tailored solutions for the myriad possible attacks might be a limiting
constraint. Small changes in the attack could require the redesign of the entire system.
In this paper, we do not focus on custom-tailored solutions. Instead, inspired by the
recent success of Deep Learning in several vision tasks [46, 47, 130, 173, 242], and by the
ability of the technique to leverage data, we focus on two general-purpose approaches to
build image-based anti-spoofing systems with convolutional networks for several attack
types in three biometric modalities, namely iris, face, and fingerprint. The first technique
that we explore is hyperparameter optimization of network architectures [18,195] that we
henceforth call architecture optimization, while the second lies at the core of convolutional
networks and consists of learning filter weights via the well-known back-propagation [135]
algorithm, hereinafter referred to as filter optimization.
Fig. 4.1 illustrates how such techniques are used. The architecture optimization (AO)
approach is presented on the left and is highlighted in blue while the filter optimization
(FO) approach is presented on the right and is highlighted in red. As we can see, AO
is used to search for good architectures of convolutional networks in a given spoofing
detection problem and uses convolutional filters whose weights are set at random in order
to make the optimization practical. This approach assumes little a priori knowledge about
the problem, and is an area of research in deep learning that has been successful in showing
that the architecture of convolutional networks, by themselves, is of extreme importance
to performance [15, 18, 20, 194, 195, 221]. In fact, the only knowledge AO assumes about
the problem is that it is approachable from a computer vision perspective.
Still in Fig 4.1, FO is carried out with back-propagation in a predefined network ar-
chitecture. This is a longstanding approach for building convolutional networks that has
recently enabled significant strides in computer vision, specially because of an under-
standing of the learning process, and the availability of plenty of data and processing
power [130, 233, 242]. Network architecture in this context is usually determined by pre-
vious knowledge of related problems.
In general, we expect AO to adapt the architecture to the problem in hand and FO to
model important stimuli for discriminating fake and real biometric samples. We evaluate
AO and FO not only in separate, but also in combination, i.e., architectures learned with
AO are used for FO as well as previously known good performing architectures are used
with random filters. This explains the crossing dotted lines in the design flow of Fig 4.1.
As our experiments show, the benefits of evaluating AO and FO apart and later
combining them to build anti-spoofing systems are twofold. First, it enables us to have a
better comprehension of the interplay between these approaches, something that has been
largely underexplored in the literature of convolutional networks. Second, it allows us to
build systems with outstanding performance in all nine publicly available benchmarks
considered in this work.
The first three of such benchmarks consist of spoofing attempts for iris recognition
systems, Biosec [219], Warsaw [51], and MobBIOfake [228]. Replay-Attack [41] and
3DMAD [66] are the benchmarks considered for faces, while Biometrika, CrossMatch,
Italdata, and Swipe are the fingerprint benchmarks here considered, all them recently
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Figure 4.1: Schematic diagram detailing how anti-spoofing systems are built from spoofing
detection benchmarks. Architecture optimization (AO) is shown on the left and filter
optimization (FO) on the right. In this work, we not only evaluate AO and FO in
separate, but also in combination, as indicated by the crossing dotted lines.
used in the 2013 Fingerprint Liveness Detection Competition (LivDet’13) [83].
Results outperform state-of-the-art counterparts in eight of the nine cases and observe
a balance in terms of performance between AO and FO, with one performing better than
the other depending on the sample size and problem difficulty. In some cases, we also
show that when both approaches are combined, we can obtain performance levels that
neither one can obtain by itself. Moreover, by observing the behaviour of AO and FO, we
take advantage of domain knowledge to propose a single new convolutional architecture
that push performance in five problems even further, sometimes by a large margin, as in
CrossMatch (68.80% v. 98.23%).
The experimental results strongly indicate that convolutional networks can be readily
used for robust spoofing detection. Indeed, we believe that data-driven solutions based on
deep representations might be a valuable direction to this field of research, allowing the
construction of systems with little effort even to image-based attack types yet to come.
We organized the remainder of this work into five sections. Section 4.2 presents previ-
ous anti-spoofing systems for the three biometric modalities covered in this paper, while
Section 4.3 presents the considered benchmarks. Section 4.4 describes the methodology
adopted for architecture optimization (AO) and filter optimization (FO) while Section 4.5
presents experiments, results, and comparisons with state-of-the-art methods. Finally,
Section 4.6 concludes the paper and discusses some possible future directions.
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4.2 Related Work
In this section, we review anti-spoofing related work for iris, face, and fingerprints, our
focus in this paper.
4.2.1 Iris Spoofing
Daugman [60, Section 8 – Countermeasures against Subterfuge]1 was one of the first
authors to discuss the feasibility of some attacks on iris recognition systems. The author
proposed the use of Fast Fourier Transform to verify the high frequency spectral magnitude
in the frequency domain.
The solutions for iris liveness detection available in the literature range from active
solutions relying on special acquisition hardware [113,137,174] to software-based solutions
relying on texture analysis of the effects of an attacker using color contact lenses with
someone else’s pattern printed onto them [259]. Software-based solutions have also ex-
plored the effects of cosmetic contact lenses [32,64,120,264]; pupil constriction [102]; and
multi biometrics of electroencephalogram (EEG) and iris together [115], among others.
Galbally et al. [75] investigated 22 image quality measures (e.g., focus, motion, oc-
clusion, and pupil dilation). The best features are selected through sequential floating
feature selection (SFFS) [198] to feed a quadratic discriminant classifier. The authors
validated the work on the BioSec [68,219] benchmark. Sequeira et al. [226] also explored
image quality measures [75] and three classification techniques validating the work on
the BioSec [68, 219] and Clarkson [224] benchmarks and introducing the MobBIOfake
benchmark comprising 800 iris images from the MobBIO multimodal database [228].
Sequeira et al. [227] extended upon previous works also exploring quality measures.
They first used a feature selection step on the features of the studied methods to ob-
tain the “best features” and then used well-known classifiers for the decision-making. In
addition, they applied iris segmentation [164] to obtaining the iris contour and adapted
the feature extraction processes to the resulting non-circular iris regions. The validation
considered five datasets (BioSec [68,219], MobBIOfake [228], Warsaw [51], Clarkson [224]
and NotreDame [63].
Textures have also been explored for iris liveness detection. In the recent MobILive2 [229]
iris spoofing detection competition, the winning team explored three texture descriptors:
Local Phase Quantization (LPQ) [171], Binary Gabor Pattern [272], and Local Binary
Pattern (LBP) [169].
Analyzing printing regularities left in printed irises, Czajka [51] explored some peaks
in the frequency spectrum were associated to spoofing attacks. For validation, the authors
introduced the Warsaw dataset containing 729 fake images and 1,274 images of real eyes.
In [224], The First Intl. Iris Liveness Competition in 2013, the Warsaw database was also
evaluated, however, the best reported result achieved 11.95% of FRR and 5.25% of FAR
by the University of Porto team.
Sun et al. [238] recently proposed a general framework for iris image classification based
1It also appears in a lecture of Daugman at IBC 2004 [58].
2MobLive 2014, Intl. Joint Conference on Biometrics (IJCB).
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on a Hierarchical Visual Codebook (HVC). The HVC encodes the texture primitives of
iris images and is based on two existing bag-of-words models. The method achieved
state-of-the-art performance for iris spoofing detection, among other tasks.
In summary, iris anti-spoofing methods have explored hard-coded features through
image-quality metrics, texture patterns, bags-of-visual-words and noise artifacts due to the
recapturing process. The performance of such solutions vary significantly from dataset to
dataset. Differently, here we propose the automatically extract vision meaningful features
directly from the data using deep representations.
4.2.2 Face Spoofing
We can categorize the face anti-spoofing methods into four groups [214]: user behavior
modeling, methods relying on extra devices [270], methods relying on user cooperation
and, finally, data-driven characterization methods. In this section, we review data-driven
characterization methods proposed in literature, the focus of our work herein.
Määttä et al. [151] used LBP operator for capturing printing artifacts and micro-
texture patterns added in the fake biometric samples during acquisition. Schwartz et
al. [214] explored color, texture, and shape of the face region and used them with Partial
Least Square (PLS) classifier for deciding whether a biometric sample is fake or not. Both
works validated the methods with the Print Attack benchmark [8]. Lee et al. [139] also
explored image-based attacks and proposed the frequency entropy analysis for spoofing
detection.
Pinto et al. [193] pioneered research on video-based face spoofing detection. They
proposed visual rhythm analysis to capture temporal information on face spoofing attacks.
Mask-based face spoofing attacks have also been considered thus far. Erdogmus et
al. [65] dealt with the problem through Gabor wavelets: local Gabor binary pattern his-
togram sequences [273] and Gabor graphs [262] with a Gabor-phase based similarity mea-
sure [90]. Erdogmus & Marcel [66] introduced the 3D Mask Attack database (3DMAD),
a public available 3D spoofing database, recorded with Microsoft Kinect sensor.
Kose et al. [127] demonstrated that a face verification system is vulnerable to mask-
based attacks and, in another work, Kose et al. [126] evaluated the anti-spoofing method
proposed by Määttä et al. [151] (originally proposed to detect photo-based spoofing at-
tacks). Inspired by the work of Tan et al. [245], Kose et al. [128] evaluated a solution
based on reflectance to detect attacks performed with 3D masks.
Finally, Pereira et al. [184] proposed a score-level fusion strategy in order to detect
various types of attacks. In a follow-up work, Pereira et al. [69] proposed an anti-spoofing
solution based on the dynamic texture, a spatio-temporal version of the original LBP.
Results showed that LBP-based dynamic texture description has a higher effectiveness
than the original LBP.
In summary, similarly to iris spoofing detection methods, the available solutions in
the literature mostly deal with the face spoofing detection problem through texture pat-
terns (e.g., LBP-like detectors), acquisition telltales (noise), and image quality metrics.
Here, we approach the proplem by extracting meaningful features directly from the data
regardless of the input type (image, video, or 3D masks).
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4.2.3 Fingerprint Spoofing
We can categorize fingerprint spoofing detection methods roughly into two groups: hardware-
based (exploring extra sensors) and software-based solutions (relying only on the infor-
mation acquired by the standard acquisition sensor of the authentication system) [83].
Galbally et al. [71] proposed a set of feature for fingerprint liveness detection based on
quality measures such as ridge strength or directionality, ridge continuity, ridge clarity, and
integrity of the ridge-valley structure. The validation considered the three benchmarks
used in LivDet 2009 – Fingerprint competition [159] captured with different optical sen-
sors: Biometrika, CrossMatch, and Identix. Later work [72] explored the method in the
presence of gummy fingers.
Ghiani et al. [82] explored LPQ [171], a method for representing all spectrum char-
acteristics in a compact feature representation form. The validation considered the four
benchmarks used in the LivDet 2011 – Fingerprint competition [266].
Gragnaniello et al. [86] explored the Weber Local Image Descriptor (WLD) for liveness
detection, well suited to high-contrast patterns such as the ridges and valleys of finger-
prints images. In addition, WLD is robust to noise and illumination changes. The vali-
dation considered the LivDet 2009 and LivDet 2011 – Fingerprint competition datasets.
Jia et al. [112] proposed a liveness detection scheme based on Multi-scale Block Local
Ternary Patterns (MBLTP). Differently of the LBP, the Local Ternary Pattern operation
is done on the average value of the block instead of the pixels being more robust to noise.
The validation considered the LivDet 2011 – Fingerprint competition benchmarks.
Ghiani et al. [81] explored Binarized Statistical Image Features (BSIF) originally pro-
posed by Kannala et al. [114]. The BSIF was inspired in the LBP and LPQ methods. In
contrast to LBP and LPQ approaches, BSIF learns a filter set by using statistics of nat-
ural images [104]. The validation considered the LivDet 2011 – Fingerprint competition
benchmarks.
Recent results reported in the LivDet 2013 Fingerprint Liveness Detection Competi-
tion [81] show that fingerprint spoofing attack detection task is still an open problem with
results still far from a perfect classification rate.
We notice that most of the groups approach the problem with hard-coded features
sometimes exploring quality metrics related to the modality (e.g., directionality and ridge
strength), general texture patterns (e.g., LBP-, MBLTP-, and LPQ-based methods), and
filter learning through natural image statistics. This last approach seems to open a new
research trend, which seeks to model the problem learning features directly from the
data. We follow this approach in this work, assuming little a priori knowledge about
acquisition-level biometric spoofing and exploring deep representations of the data.
4.2.4 Multi-modalities
Recently, Galbally et al. [74] proposed a general approach based on 25 image quality
features to detect spoofing attempts in face, iris, and fingerprint biometric systems. Our
work is similar to theirs in goals, but radically different with respect to the methods.
Instead of relying on prescribed image quality features, we build features that would be
96
hardly thought by a human expert with AO and FO. Moreover, here we evaluate our
systems in more recent and updated benchmarks.
4.3 Benchmarks
In this section, we describe the benchmarks (datasets) that we consider in this work.
All them are publicly available upon request and suitable for evaluating countermeasure
methods to iris, face and fingerprint spoofing attacks. Table 4.1 shows the major features
of each one and in the following we describe their details.
4.3.1 Iris Spoofing Benchmarks
Biosec
This benchmark was created using iris images from 50 users of the BioSec [219]. In
total, there are 16 images for each user (2 sessions × 2 eyes × 4 images), totalizing
800 valid access images. To create spoofing attempts, the original images from Biosec
were preprocessed to improve quality and printed using an HP Deskjet 970cxi and an
HP LaserJet 4200L printers. Finally, the iris images were recaptured with the same iris
camera used to capture the original images.
Warsaw
This benchmark contains 1274 images of 237 volunteers representing valid accesses and
729 printout images representing spoofing attempts, which were generated by using two
printers: (1) a HP LaserJet 1320 used to produce 314 fake images with 600 dpi resolution,
and (2) a Lexmark C534DN used to produce 415 fake images with 1200 dpi resolution.
Both real and fake images were captured by an IrisGuard AD100 biometric device.
MobBIOfake
This benchmark contains live iris images and fake printed iris images captured with the
same acquisition sensor, i.e., a mobile phone. To generate fake images, the authors first
performed a preprocessing in the original images to enhance the contrast. The prepro-
cessed images were then printed with a professional printer on high quality photographic
paper.
4.3.2 Video-based Face Spoofing Benchmarks
Replay-Attack
This benchmark contains short video recordings of both valid accesses and video-based at-
tacks of 50 different subjects. To generate valid access videos, each person was recorded in
two sessions in a controlled and in an adverse environment with a regular webcam. Then,
spoofing attempts were generated using three techniques: (1) print attack, which presents
to the acquisition sensor hard copies of high-resolution digital photographs printed with
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a Triumph-Adler DCC 2520 color laser printer; (2) mobile attack, which presents to the
acquisition sensor photos and videos taken with an iPhone using the iPhone screen; and
(3) high-definition attack, in which high resolution photos and videos taken with an iPad
are presented to the acquisition sensor using the iPad screen.
3DMAD
This benchmark consists of real videos and fake videos made with people wearing masks.
A total of 17 different subjects were recorded with a Microsoft Kinect sensor, and videos
were collected in three sessions. For each session and each person, five videos of 10 seconds
were captured. The 3D masks were produced by ThatsMyFace.com using one frontal and
two profile images of each subject. All videos were recorded by the same acquisition
sensor.
4.3.3 Fingerprint Spoofing Benchmarks
LivDet2013
This dataset contains four sets of real and fake fingerprint readings performed in four
acquisition sensors: Biometrika FX2000, Italdata ET10, Crossmatch L Scan Guardian,
and Swipe. For a more realistic scenario, fake samples in Biometrika and Italdata were
generated without user cooperation, while fake samples in Crossmatch and Swipe were
generated with user cooperation. Several materials for creating the artificial fingerprints
were used, including gelatin, silicone, latex, among others.
4.3.4 Remark
Images found in these benchmarks can be observed in Fig. 4.5 of Section 4.5. As we can
see, variability exists not only across modalities, but also within modalities. Moreover,
it is rather unclear what features might discriminate real from spoofed images, which
suggests that the use of a methodology able to use data to its maximum advantage might
be a promising idea to tackle such set of problems in a principled way.
4.4 Methodology
In this section, we present the methodology for architecture optimization (AO) and filter
optimization (FO) as well as details about how benchmark images are preprocessed, how
AO and FO are evaluated across the benchmarks, and how these methods are imple-
mented.
4.4.1 Architecture Optimization (AO)
Our approach for AO builds upon the work of Pinto et al. [195] and Bergstra et al. [20],
i.e., fundamental, feedforward convolutional operations are stacked by means of hyperpa-
rameter optimization, leading to effective yet simple convolutional networks that do not
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require expensive filter optimization and from which prediction is done by linear support
vector machines (SVMs).
Operations in convolutional networks can be viewed as linear and non-linear transfor-
mations that, when stacked, extract high level representations of the input. Here we use
a well-known set of operations called (i) convolution with a bank of filters, (ii) rectified
linear activation, (iii) spatial pooling, and (iv) local normalization. Appendix B provides
a detailed definition of these operations.
We denote as layer the combination of these four operations in the order that they
appear in the left panel of Fig. 4.2. Local normalization is optional and its use is governed
by an additional “yes/no” hyperparameter. In fact, there are other six hyperparameters,
each of a particular operation, that have to be defined in order to instantiate a layer.
They are presented in the lower part of the left panel in Fig. 4.2 and are in accordance to
the definitions of Appendix B.
Considering one layer and possible values of each hyperparameter, there are over
3,000 possible layer architectures, and this number grows exponentially with the number
of layers, which goes up to three in our case (Fig. 4.2 right panel). In addition, there
are network-level hyperparameters, such as the size of the input image, that expand
possibilities to a myriad potential architectures.
The overall set of possible hyperparameter values is called search space, which in
this case is discrete and contains variables that are only meaningful in combination with
others. For example, hyperparameters of a given layer are just meaningful if the candidate
architecture has actually that number of layers. In spite of the intrinsic difficulty in
optimizing architectures in this space, random search has played and important role in
problems of this type [18, 195] and it is the strategy of our choice due to its effectiveness
and simplicity.
We can see in Fig. 4.2 that a three-layered network has a total of 25 hyperparameters,
seven per layer and four at network level. They are all defined in Appendix B with the
exception of input size, which seeks to determine the best size of the image’s greatest axis
(rows or columns) while keeping its aspect ratio. Concretely, random search in this paper
can be described as follows:
1. Randomly — and uniformly, in our case — sample values from the hyperparameter
search space;
2. Extract features from real and fake training images with the candidate architecture;
3. Evaluate the architecture according to an optimization objective based on linear
SVM scores;
4. Repeat steps 1–3 until a termination criterion is met;
5. Return the best found convolutional architecture.
Even though there are billions of possible networks in the search space (Fig. 4.2), it
is important to remark that not all candidate networks are valid. For example, a large
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operation hyperparameter values
convolution filter size {3, 5, 7, 9}
number of filters {32, 64, 128, 256}
activation —
pooling size {3, 5, 7, 9}
stride {1, 2, 4, 8}
strength {1, 2, 10}
local norm. apply (yes/no) {yes, no}
size {3, 5, 7, 9}
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input size {64, 128, 256, original}
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depth {1, 2, 3}
local norm.
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layer 1 layer 1 layer 1
layer 2 layer 2
layer 3
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activation
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Figure 4.2: Schematic diagram for architecture optimization (AO) illustrating how oper-
ations are stacked in a layer (left) and how the network is instantiated and evaluated ac-
cording to possible hyperparameter values (right). Note that a three-layered convolutional
network of this type has a total of 25 hyperparameters governing both its architecture
and its overall behaviour through a particular instance of stacked operations.
number of candidate architectures (i.e., points in the search space) would produce rep-
resentations with spatial resolution smaller than one pixel. Hence, they are naturally
unfeasible. Additionally, in order to avoid very large representations, we discard in ad-
vance candidate architectures whose intermediate layers produce representations of over
600K elements or whose output representation has over 30K elements.
Filter weights are randomly generated for AO. This strategy has been successfully used
in the vision literature [111,194,195,221] and is essential to make AO practical, avoiding
the expensive filter optimization (FO) part in the evaluation of candidate architectures.
We sample weights from a uniform distribution U(0, 1) and normalize the filters to zero
mean and unit norm in order to ensure that they are spread over the unit sphere. When
coupled with rectified linear activation (Appendix B), this sampling enforces sparsity in
the network by discarding about 50% of the expected filter responses, thereby improving
the overall robustness of the feature extraction.
A candidate architecture is evaluated by first extracting deep representations from
real and fake images and later training hard-margin linear SVMs (C=105) on these repre-
sentations. We observed that the sensitivity of the performance measure was saturating
with traditional 10-fold cross validation (CV) in some benchmarks. Therefore, we opted
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for a different validation strategy. Instead of training on nine folds and validating on
one, we train on one fold and validate on nine. Precisely, the optimization objective is
the mean detection accuracy obtained from this adapted cross-validation scheme, which
is maximized during the optimization.
For generating the 10 folds, we took special care in putting all samples of an individual
in the same fold to enforce robustness to cross-individual spoofing detection in the opti-
mized architectures. Moreover, in benchmarks where we have more than one attack type
(e.g., Replay-Attack and LivDet2013, see Section 4.3), we evenly distributed samples of
each attack type across all folds in order to enforce that candidate architectures are also
robust to different types of attack.
Finally, the termination criterion of our AO procedure simply consists of counting the
number of valid candidate architectures and stopping the optimization when this number
reaches 2,000.
4.4.2 Filter Optimization (FO)
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Figure 4.3: Architecture of convolutional network found in the Cuda-convnet library and
here used as reference for filter optimization (cf10-11, top). Proposed network architecture
extending upon cf10-11 to better suiting spoofing detection problems (spoofnet, bottom).
Both architectures are typical examples where domain knowledge has been incorporated
for increased performance.
We now turn our attention to a different approach for tackling the problem. Instead
of optimizing the architecture, we explore the filter weights and how to learn them for
better characterizing real and fake samples. Our approach for FO is at the origins of
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convolutional networks and consists of learning filter weights via the well-known back-
propagation algorithm [135]. Indeed, due to a refined understanding of the optimization
process and the availability of plenty of data and processing power, back-propagation
has been the gold standard method in deep networks for computer vision in the last
years [130,233,271].
For optimizing filters, we need to have an already defined architecture. We start
optimizing filters with a standard public convolutional network and training procedure.
This network is available in the Cuda-convnet library [129] and is currently one of the
best performing architectures in CIFAR-10,3 a popular computer vision benchmark in
which such network achieves 11% of classification error. Hereinafter, we call this network
cuda-convnet-cifar10-11pct, or simply cf10-11.
Fig. 4.3 depicts the architecture of cf10-11 in the top panel and is a typical example
where domain knowledge has been incorporated for increased performance. We can see it
as a three-layered network in which the first two layers are convolutional, with operations
similar to the operations used in architecture optimization (AO). In the third layer, cf10-
11 has two sublayers of unshared local filtering and a final fully-connected sublayer on
top of which softmax regression is performed. A detailed explanation of the operations in
cf10-11 can be found in [129].
In order to train cf10-11 in a given benchmark, we split the training images into
four batches observing the same balance of real and fake images. After that, we follow
a procedure similar to the original4 for training cf10-11 in all benchmarks, which can be
described as follows:
1. For 100 epochs, train the network with a learning rate of 10−3 by considering the
first three batches for training and the fourth batch for validation;
2. For another 40 epochs, resume training now considering all four batches for training;
3. Reduce the learning rate by a factor of 10, and train the network for another 10
epochs;
4. Reduce the learning rate by another factor of 10, and train the network for another
10 epochs.
After evaluating filter learning on the cf10-11 architecture, we also wondered how filter
learning could benefit from an optimized architecture incorporating domain-knowledge of
the problem. Therefore, extending upon the knowledge obtained with AO as well as with
training cf10-11 in the benchmarks, we derived a new architecture for spoofing detection
that we call spoofnet. Fig. 4.3 illustrates this architecture in the bottom panel and has
three key differences as compared to cf10-11. First, it has 16 filters in the first layer
instead of 64. Second, operations in the second layer are stacked in the same order that
we used when optimizing architectures (AO). Third, we removed the two unshared local
filtering operations in the third layer, as they seem inappropriate in a problem where
object structure is irrelevant.
3http://www.cs.toronto.edu/~kriz/cifar.html
4https://code.google.com/p/cuda-convnet/wiki/Methodology.
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Table 4.2: Input image dimensionality after basic preprocessing on face and fingerprint
images (highlighted). See Section 4.4.3 for details.
Modality Benchmark
Dimensions
columns× rows
Iris
Warsaw [51] 640× 480
Biosec [219] 640× 480
MobBIOfake [228] 250× 200
Face
Replay-Attack [36] 200× 200
3DMAD [42] 200× 200
Fingerprint
Biometrika [83] 312× 372
CrossMatch [83] 480× 675
Italdata [83] 384× 432
Swipe [83] 187× 962
These three modifications considerably dropped the number of weights in the network
and this, in turn, allowed us to increase of size of the input images from 32 × 32 to
128 × 128. This is the fourth and last modification in spoofnet, and we believe that it
might enable the network to be more sensitive to subtle local patterns in the images.
In order to train spoofnet, the same procedure used to train cf10-11 is considered
except for the initial learning rate, which is made 10−4, and for the number of epochs
in each step, which is doubled. These modifications were made because of the decreased
learning capacity of the network.
Finally, in order to reduce overfitting, data augmentation is used for training both
networks according to the procedure of [130]. For cf10-11, five 24 × 24 image patches
are cropped out from the 32 × 32 input images. These patches correspond to the four
corners and central region of the original image, and their horizontal reflections are also
considered. Therefore, ten training samples are generated from a single image. For
spoofnet, the procedure is the same except for the fact that input images have 128× 128
pixels and cropped regions are of 112 × 112 pixels. During prediction, just the central
region of the test image is considered.
4.4.3 Elementary Preprocessing
A few basic preprocessing operations were executed on face and fingerprint images in
order to properly learn representations for these benchmarks. This preprocessing led to
images with sizes as presented in Table 4.2 and are described in the next two sections.
Face Images
Given that the face benchmarks considered in this work are video-based, we first evenly
subsample 10 frames from each input video. Then, we detect the face position using Viola
& Jones [255] and crop a region of 200× 200 pixels centered at the detected window.
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Fingerprint Images
Given the diverse nature of images captured from different sensors, here the preprocessing
is defined according to the sensor type.
1. Biometrika: we cropped the central region of size in columns and rows corresponding
to 70% of the original image dimensions.
2. Italdata and CrossMatch: we cropped the central region of size in columns and rows
respectively corresponding to 60% and 90% of the original image columns and rows.
3. Swipe: As the images acquired by this sensor contain a variable number of blank
rows at the bottom, the average number of non-blank rows M was first calculated
from the training images. Then, in order to obtain images of a common size with
non-blank rows, we removed their blank rows at the bottom and rescaled them to
M rows. Finally, we cropped the central region corresponding to 90% of original
image columns and M rows.
The rationale for these operations is based on the observation that fingerprint images
in LivDet2013 tend to have a large portion of background content and therefore we try to
discard such information that could otherwise mislead the representation learning process.
The percentage of cropped columns and rows differs among sensors because they capture
images of different sizes with different amounts of background.
For architecture optimization (AO), the decision to use image color information was
made according to 10-fold validation (see Section 4.4.1), while for filter optimization (FO),
color information was considered whenever available for a better approximation with the
standard cf10-11 architecture. Finally, images were resized to 32× 32 or 128× 128 to be
taken as input for the cf10-11 and spoofnet architectures, respectively.
4.4.4 Evaluation Protocol
For each benchmark, we learn deep representations from their training images according
to the methodology described in Section 4.4.1 for architecture optimization (AO) and
in Section 4.4.2 for filter optimization (FO). We follow the standard evaluation protocol
of all benchmarks and evaluate the methods in terms of detection accuracy (ACC) and
half total error rate (HTER), as these are the metrics used to assess progress in the set
of benchmarks considered herein. Precisely, for a given benchmark and convolutional
network already trained, results are obtained by:
1. Retrieving prediction scores from the testing samples;
2. Calculating a threshold τ above which samples are predicted as attacks;
3. Computing ACC and/or HTER using τ and test predictions.
The way that τ is calculated differs depending on whether the benchmark has a de-
velopment set or not (Table 4.1). Both face benchmarks have such a set and, in this
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case, we simply obtain τ from the predictions of the samples in this set. Iris and finger-
print benchmarks have no such a set, therefore τ is calculated depending on whether the
convolutional network was learned with AO or FO.
In case of AO, we calculate τ by joining the predictions obtained from 10-fold validation
(see Section 4.4.1) in a single set of positive and negative scores, and τ is computed as the
point that lead to an equal error rate (EER) on the score distribution under consideration.
In case of FO, scores are probabilities and we assume τ = 0.5. ACC and HTER are then
trivially computed with τ on the testing set.
It is worth noting that the Warsaw iris benchmark provides a supplementary testing
set that here we merge with the original testing set in order to replicate the protocol
of [224]. Moreover, given face benchmarks are video-based and that in our methodology
we treat them as images (Section 4.4.3), we perform a score-level fusion of the samples
from the same video according to the max rule [217]. This fusion is done before calculating
τ .
4.4.5 Implementation
Our implementation for architecture optimization (AO) is based on Hyperopt-convnet [17]
which in turn is based on Theano [19]. LibSVM [37] is used for learning the linear classifiers
via Scikit-learn.5 The code for feature extraction runs on GPUs due to Theano and the
remaining part is multithreaded and runs on CPUs. We extended Hyperopt-convnet in
order to consider the operations and hyperparameters as described in Appendix B and
Section 4.4.1 and we will make the source code freely available in [40]. Running times are
reported with this software stack and are computed in an Intel i7 @3.5GHz with a Tesla
K40 that, on average, takes less than one day to optimize an architecture — i.e., to probe
2,000 candidate architectures — for a given benchmark.
As for filter optimization (FO), Cuda-convnet [129] is used. This library has an ex-
tremely efficient implementation to train convolutional networks via back-propagation
on NVIDIA GPUs. Moreover, it provides us with the cf10-11 convolutional architecture
taken in this work as reference for FO.
4.5 Experiments and Results
In this section, we evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed methods for spoofing detec-
tion. We show experiments for the architecture optimization and filter learning approaches
along with their combination for detecting iris, face, and fingerprint spoofing on the nine
benchmarks described in Section 4.3. We also present results for the spoofnet, which in-
corporates some domain-knowledge on the problem. We compare all of the results with
the state-of-the-art counterparts. Finally, we discuss the pros and cons of using such
approaches and their combination along with efforts to understand the type of features
learned and some effeciency questions when testing the proposed methods.
5http://scikit-learn.org
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4.5.1 Architecture Optimization (AO)
Table 4.3 presents AO results in detail as well as previous state-of-the-art (SOTA) perfor-
mance for the considered benchmarks. With this approach, we can outperform four SOTA
methods in all three biometric modalities. Given that AO assumes little knowledge about
the problem domain, this is remarkable. Moreover, performance is on par in other four
benchmarks, with the only exception of Swipe. Still in Table 4.3, we can see information
about the best architecture such as time taken to evaluate it (feature extraction + 10-fold
validation), input size, depth, and dimensionality of the output representation in terms
of columns × rows × feature maps.
Regarding the number of layers in the best architectures, we can observe that six out
of nine networks use two layers, and three use three layers. We speculate that the number
of layers obtained is a function of the problem complexity. In fact, even though there are
many other hyperparameters involved, the number of layers play an important role in this
issue, since it directly influences the level of non-linearity and abstraction of the output
with respect to the input.
With respect to the input size, we can see in comparison with Table 4.2, that the best
performing architectures often use the original image size. This was the case for all iris
benchmarks and for three (out of four) fingerprint benchmarks. For face benchmarks,
a larger input was preferred for Replay-Attack, while a smaller input was preferred for
3DMAD. We hypothesize that this is also related to the problem difficulty, given that
Replay-Attack seems to be more difficult, and that larger inputs tend to lead to larger
networks.
We still notice that the dimensionality of the obtained representations are, in general,
smaller than 10K features, except for Italdata. Moreover, for the face and iris bench-
marks, it is possible to roughly observe a relationship between the optimization objective
calculated in the training set and the detection accuracy measure on the testing set (Sec-
tion 4.4.4), which indicates the appropriateness of the objective for these tasks. However,
for the fingerprint benchmarks, this relationship does not exist, and we accredit this to
either a deficiency of the optimization objective in modelling these problems or to the
existence of artifacts in the training set misguiding the optimization.
4.5.2 Filter Optimization (FO)
Table 4.4 shows the results for FO, where we repeat architecture optimization (AO)
results (with random filters) in the first column to facilitate comparisons. Overall, we can
see that both networks, cf10-11 and spoofnet have similar behavior across the biometric
modalities.
Surprisingly, cf10-11 obtains excellent performance in all four fingerprint benchmarks
as well as in the MobBIOFake, exceeding SOTA in three cases, in spite of the fact that
it was used without any modification. However, in both face problems and in two iris
problems, cf10-11 performed poorly. Such difference in performance was not possible to
anticipate by observing training errors, which steadily decreased in all cases until training
was stopped. Therefore, we believe that in these cases FO was misguided by the lack of
training data or structure in the training samples irrelevant to the problem.
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Table 4.4: Results for filter optimization (FO) in cf10-11 and spoofnet (Fig. 4.3). Even
though both networks present similar behavior, spoofnet is able to push performance even
further in problems which cf10-11 was already good for. Architecture optimization (AO)
results (with random filters) are shown in the first column to facilitate comparisons.
filter
modality random optimized
(metric) benchmark AO cf10-11 spoofnet SOTA
iris Warsaw 99.84 67.20 66.42 97.50
(ACC) Biosec 98.93 59.08 47.67 100.00
MobBIOfake 98.63 99.13 100.00 99.75
face Replay-Attack 0.75 55.13 55.38 5.11
(HTER) 3DMAD 0.00 40.00 24.00 0.95
fingerprint Biometrika 96.50 98.50 99.85 98.30
(ACC) Crossmatch 92.09 97.33 98.23 68.80
Italdata 97.45 97.35 99.95 99.40
Swipe 88.94 98.70 99.08 96.47
To reinforce this claim, we performed experiments with filter optimization (FO) in
spoofnet by varying the training set size with 20%, 40%, and 50% of fingerprint bench-
marks. As expected, in all cases, the less training examples, the worse is the generalization
of the spoofnet (lower classification accuracies). Considering the training phase, for in-
stance, when using 50% of training set or less, the accuracy achieved by the learned
representation is far worse than the one achieved when using 100% of training data. This
fact reinforces the conclusion presented herein regarding the small sample size problem.
Maybe a fine-tuning of some parameters, such as the number of training epochs and the
learning rates, can diminish the impact of the small sample size problem stated here,
however, this is an open research topic by itself.
For spoofnet, the outcome is similar. As we expected, the proposed architecture was
able to push performance even further in problems which cf10-11 was already good for,
outperforming SOTA in five out of nine benchmarks. This is possibly because we made
the spoofnet architecture simpler, with less parameters, and taking input images with a
size better suited to the problem.
As compared to the results in AO, we can observe a good balance between the ap-
proaches. In AO, the resulting convolutional networks are remarkable in the face bench-
marks. In FO, networks are remarkable in fingerprint problems. While in AO all optimized
architectures have good performance in iris problems, FO excelled in one of these prob-
lems, MobBIOFake, with a classification accuracy of 100%. In general, AO seems to result
in convolutional networks that are more stable across the benchmarks, while FO shines
in problems in which learning effectively occurs. Considering both AO and FO, we can
see in Table 4.4 that we outperformed SOTA methods in eight out of nine benchmarks.
The only benchmark were SOTA performance was not achieved is Biosec, but even in this
case the result obtained with AO is competitive.
109
Understanding how a set of deep learned features capture properties and nuances of
a problem is still an open question in the vision community. However, in an attempt to
understand the behavior of the operations applied onto images after they are forwarded
through the first convolutional layer, we generate Fig. 4.4a that illustrates the filters
learned via backpropagation algorithm and Figs. 4.4b and 4.4c showing the mean of real
and fake images that compose the test set, respectively. To obtain output values from
the first convolutional layer and get a sense of them, we also instrumented the spoofnet
convolutional network to forward the real and fake images from the test set through
network. Figs 4.4d and 4.4e show such images for the real and fake classes, respectively.
We can see in Fig. 4.4a that the filters learned patterns resemble textural patterns
instead of edge patterns as usually occurs in several computer vision problems [130,173].
This is particularly interesting and in line with several anti-spoofing methods in the the
literature which also report good results when exploring texture information [83,151].
In addition, Fig. 4.4b and 4.4c show there are differences between real and fake images
from test, although apparently small in such a way that a direct analysis of the images
would not be enough for decision making. However, when we analyze the mean activation
maps for each class, we can see more interesting patterns. In Figs. 4.4d and 4.4e, we have
sixteen pictures with 128× 128 pixel resolution. These images correspond to the sixteen
filters that composing the first layer of the spoofnet. Each position (x, y) in these 128×128
images corresponds to a 5× 5 area (receptive field units) in the input images. Null values
in a given unit means that the receptive field of the unit was not able to respond to the
input stimuli. In contrast, non-null values mean that the receptive field of the unit had a
responsiveness to the input stimuli.
We can see that six filters have a high responsiveness to the background information
of the input images (filters predominantly white) whilst ten filters did not respond to
background information (filters predominantly black). From left to right, top to bottom,
we can see also that the images corresponding to the filters 2, 7, 13, 14 and 15 have high
responsiveness to information surrounding the central region of the sensor (usually where
fingerprints are present) and rich in texture datails. Although these regions of high and
low responsiveness are similar for both classes we can notice some differences. A significant
difference in this first convolutional layer to images for the different classes is that the
response of the filters regarding to fake images (Fig 4.4e) generates a blurring pattern,
unlike the responses of the filters regarding to real images (Fig 4.4d) which generate a
sharper pattern. We believe that the same way as the first layer of a convolutional network
has the ability to respond to simple and relevant patterns (edge information) to a problem
of recognition objects in general, in computer vision, the first layer in the spoofnet also
was able to react to a simple pattern recurrent in spoof problems, the blurring effect, an
artifact previously explored in the literature [74]. Finally, we are exploring visualisation
only of the first layer; subsequent layers of the network can find new patterns in these
regions activated by the first layer further emphasizing class differences.
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(a) Filter weights of the first convolutional layer that were learned using
the backpropagation algorithm.
(b) Mean for real images
(test set).
(c) Mean for fake images
(test set).
(d) Activation maps for real images. (e) Activation maps for fake images.
Figure 4.4: Activation maps of the filters that compose the first convolutional layer when
forwarding real and fake images through the network.
4.5.3 Interplay between AO and FO
In the previous experiments, architecture optimization (AO) was evaluated using random
filters and filter optimization (FO) was carried out in the predefined architectures cf10-11
and spoofnet. A natural question that emerges in this context is how these methods would
perform if we (i) combine AO and FO and if we (ii) consider random filters in cf10-11
and spoofnet.
Results from these combinations are available in Table 4.5 and show a clear pattern.
When combined with AO, FO again exceeds previous SOTA in all fingerprint benchmarks
and performs remarkably good in MobBIOFake. However, the same difficulty found by
FO in previous experiments for both face and two iris benchmarks is also observed here.
Even though spoofnet performs slightly better than AO in the cases where SOTA is
exceeded (Table 4.4), it is important to remark that our AO approach may result in
architectures with a much larger number of filter weights to be optimized, and this may
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Table 4.5: Results for architecture and filter optimization (AO+FO) along with cf10-11
and spoofnet networks considering random weights. AO+FO show compelling results for
fingerprints and one iris benchmark (MobBIOFake). We can also see that spoofnet can
benefit from random filters in situations it was not good for when using filter learning
(e.g., Replay-Attack).
filter
modality optimized random
(metric) benchmark AO cf10-11 spoofnet SOTA
iris Warsaw 59.55 87.06 96.44 97.50
(ACC) Biosec 57.50 97.33 97.42 100.00
MobBIOfake 99.38 77.00 72.00 99.75
face Replay-Attack 55.88 5.62 3.50 5.11
(HTER) 3DMAD 40.00 8.00 4.00 0.95
fingerprint Biometrika 99.30 77.45 94.70 98.30
(ACC) Crossmatch 98.04 83.11 87.82 68.80
Italdata 99.45 76.45 91.05 99.40
Swipe 99.08 87.60 96.75 96.47
have benefited spoofnet.
It is also interesting to observe in Table 4.5 the results obtained with the use of random
filters in cf10-11 and spoofnet. The overall balance in performance of both networks across
the benchmarks is improved, similar to what we have observed with the use of random
filters in Table 4.3. An striking observation is that spoofnet with random filters exceed
previous SOTA in Replay-Attack, and this supports the idea that the poor performance
of spoofnet in Replay-Attack observed in the FO experiments (Table 4.4) was not a matter
of architecture.
4.5.4 Runtime
We estimate time requirements for anti-spoofing systems built with convolutional net-
works based on measurements obtained in architecture optimization (AO). We can see
in Table 4.3 that the most computationally intensive deep representation is the one found
for the Swipe benchmark, and demands 148 (97+51) seconds to process 2,200 images.
Such a running time is only possible due to the GPU+CPU implementation used (Sec-
tion 4.4.5), which is critical for this type of learning task. In a hypothetical operational
scenario, we could ignore the time required for classifier training (51 seconds, in this case).
Therefore, we can estimate that, on average, a single image captured by a Swipe sensor
would require approximately 45 milliseconds — plus a little overhead — to be fully pro-
cessed in this hypothetical system. Moreover, the existence of much larger convolutional
networks running in realtime in budgeted mobile devices [258] also supports the idea that
the approach is readily applicable in a number of possible scenarios.
112
iris Biosec
real
hit misshitmiss
fake
MobBIOfake
real
hit misshitmiss
fake
Warsaw
real
hit misshitmiss
fake
none
 LivDet2013
Biometrika
real
hit
miss
fake
Crossmatch
real
hit
miss
fake
Italdata
real
hit
miss
fake
Swipe
real
hit
miss
fake
face real
hit
miss
Replay-Attack fake
hit
miss
fingerprint
real
hit
Mask-Attack fake
hit
none none
Figure 4.5: Examples of hit and missed testing samples lying closest to the real-fake
decision boundary of each benchmark. A magnified visual inspection on these images
may suggest some properties of the problem to which the learned representations are
sensitive.
4.5.5 Visual Assessment
In Fig. 4.5, we show examples of hit and missed testing samples lying closest to the real-
fake decision boundary of the best performing system in each benchmark. A magnified
visual inspection on these images may give us some hint about properties of the problem
to which the learned representations are sensitive.
While it is difficulty to infer anything concrete, it is interesting to see that the real
missed sample in Biosec is quite bright, and that skin texture is almost absent in this case.
Still, we may argue that a noticeable difference exists in Warsaw between the resolution
used to print the images that led to the fake hit and the fake miss.
Regarding the face benchmarks, the only noticeable observation from Replay-Attack
is that the same person is missed both when providing to the system a real and a fake
biometric reading. This may indicate that some individuals are more likely to successfully
attack a face recognition systems than others. In 3DMAD, it is easy to see the difference
between the real and fake hits. Notice that there was no misses in this benchmark.
A similar visual inspection is much harder in the fingerprint benchmarks, even though
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the learned deep representations could effectively characterize these problems. The only
observation possible to be made here is related to the fake hit on CrossMatch, which
is clearly abnormal. The images captured with the Swipe sensor are naturally narrow
and distorted due to the process of acquisition, and this distortion prevents any such
observation.
4.6 Conclusions and Future Work
In this work, we investigated two deep representation research approaches for detecting
spoofing in different biometric modalities. On one hand, we approached the problem by
learning representations directly from the data through architecture optimization with a
final decision-making step atop the representations. On the other, we sought to learn filter
weights for a given architecture using the well-known back-propagation algorithm. As the
two approaches might seem naturally connected, we also examined their interplay when
taken together. In addition, we incorporated our experience with architecture optimiza-
tion as well as with training filter weight for a given architecture into a more interesting
and adapted network, spoofnet.
Experiments showed that these approaches achieved outstanding classification results
for all problems and modalities outperforming the state-of-the-art results in eight out of
nine benchmarks. Interestingly, the only case for which our approaches did not achieve
SOTA results is for the Biosec benchmark. However, in this case, it is possible to achieve
a 98.93% against 100.0% accuracy of the literature. These results support our hypothesis
that the conception of data-driven systems using deep representations able to extract
semantic and vision meaningful features directly from the data is a promising venue.
Another indication of this comes from the initial study we did for understanding the type
of filters generated by the learning process. Considering the fingerprint case, learning
directly from data, it was possible to come up with discriminative filters that explore the
blurring artifacts due to recapture. This is particularly interesting as it is in line with
previous studies using custom-tailored solutions [74].
It is important to emphasise the interplay between the architecture and filter optimiza-
tion approaches for the spoofing problem. It is well-known in the deep learning literature
that when thousands of samples are available for learning, the filter learning approach
is a promising path. Indeed, we could corroborate this through fingerprint benchmarks
that considers a few thousand samples for training. However, it was not the case for
faces and two iris benchmarks which suffer from the small sample size problem (SSS) and
subject variability hindering the filter learning process. In these cases, the architecture
optimization approach was able to learn representative and discriminative features pro-
viding comparable spoofing effectiveness to the SOTA results in almost all benchmarks,
and specially outperforming them in three out of four SOTA results when the filter learn-
ing approach failed. It is worth mentioning that sometimes it is still possible to learn
meaningful features from the data even with a small sample size for training. We believe
this happens in more well-posed datasets with less variability between training/testing
data as it is the case of MobioBIOfake benchmark in which the AO approach achieved
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99.38% just 0.37% behind the SOTA result.
As the data tell it all, the decision to which path to follow can also come from the
data. Using the evaluation/validation set during training, the researcher/developer can
opt for optimizing architectures, learn filters or both. If training time is an issue and
a solution must be presented overnight, it might be interesting to consider an already
learned network that incorporates some additional knowledge in its design. In this sense,
spoofnet could be a good choice. In all cases, if the developer can incorporate more
training examples, the approaches might benefit from such augmented training data.
The proposed approaches can also be adapted to other biometric modalities not di-
rectly dealt with herein. The most important difference would be in the input type of
data since all discussed solutions directly learn their representations from the data.
For the case of iris spoofing detection, here we dealt only with iris spoofing printed
attacks and some experimental datasets using cosmetic contact lenses have recently be-
come available allowing researchers to study this specific type of spoofing [32, 264]. For
future work, we intend to evaluate such datasets using the proposed approaches here and
also consider other biometric modalities such as palm, vein, and gait.
Finally, it is important to take all the results discussed herein with a grain of salt.
We are not presenting the final word in spoofing detection. In fact, there are important
additional research that could finally take this research another step forward. We envision
the application of deep learning representations on top of pre-processed image feature
maps (e.g., LBP-like feature maps, acquisition-based maps exploring noise signatures,
visual rhythm representations, etc.). With an n-layer feature representation, we might be
able to explore features otherwise not possible using the raw data. In addition, exploring
temporal coherence and fusion would be also important for video-based attacks.
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Chapter 5
Counteracting Presentation Attacks in
Face, Fingerprint, and Iris Recognition
“A friend is one that knows you as you are, understands where you have been,
accepts what you have become, and still, gently allows you to grow.”
—William Shakespeare, (1564–1616)
“A sweet friendship refreshes the soul.”
—Bible, Proverbs 27:9
Abstract
This chapter explores data-driven approaches to presentation attack detection for three
biometric modalities: face, iris and fingerprint. The primary aim of this chapter is to show
how pre-trained deep neural networks can be used to build classifiers that can distinguish
between authentic images of faces, irises and fingerprints and their static imitations.
The most important, publicly available benchmarks representing various attack types
were used in a unified presentation attack detection framework in both same-dataset
and cross-dataset experiments. The pre-trained VGG neural networks, being the core
of this solution, tuned independently for each modality and each dataset present almost
perfect accuracy for all three biometric techniques. In turn, low classification accuracies
achieved in cross-dataset evaluations show that models based on deep neural networks are
sensitive not only to features specific to biometric imitations, but also to dataset-specific
properties of samples. Thus, such models can provide a rapid solution in scenarios in
which properties of imitations can be predicted but appropriate feature engineering is
difficult. However, these models will perform worse if the properties of imitations being
detected are unknown. This chapter includes also a current literature review summarizing
up-to-date data-driven solutions to face, iris and finger liveness detection.
See permission to use the copyrighted material in Appendix C.
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5.1 Introduction
B IOMETRIC authentication is a technology designed to recognize humans automati-cally based on their behavior, physical and chemical traits. Recently, this technology
emerged as an important mechanism for access control in many modern applications, in
which the traditional methods including the ones based on knowledge (e.g., keywords) or
based on tokens (e.g., smart cards) might be ineffective since they are easily shared, lost,
stolen or manipulated [109]. Biometric technologies are increasingly used as the main
authenticating factor for access control and also jointly with traditional authentication
mechanisms, as a “step-up authentication” factor in two- or three-factor authentication
systems.
In this context, face, iris and fingerprint are the most commonly-used biometric traits.
In fact, the choice of the trait to be used takes into account some issues such as uni-
versality, easiness to measure the biometric characteristics, performance, or difficulty to
circumvent the system [109]. However, a common disadvantage of these traits is that an
impostor might produce a synthetic replica that can be presented to the biometric sensor
to circumvent the authentication process. In the literature, the mechanisms to protect the
biometric system against this type of attack are referred to as spoofing detection, liveness
detection or presentation attack detection (PAD). Hereinafter, we will use the most generic
term, presentation attack detection (PAD), which was initially proposed by SC37 experts
in ISO/IEC 30107 – Presentation Attack Detection – Framework (Part 1), Data Formats
(Part 2), and Testing and Reporting (Part 3).
The idea of spoofing biometric recognition is surprisingly older than biometrics itself.
A careful reader of the Old Testament can find an impersonation attempt described in
the Book of Genesis, based on presentation of a goat’s fur put on Jacob’s hand to imitate
properties of Esau’s skin, so that Jacob would be blessed by Isaac. A fictitious example
that is surprisingly realistic is the description of how to copy someone’s fingerprint using
a wax mold and gelatin presented by Austin Freeman in his crime novel “The Red Thumb
Mark”. The novel appeared in 1907, and the technique described is still used almost
100 years later to spoof fingerprint sensors. Note that this description appeared only
four years after fingerprints were adopted by Scotland Yard, and long before the first
fingerprint sensor appeared on the market.
Recent scientific studies and open challenges such as LivDet (www.livdet.org) sug-
gest that presentation attacks are still an open problem in biometrics. Phan and Boulke-
nafet [27,187] suggest that face recognition systems are vulnerable to presentation attacks
with an equal error rate (related to distinguishing presentation attacks from genuine sam-
ples) reaching as high as 9%. Fingerprint-based recognition systems still face the same
problem, with an average classification error rate achieving 2.9% [166]. Iris-based authen-
tication, considered by many to be one of the most reliable biometrics, awaits efficient
PAD methodology. Recent proposals in this area still report an average classification error
rate around 1% [199].
Besides the laboratory testing of the biometric system’s vulnerability to attack, a few
real cases also confirm the problem. In the small city of Ferraz de Vasconcelos, in the
outskirts of São Paulo, Brazil, a physician of the service of mobile health care and urgency
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Source Problem Target ProblemInitial Network
Face Identification
Image Classification
Face PAD
Iris PAD
Fingerprint PAD
Fine-Tuning 
Domain Adaptation Final Classification
Figure 5.1: General pipeline exploited in this work. Initial network architectures, orig-
inally proposed for other problems, are independently fine-tuned with appropriate PAD
examples from different datasets leading to discriminative features. Ultimately, classifiers
are trained to separate between authentic images of faces, irises and fingerprints from
their presentation attack versions.
was caught red-handed by the police in a scam that used silicone fingers to bypass an
authentication system and confirm the presence several colleagues at work [147]. A similar
case has been investigated by the Brazilian Federal Police in 2014, when workers at the
Paranaguá Harbor in the Brazilian southern state of Paraná, were suspected of using
silicone fingers to circumvent a time attendance biometric system [35]. In Germany, the
biometric hacking team in the Chaos Computer Club managed to hack Apple’s iPhone
Touch ID [10] a few days after its launch, demonstrating that a biometric system without
an adequate protection is unsuitable as a reliable access control method. Other cases of
spoofing surveillance systems with 3-D masks to change their apparent age or race can
also be found in [210,211].
Considering the three aforementioned modalities, when we look at the literature and
analyze the algorithms to prevent presentation attacks, we observe that the most promis-
ing in terms of errors and minimum effort of implementation or cost often share an in-
teresting feature: they belong to a group of algorithms referred to as data-driven char-
acterization algorithms. According to Pinto et al. [189], methods based on data-driven
characterization exploit only the data that comes from a standard biometric sensor look-
ing for evidence of artifacts in the already acquired biometric sample. Such approaches
are preferable in practice because they are easily integrable with the existing recognition
systems, as there is no extra requirement in terms of hardware nor is there the need of
human interaction to detect attempted attacks.
Although the existing methods following this idea have led to good detection rates,
we note that some aspects still need to be taken into account when evaluating a PAD
approach, e.g., different types of attack, variety of devices to perform attempted attacks,
and attacks directed to different sensors. Another aspect that is normally overlooked is
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that most detection methods are custom-tailored to specific types of presentation attacks,
in what we refer to as hand-crafting of the features. With the emergence of deep learning
methods and their success in tasks such as image classification, voice recognition and
language translation, in this chapter, we set forth the objective of exploiting deep learning
solutions for detecting presentation attacks, using data-driven solutions. In these cases,
the biometric designer is responsible for choosing an appropriate architecture for PAD
and training solely from the existing data available. We believe that this type of solution
is the next step when designing robust presentation attack detectors and also that they
can, if carefully designed, better deal with the challenging cross-dataset scenario. The
cross-dataset scenario arises when the system is trained with a dataset from one sensor or
one scenario, and then later tested on data from a different sensor or scenario. Figure 5.1
depicts the general pipeline we exploit in this chapter. We start with pre-trained deep
neural networks and tune them independently for each modality (face, iris and fingerprint)
with different datasets before building the final classifiers to distinguish between authentic
images of faces, irises and fingerprints from their static counterparts.
We organize the rest of this Chapter as follows. Section 5.2 discusses state-of-the-art
methods for PAD considering the three modalities considered in this chapter (face, iris and
fingerprint). Section 5.3 details the data-driven PAD solution that we advocate as very
promising for this problem, while Section 5.5 shows the experiments and validations for
different biometric spoofing datasets. We close the chapter with some final considerations
in Section 5.6.
5.2 Related Work
In this section, we review some of the most important presentation-attack detection meth-
ods published in the literature for iris, face and fingerprint.
5.2.1 Face Presentation Attack Detection
The existing face anti-spoofing techniques can be categorized into four groups [214]: user
behavior modeling [176, 263] (e.g., eye blinking, small face movements), methods that
require additional hardware [66] (e.g., infrared cameras and depth sensors), methods based
on user cooperation (e.g., challenge questions) and, finally, data-driven characterization
approaches, which is the focus of our work herein.
We start this section reviewing frequency-based approaches, which are methods that
rely on analyzing artifacts that are better visible in the frequency domain. Early studies
followed this idea [141], and nowadays we have several works that support the effectiveness
of this approach in detecting face spoofing. In [141], Li et al. proposed a face spoofing
detection that emerged from the observation that the faces in photographs are smaller
than the real ones and that the expressions and poses of the faces in photographs are
invariant. Based on these observations, the authors devised a threshold-based decision
method for detecting photo-based attempted attacks based on the energy rate of the
high frequency components in the 2-D Fourier spectrum. The major limitation of the
technique proposed by Li et al. is that the high frequency components are affected by
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illumination, which makes this frequency band too noisy [141,245]. To reduce that effect,
Tan et al. [245] exploited the difference of image variability in the high-middle band. This
is done using Difference of Gaussian (DoG) bandpass filtering, which keeps as much detail
as possible without introducing noisy or aliasing artifacts.
In [193], Pinto et al. introduced an idea seeking to overcome the illumination effect
when working in the frequency domain. In that work, the authors proposed a face anti-
spoofing method for detecting video-based attempted attacks based on Fourier analysis
of the noise signature extracted from videos, instead of using the image pixel values
directly. Basically, after isolating the noise signal present in the video frames, the authors
transformed that information to the Fourier domain and used the visual rhythm technique
to capture the most important frequency components to detect an attempted attack,
taking advantage of the spectral and temporal information. In a more recent work [190],
the same authors expanded upon this technique taking advantage of the spectral, temporal
and spatial information from the noise signature, using the concept of visual codebooks.
According to the authors, the new method enabled them to detect different types of
attacks such as print- and mask-based attempted attacks as well.
Lee et al. [139] proposed an anti-spoofing technique based on the cardiac pulse mea-
surements using video imaging [197]. The authors extended upon previous work proposed
by Poh et al. [197] by adding a threshold-based decision level based on the entropy mea-
sure. It was calculated from the power spectrum obtained from normalized RGB channels
after eliminating the cross-channel noise, caused by the environment interference, using
the Independent Component Analysis (ICA).
Another expressive branch of face anti-spoofing algorithms reported in the literature
consists of texture-based approaches. In general, those algorithms exploit textural cues
inserted in the fake biometric samples during its production and presentation to the bio-
metric sensor under attack (e.g., printing defects, aliasing and blurring effects). Tan et
al. [245] proposed a texture-based approach to detect attacks with printed photographs
based on the difference of the surface roughness of an attempted attack and a real face.
The authors estimate the luminance and reflectance of the image under analysis and clas-
sify them using Sparse Low Rank Bilinear Logistic Regression methods. Their work was
extended upon by Peixoto et al. [181], who incorporated measures for different illumina-
tion conditions.
Similar to Tan et al. [245], Kose et al. [128] evaluated a solution based on reflectance to
detect attacks performed with printed masks. To decompose the images into components
of illumination and reflectance, the Variational Retinex [5] algorithm was applied.
Määttä et al. [151, 152] relied on micro textures for face spoofing detection, inspired
by the characterization of printing artifacts and by differences in light reflection when
comparing real samples and presentation attack samples. The authors proposed a fusion
scheme based on the Local Binary Pattern (LBP) [168], Gabor wavelets [61], and His-
togram of Oriented Gradients (HOG) [56]. Similarly, to find a holistic representation of
the face able to reveal an attempted attack, Schwartz et al. [214] proposed a method that
employs different attributes of the images (e.g., color, texture and shape of the face).
Chingovska et al. [41] investigated the use of different variations of the LBP operator
used in [151]. The histograms generated from these descriptors were classified using χ2
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histogram comparison, Linear Discriminant Analysis (LDA) and Support Vector Machine
(SVM).
Face spoofing attacks performed with static masks have also been considered in the
literature. Erdogmus et al. [65] explored a database with six types of attacks using facial
information of four subjects. To detect attempted attacks, the authors used two algo-
rithms based on Gabor wavelet [138] with a Gabor-phase based similarity measure [90].
Pereira et al. [184] proposed a score-level fusion strategy for detecting various types of
attacks. The authors trained classifiers using different databases and used the Q statistics
to evaluate the dependency between classifiers. In a follow-up work, Pereira et al. [69] pro-
posed an anti-spoofing solution based on the dynamic texture, which is a spatiotemporal
version of the original LBP.
Garcia et al. [77] proposed an anti-spoofing method based on detection of the Moiré
patterns, which appear due to the overlap of the digital grids. To find these patterns, the
authors used a peak-detector algorithm based on maximum-correlation thresholding, in
that strong peaks reveal an attempted attack. Similar to [77], Patel et al. [179] proposed a
presentation attack detection technique also based on the Moiré pattern detection, which
uses the the multi-scale version of the LBP descriptor (M-LBP).
Tronci et al. [253] exploited the motion information and clues that are extracted from
the scene by combining two types of processes, referred to as static and video-based
analysis. The static analysis consists of combining different visual features such as color,
edge, and Gabor textures, whereas the video-based analysis combines simple motion-
related measures such as eye blink, mouth movement, and facial expression change.
Anjos et al. [8] proposed a method for detecting photo-based attacks assuming a sta-
tionary facial recognition system. According to the authors, the intensity of the relative
motion between the face region and the background can be used as a clue to distin-
guish valid access of attempted attacks, since the motion variations between face and
background regions exhibit greater correlation in the case of attempted attacks.
Wen et al. [260] proposed a face spoof detection algorithm based on image distortion
analysis (IDA), describing different features such as specular reflection, blurriness, chro-
matic moment, and color diversity. These features are concatenated in order to generate
feature vectors, which are used to generate an ensemble classifier, each one specialized to
detect a type of attempted attack.
Kim et al. [118] proposed a method based on the diffusion speed of a single image to
detect attempted attacks. The authors define the local patterns of the diffusion speed,
namely local speed patterns via Total Variation (TV) flow [218], which are used as feature
vectors to train a linear classifier, using the SVM, to determine whether the given face is
fake. In turn, Boulkenafet et al. [29] proposed an anti-spoofing technique using a color
texture analysis. Basically, the authors perform a micro-texture analysis considering the
color-texture information from the luminance and the chrominance channels by extracting
feature descriptions from different color spaces.
Different from the previous methods, which focus on defining a presentation attack
detection that does not leverage the identity information present in the gallery, Yang et
al. [268] proposed a person-specific face anti-spoofing approach, in which a classifier was
built for each person. According to the authors, this strategy minimizes the interferences
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among subjects.
Virtually all previous methods exploit handcrafted features to analyze possible clues
related to a presentation attack attempt. Whether these features are related to texture,
color, gradients, noise or even reflection, blurriness, and chromatic moment, they always
come down to the observation of specific artifacts present in the images and how they can
be captured properly. In this regard, LBP stands out as the staple of face-based spoofing
research thus far. Departing from this hand-crafted characterization modeling strategy, a
recent trend in the literature has been devoted to designing and deploying solutions able
to directly learn, from the existing available training data, the intrinsic discriminative
features of the classes of interest, the so-called data-driven characterization techniques,
probably motivated by the huge success these approaches have been showing in other
vision-related problems [131,241]. Out of those, the ones based on deep learning solutions
stand out right away as very promising for being highly adaptive to different situations.
Menotti et al. [162] aimed at hyperparameter optimization of network architectures [16,
196] (architecture optimization) and on learning filter weights via the well-known back-
propagation algorithm [136] (filter optimization) to design a face spoofing detection ap-
proach. The first approach consists of learning suitable convolutional network architec-
tures for each domain, whereas the second approach focuses on learning the weights of
the network via back propagation.
Manjani et al. [154] proposed an anti-spoofing solution based on a deep dictionary
learning technique originally proposed in [246] to detect attempted attacks performed us-
ing silicone masks. According to the authors, deep dictionary learning combines concepts
of two most prominent paradigms for representation learning, deep learning and dictio-
nary learning, which enabled the authors to achieve a good representation even using a
small data for training.
5.2.2 Fingerprint Presentation Attack Detection
Fingerprint PAD methods can be categorized into two groups: hardware-based and
software-based solutions [83]. Methods falling into the first group use information pro-
vided from additional sensors to gather artifacts that reveal a spoofing attack that is
outside of the fingerprint image. Software-based techniques rely solely on the information
acquired by the biometric sensor of the fingerprint authentication system.
Based on several quality measures (e.g., ridge strength or directionality, ridge continu-
ity), Galbally et al. [71, 72] proposed a set of features aiming at fingerprint presentation
attack detection, which were used to feed a Linear Discriminant Analysis (LDA) classifier.
Gragnaniello et al. [86] proposed an anti-spoofing solution based on Weber Local De-
scriptor (WLD) operating jointly with other texture descriptors such as Local Phase
Quantization (LPQ) and Local Binary Pattern Descriptor (LBP). The experimental re-
sults suggest that WLD and LPQ complement one another, and their joint usage can
greatly improve their discriminating ability, even when compared individually or com-
bined with LBP.
Inspired by previous works based on LBP descriptor, Jia et al. [112] proposed a spoof-
ing detection scheme based on Multi-scale Block Local Ternary Patterns (MBLTP) [244].
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According to the authors, the computation of the LTP descriptor is based on average
values of block subregions rather than individual pixels, which makes it less sensitive to
noise, since the computation is based on a 3-value code representation and on average
values of block subregions, rather than on individual pixels.
Ghiani et al. [81] proposed the use of Binarized Statistical Image Features (BSIF),
a textural binary descriptor whose design was inspired by the LBP and LPQ methods.
Basically, the BSIF descriptor learns a filter set by using statistics of natural images [104],
leading to descriptors better adapted to the problem. The same authors also explored the
LPQ descriptor to find a feature space insensitive to blurring effects [82].
In [85], Gottschlich proposed another idea based on filter learning convolution com-
parison pattern. To detect a fingerprint spoofing, the authors compute the discrete cosine
transform (DCT) from rotation invariant patches, and compute their binary patterns by
comparing pairs of DCT coefficients. These patterns are gathered in a histogram, which
was used to feed a linear SVM classifier.
Rattani et al. [206] introduced a scheme for automatic adaptation of a liveness detector
to new spoofing materials in the operational phase. The aim of the proposed approach
is to reduce the security risk posed by new spoof materials on an anti-spoofing system.
The authors proposed a novel material detector specialized to detect new spoof materials,
pointing out the need for retraining the system with the new material spotted.
Similar to [206], Rattani et al. [207] proposed an automatic adaptation anti-spoofing
system composed of an open-set fingerprint spoofing detector and by a novel material
detector, both based on Weibull-calibrated SVM (W-SVM) [223]. The novel material
detector was built with a multi-class W-SVM, composed by an ensemble of pairs of 1-
Class and binary SVMs, whereas the open set fingerprint spoofing detector was trained
with features based on textural [82], physiological [155] and anatomical [243] attributes.
Gragnaniello et al. [88] proposed a fingerprint spoofing detection based on both spa-
tial and frequency information, in order to extract local amplitude contrast, and local
behavior of the image, which were synthesized by considering the phase of some selected
transform coefficients generated by the short-time Fourier transform (STFT). This infor-
mation generates a bi-dimensional contrast-phase histogram, which was used to train a
linear SVM classifier.
Kumpituck et al. [134] exploited an anti-spoofing schema based on wavelet decompo-
sition and LBP operator. In this work, the authors extract LBP histograms from several
wavelet sub-band images, which were concatenated and used to feed an SVM classifier.
The authors also evaluated a more conventional approach that consists of calculating
the energy from wavelet sub-bands instead of the LBP histograms. Experimental results
show that wavelet-LBP descriptor achieved a better discrimination than wavelet-energy
and LBP descriptors used separately, besides achieving competitive results with the state-
of-the-art methods.
Finally, also departing from the traditional modeling, which uses basically texture
patterns to characterize fingerprint images, Nogueira et al. [166] proposed a fingerprint
anti-spoofing technique based on the concept of pre-trained convolutional neural net-
works. Basically, the authors use well-known CNN architectures in the literature such as
AlexNet [131] and VGG [233] as their starting point for learning the network weights for
123
fingerprint spoofing detection.
Marasco et al. [156] investigated two well-known CNN architectures, the GoogLeNet [239],
CaffeNet [131], in order to analyze their robustness in detecting unseen spoof materials
and fake samples from new sensors. As mentioned before, Menotti et al. [162] also pro-
posed hyperparameter optimization of network architectures along with filter optimization
techniques for detecting fingerprints presentation attacks.
5.2.3 Iris Presentation Attack Detection
Early work on iris spoofing detection dates back to the 1990’s, when Daugman [59] dis-
cussed the feasibility of some attacks on iris recognition systems. In that work, he proposed
to detect such attempts using the Fast Fourier Transform to verify the high frequency
spectral magnitude.
According to Czajka [53], solutions for iris liveness detection can be categorized into
four groups, as Cartesian product of two dimensions: type of measurement (passive or
active) and type of model of the object under test (static / dynamic). Passive solutions
mean that the object is not stimulated more than it is needed to acquire an iris image
for recognition purpose. Hence, it typically means that no extra hardware is required
to detect an attempted attack. Active solutions try to stimulate an eye and observe
the response to that stimuli. It means that typically some extra hardware elements are
required. In turn, the classification between static and dynamic objects means that the
algorithm can detect an attempted attack using just one (static) image from the biometric
sensor or needs to use a sequence of images to observe selected dynamic features. In this
section, we review only passive and static methods, which is the focus of this chapter.
In [174], Pacut et al. introduced three iris liveness detection algorithms based on the
analysis of the image frequency spectrum, controlled light reflection from the cornea and
pupil dynamics. These approaches were evaluated with paper printouts produced with
different printers and printout carriers, and shown to be able to spoof two commercial
iris recognition systems. A small hole was made in the place of the pupil, and this
trick was enough to deceive commercial iris recognition systems used in their study. The
experimental results obtained on the evaluation set composed of 77 pairs of fake and live
iris images showed that the controlled light reflections and pupil dynamics achieve zero for
both False Acceptance Rate and False Rejection Rate. In turn, two commercial cameras
were not able to detect 73.1% and 15.6% of iris paper printouts and matched them to
biometric references of authentic eyes.
Galbally et al. [75] proposed an approach based on 22 image quality measures (e.g.,
focus, occlusion, and pupil dilation). The authors use sequential floating feature selec-
tion [198] to single out the best features, which were used to feed a quadratic discriminant
classifier. To validate the proposed approach, the authors used the BioSec [68,219] bench-
mark, which contains print-based iris spoofing attacks. Similarly, Sequeira et al. [226] also
exploited image quality measures [75] and three different classification techniques, vali-
dating the work on BioSec [68, 219] and Clarkson [224] benchmarks and introducing the
MobBIOfake benchmark comprising 800 iris images. Sequeira et al. [227] extended upon
previous work using a feature selection step to obtain a better representation to detect
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an attempted attack. The authors also applied iris segmentation [164] to obtain the iris
contour and adapted the feature extraction processes to the resulting non-circular iris
regions.
In [259], Wei et al. addressed the problem of iris liveness detection based on three
texture measures: iris edge sharpness (ES), iris-texton feature for characterizing the visual
primitives of iris texture (IT) and using selected features based on co-occurrence matrix
(CM). In particular, they used fake iris wearing color and textured contact lenses. The
experiments showed that the ES feature achieved comparable results to the state of the
art methods at that time, and the IT and CM measures outperformed the state of the art
algorithms.
Czajka [51] proposed a solution based on frequency analysis to detect printed irises.
The author associated peaks found in the frequency spectrum to regular patterns observed
for printed samples. This method, tuned to achieve close-to-zero false rejection rate (i.e.,
not introducing additional false alarms to the entire system), was able to detect 95% of
printed irises. This paper also introduced the Warsaw LivDet-Iris-2013 dataset containing
729 fake images and 1, 274 images of real eyes.
Texture analysis has also been explored for iris spoofing detection. In the MobILive [229]
iris spoofing detection competition, the winning team relied upon three texture descrip-
tors: LBP [169], LPQ [171] and Binary Gabor Pattern (BGP) [272]. Sun et al. [238]
recently proposed a general framework for iris image classification based on a Hierarchi-
cal Visual Codebook (HVC). The HVC encodes the texture primitives of iris images and
is based on two existing bag-of-words models. The method achieved a state-of-the-art
performance for iris spoofing detection, among other tasks related to iris recognition.
Doyle et al. [64] proposed a solution based on modified Local Binary Patterns
(mLBP) [170] descriptor. In this work, the authors show that although it is possible
to obtain good classification results using texture information extracted by the mLBP
descriptor, when lenses produced by different manufacturers are used, the performance of
this method drops significantly. They report 83% and 96% of correct classification when
measured on two separated datasets, and a significant drop in accuracy when the same
method was trained on the one dataset and tested on the other dataset: 42% and 53%,
respectively. This cross-dataset validation has been shown to be very challenging and
seems to be recommended in several validation setups for presentation attack detection.
Yadav et al. [264] extended upon the previous work by analyzing the effect of soft and
textured contact lenses on iris recognition.
In [200], Raja et al. proposed an anti-spoofing method based on Eulerian Video Mag-
nification (EVM) [24], which was applied to enhance the subtle phase information in the
eye region. The authors proposed a decision rule based on cumulative phase information,
which was applied by using a sliding window approach upon the phase component for
detecting the rate of the change in the phase with respect to time.
Raghavendra et al. [199] proposed a novel spoofing detection scheme based on a multi-
scale version of the Binarized Statistical Image Features (BSIF) and linear Support Vector
Machine (SVM). Gupta et al. [91] proposed an anti-spoofing technique based on local
descriptors such as LBP [168], HOG [56], and GIST [172], which provide a representation
space by using attributes of the images such as color, texture, position, spatial frequency,
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and size of objects present in the image. The authors used the feature vectors produced
by the three descriptors to feed a nonlinear classifier and decide whether an image under
analysis is fake.
Czajka [52] proposed an iris spoofing detection based on pupil dynamics. In that
work, the author used the pupil dynamics model proposed by Kohn and Clynes [121] to
describe its reaction after a positive light stimuli. To decide whether the eye is alive,
the author used variants of the SVM to classify feature vectors that contain the pupil
dynamic information of a target user. This work has been further extended to a mixture
of negative and positive light stimuli [53] and presented close-to-perfect recognition of
objects not reacting to light stimuli as expected for a living eye.
Finally, Lovish et al. [148] proposed a cosmetic contact lens detection method based
on Local Phase Quantization and Binary Gabor Patterns, which combines the benefits
of both LBP and Gabor filters [272]. The histograms produced for both descriptors were
concatenated and used to build a classification model based on SVM algorithm.
Similarly to the approaches tackling the presentation attack problem in fingerprint
and faces, handcrafted texture features seem to be the preferred choice in iris spoofing
detection. Methods inspired by LBP, visual codebooks and quality metrics are the most
popular methods so far. In this sense, the works of Menotti et al. [162] and Silva et
al. [232], which exploit data-driven solutions for this problem, are sufficiently different
from the previous methods and present very promising results.
5.2.4 Unified Frameworks to Presentation Attack Detection
Galbally et al. [74] proposed a general approach based on 25 image quality features to
detect attempt attacks in face, iris and fingerprint biometric systems simultaneously.
Evaluations performed upon popular benchmarks for three modalities show that this
approach is highly competitive, considering the state-of-the-art methods dedicated for
single modalities.
In [87], Gragnaniello et al. evaluated several local descriptors for face-, fingerprint-
and iris-based biometrics in addition to the investigation of promising descriptors using
the Bag-of-Visual-Word (BoVW) model [235], Scale-Invariant Feature Transform (SIFT)
[149], DAISY [251], and the Shift-Invariant Descriptor (SID) [122].
Menotti et al. [162] (mentioned earlier in this section) showed that the combination of
architecture optimization and filter optimization provides better comprehension of how
these approaches interplay for face, iris and fingerprint PAD, and also outperforms the
best known approaches for several benchmarks.
In this chapter, we decided to explore data-driven solutions for spoofing detection in
different modalities based on deeper architectures than the one used in [162] and evaluate
the effects of such decision. Our objective is to show the potential of this approach but
also highlight its limitations, especially related to cross-dataset experiment.
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5.3 Methodology
In this section, we present the convolutional neural network that we adopted to PAD
for face, fingerprint and iris. Our objective is simply to show that this new trend in the
literature is also relevant for the task of presentation attack detection and that research
in this direction needs to be considered. At the same time, we also show that even
when adopting a powerful image classification technique such as deep neural networks, we
still cannot deal effectively with the very challenging cross-dataset problem. As a result,
it is clear that the research community now needs to shift its attention to cross-dataset
validation setups (or, more general, open-set classification) as they are closer to real-world
operational conditions when deploying biometric systems.
5.3.1 Network Architecture
For this work, we adopted the VGG network architecture proposed by [234]. However, that
network was first proposed for object recognition and not presentation attack detection.
Therefore, for each problem of interest (PAD in face, iris and fingerprint), we adapt the
network’s architecture as well as fine-tune its weights to our two-class problem of interest.
Training the network from scratch to our problem is also a possibility if enough training
samples (normal and presentation attack samples) are available. However, as this is not
often the case in this area, it is recommended to start the network weights with a related
(source) problem and then adapt these weights with training examples of a target problem.
Figure 5.2 depicts the network architecture we adopted in this work. During training,
the network’s input consists of fixed-size 224×224 RGB images which go through a stack
of convolutional layers comprising filters with a very small receptive field (3 × 3). In
this network, the convolution stride is fixed to one pixel and the spatial zero-padding
for convolutional operation is also of one pixel. There are five max-pooling layers in this
network (carefully placed after some convolution layers). The max-poolings are performed
over a 2× 2 pixel window, with stride 2.
The stack of convolutional layers is followed by three fully-connected (FC) layers: the
first two have 4,096 units each, while the the third layer performs the 2-way spoofing
classification problem of our interest (originally this was an FC layer with 1,000 units
for the ImageNet 1,000-way classification problem). The final layer is the soft-max layer
translating the outputs of 2-unit layer into a posterior probabilities of class membership.
Each unit in the hidden layers has a rectified linear (ReLU) activation function [132]. The
depth of convolution layers or, in other words, their number of channels, starts with 64
and is iteratively doubled after each max-pooling layer to a maximum of 512.
5.3.2 Training and Testing
For training, we start with the network trained to a source problem whenever it is possi-
ble. To detect presentation attacks with faces, we initialize the network with the weights
learned for face recognition [178]. However, the closest problem we had for iris and finger-
prints was general image classification. Therefore, presentation attack detection for iris
and fingerprints is performed by the network initialized with the weights pre-computed
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Figure 5.2: Adopted network architecture, originally proposed for object recognition by
the Visual Geometry Group and thus referred to as VGG network.
for the ImageNet classification problem. The first convolutional layers act mostly as a
generic feature detectors (such as edges) and are suitable for different computer vision
tasks. However, each next convolutional layer is more context-focused and extracts fea-
tures that are task-related. Hence, using last layers trained for general object recognition
in visual spoofing detection is not optimal, and a large improvement may be achieved by
specializing the network. Certainly, a preferable solution is to initialize the weights with
those used in networks solving iris- and fingerprint-related tasks, as the network would
have been specialized to this type of imagery. However, since training of such networks
from the scratch requires a lot data and effort, it is still a good move to initialize own
network with image-related weights than just purely at random and tune its weights if
there is not enough available training data.
Once a source set of weights to initialize the network is chosen, the fine-tuning follows
a standard procedure: selects the training set of the target domain and uses it to perform
forward passes and back-propagation in the network. The test for an input image is
straightforward. Just resize it to the network’s input size and feed it to the network.
As the network has been fully adapted to the target problem of interest, it will already
produce a two-class output.
More specifically, for the cases of fingerprints, the input images in a dataset are center-
cropped and resized to 224 × 224 pixels, which is the standard input size of the VGG
network. The centering happens through calculating the average of black pixels in the
binary fingerprint image and keeping all the rows/columns with a density of black pix-
els greater than the global image average plus or minus 1.8 standard deviations of each
respective row/column. This is used to eliminate the borders without any useful informa-
tion. For optimizing the network in the fingerprint case, we use the standard SGD solver
implemented in Caffe with the following hyperparameters: base learning rate of 0.0001,
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step lr policy, step size of 2,000, momentum of 0.9, weight decay of 0.0002, gamma of 0.5
and maximum of 2,001 iterations.
In the case of faces, we center-cropped the images based on the eye coordinates calcu-
lated with the aid of Face++1. Upon center-cropping, the image is resized to 224 × 224
pixels. For optimizing the network in the face case, we use the standard SGD solver
implemented in Caffe with the following hyper parameters: base learning rate of 0.001,
step lr policy, step size of 1,000, momentum of 0.9, weight decay of 0.0005, gamma of
0.001 and maximum number of iterations of 4,000.
For irises, we resize the images to the network’s standard input size of 224×224 pixels
and employ the same parameters as for the face optimization problem.
5.3.3 Memory Footprint
The chosen network has an average size of 140 MB. Most of its parameters (and memory)
are in the convolution and fully-connected layers. The first FC layer contains 100M
weights, out of a total of 134M for the entire adapted network.
5.4 Metrics and Datasets
In this section, we describe the benchmarks (datasets) and selected accuracy estimators
considered in this work. All datasets used in this chapter were freely available to us
and we believe that it is the case for other researchers upon request sent directly to
their creators. Datasets composing our testing environment are the most commonly used
benchmarks to evaluate presentation attack detection for face, iris and fingerprints. Since
all the benchmarks have been already divided by their creators into training and testing
subsets, we decided to follow these divisions. Each training subset was divided by us into
two disjoint subsets multiple times to perform cross-validation-based training to increase
generalization capabilities of the winning model and to minimize an overfitting. The
results reported further in this chapter are those obtained on testing sets. The next
subsections characterize briefly all datasets and Table 5.1 shows their major features, in
particular the number of samples in each benchmark and their assignment to training and
testing subsets.
5.4.1 Video-based Face Spoofing Benchmarks
In this chapter, we use two benchmarks used to evaluate the performance of PAD al-
gorithms for face modality, Replay-Attack [41] and CASIA Face Anti-Spoofing [274]
datasets. These datasets contain five types of attempted attacks performed with fake
samples presenting different qualities.
1http://www.faceplusplus.com/
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Replay-Attack
This benchmark contains short video recordings of both valid accesses and video-based
attacks of 50 different subjects. To generate valid access videos, each person was recorded
in two sessions in a controlled and in an adverse environment with a regular webcam.
Then, spoofing attempts were generated using three techniques:
• print attack : hard copies of high-resolution digital photographs were presented to
the acquisition sensor; these samples were printed with a Triumph-Adler DCC 2520
color laser printer;
• mobile attack : videos displayed on an iPhone screen were presented to the acquisi-
tion sensor; these videos were taken also with the iPhone;
• high-definition attack : high resolution photos and videos taken with an iPad were
presented to the acquisition sensor using the iPad screen.
CASIA
This benchmark was based on samples acquired from 50 subjects. Genuine images were
acquired by three different sensors presenting different acquisition quality (from low to
high): “long-time-used USB camera”, “newly bought USB camera”, and Sony NEX-5. Pixel
resolution of images was either 640×480 (both webcams) or 1920×1080 (Sony sensor).
Sony images were cropped to 1280×720 by the authors. During the acquisition, subjects
were asked to blink. Three kinds of presentation attacks were carried out:
• warped photo attack: high quality photos were printed on a copper paper and videos
were recorded by Sony sensor; the printed images were intentionally warped to
imitate face micro-movements,
• cut photo attack: eyes were cut from the paper printouts and an attacker hidden
behind an artifact imitated the blinking behavior when acquiring the video by the
Sony sensor,
• video attack: high quality genuine videos were displayed on an iPad screen of
1280×720 pixel resolution.
The data originating from 20 subjects was selected for a training set, while remaining
samples (acquired for 30 subjects) formed the testing set.
5.4.2 Fingerprint Spoofing Benchmarks
Two datasets used in Liveness Detection Competitions (LivDet, www.livdet.org) were
employed in this chapter. LivDet is a series of international competitions that compare
presentation attack methodologies for fingerprint and iris using a standardized testing
protocol and large quantities of spoof and live samples. All the competitions are open
to all academic and industrial institutions which have software-based or system-based
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biometric liveness detection solutions. For fingerprints, we use datasets released in 2009
and 2013.
The LivDet2009 benchmark [159] consists of three subsets of samples acquired by
Biometrics FX2000, CrossMatch Verifier 300 LC and Identix DFR2100. Both the spatial
scanning resolution and pixel resolution vary across subsets, from 500 DPI to 686 DPI,
and from 312×372 to 720×720 pixels, respectively. Three different materials were used
to prepare spoofs: Play-Doh, gelatin and silicone.
The LivDet2013 benchmark [83] contains four subsets of real and fake fingerprint
samples acquired by four sensors: Biometrika FX2000, Italdata ET10, Crossmatch L Scan
Guardian, and Swipe. Inclusion of samples from the Swipe sensor is especially interesting,
since it requires – as the name suggests – swiping a finger over the small sensor. This
makes the quality of spoofs relatively different when compared to the regular, flat sensors
requiring only touching the sensor by the finger. For a more realistic scenario, fake samples
acquired by Biometrika and Italdata were generated without user cooperation, while fake
samples acquired by Crossmatch and Swipe were generated with user cooperation. Several
materials for creating the artificial fingerprints were used, including gelatin, silicone, latex,
among others. The spatial scanning resolution varies from a small 96 DPI (the Swipe
sensor) to 569 (the Biometrika sensor). The pixel resolution is also heterogeneous: from
relatively non-standard 208×1500 to pretty large 800×750. This makes the cross-subset
evaluation quite challenging.
5.4.3 Iris Spoofing Benchmarks
To evaluate our proposed method in detecting iris presentation attack, we used two bench-
marks: AVTS [219] and a new dataset Warsaw LivDet2015, which is an extension of War-
saw LivDet2013 [51]. These datasets contain attempted attacks performed with printed
iris images, which were produced using different printers and paper types.
AVTS
This benchmark was based on live samples collected for 50 volunteers under the European
project BioSec (Biometrics and Security). To create spoofing attempts, the authors tested
two printers (HP Deskjet 970cxi and HP LaserJet 4200L), various paper types (e.g.,
cardboard as well as white, recycle, photo, high resolution and butter papers), and a
number of pre-processing operations. The combination that gave the highest probability
of image acquisition by the LG IrisAccess EOU3000 sensor used in the study was selected
for a final dataset collection. The authors printed their samples with the inkjet printer (HP
Deskjet 970cxi) on a high resolution paper and applied an Open-TopHat pre-processing
to each image prior printing. The pixel resolution of each image was 640×480, which is
recommended by ISO/IEC as a standard resolution for iris recognition samples.
Warsaw LivDet2015
This dataset is an extension of the LivDet-Iris 2013 Warsaw Subset [51] and was used
in 2015 edition of LivDet-Iris competition (www.livdet.org). It gathers 2854 images of
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Table 5.1: Main features of the benchmarks considered herein.
Modality Benchmark Color Dimension # Training # Testing
cols× rows Live Fake Total Live Fake Total
Face
Replay-Attack Yes 320× 240 600 3000 3600 4000 800 4800
CASIA Yes 1280× 720 120 120 240 180 180 360
Iris
Warsaw LivDet2015 No 640× 480 852 815 1667 2002 3890 5892
AVTS No 640× 480 200 200 400 600 600 1200
Fingerprint
LivDet2009: CrossMatch No 640× 480 500 500 1000 1500 1500 3000
LivDet2009: Identix No 720× 720 375 375 750 1125 1125 2250
LivDet2009: Biometrika No 312× 372 500 500 1000 1500 1500 3000
LivDet2013: Biometrika No 312× 372 1000 1000 2000 1000 1000 2000
LivDet2013: CrossMatch No 800× 750 1250 1000 2250 1250 1000 2250
LivDet2013: Italdata No 640× 480 1000 1000 2000 1000 1000 2000
LivDet2013: Swipe No 208× 1500 1250 1000 2250 1250 1000 2250
authentic eyes and 4705 images of the paper printouts prepared for almost 400 distinct
eyes. The photographed paper printouts were used to successfully forge an example
commercial iris recognition system (i.e., samples used in real and successful presentation
attacks). Two printers were used to generate spoofs: HP LaserJet 1320 and Lexmark
C534DN. Both real and fake images were captured by an IrisGuard AD100 biometric
device with liveness detection functionality intentionally switched off. To get a free copy
of this dataset follow the instructions given at Warsaw’s lab webpage http://zbum.ia.
pw.edu.pl/EN/node/46.
5.4.4 Error Metrics
In this chapter we use the error metrics that are specific to presentation attack detection,
and partially considered by ISO/IEC in their PAD-related standards [105].
Attack Presentation Classification Error Rate (APCER): proportion of attack
presentations incorrectly classified as bona fide (genuine) presentations at the PAD sub-
system in a specific scenario. This error metric is analogous to false match rate (FMR) in
biometric matching, that is related to false match of samples belonging to two different
subjects. As FMR, the APCER is a function of a decision threshold τ .
Bona Fide Presentation Classification Error Rate (BPCER): proportion of bona
fide (genuine) presentations incorrectly classified as presentation attacks at the PAD sub-
system in a specific scenario. This error metric is analogous to false non-match rate
(FNMR) in biometric matching, that is related to false non-match of samples belonging
to the same subject. Again, the BPCER is a function of a decision threshold τ .
Half Total Error Rate (HTER): combination of APCER and BPCER in a single
error rate with a decision threshold as an argument:
HTER(τ) =
APCER(τ) + BPCER(τ)
2
(5.1)
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5.5 Results
In this section, we present and discuss the experimental results of the proposed method.
Sections 5.5.1, 5.5.2 and5.5.3 show the performance results and the experimental protocols
employed to validate the performance of the proposed methodology.
5.5.1 Face
In this section, we present the results of our proposed PAD for face modality. The
experiments are conducted considering the original protocol of the datasets used in this
chapter (cf., Section 5.4), as well cross-dataset protocol, hereafter referred to as same-
dataset and cross-dataset protocols, respectively. In general, a prime requirement of
most machine learning algorithms is that both training and testing sets are independent
and identically distributed. But, unfortunately, it does not always happen in practice
– subsets can be identically distributed (e.g., captured using the same sensor and in
the same environment conditions), but totally dependent due to adding of bias in the
data (e.g., some dirt in the biometric sensor used to capture both subsets, identities
present in two subsets, artifacts added during the attack simulations, etc.). In addition,
the effects of the closed-world assumption [223] may mislead us to believe that a given
approach is perfect when in fact its performance can be disastrous when deployed in
practice for unknown presentation attacks. In this context, both same-dataset and cross-
dataset are key experimental protocols in determining more accurate detection rates of
an anti-spoofing system when operating in less controlled scenarios with different kinds
of attacks and sensors.
Same-dataset results. Table 5.2 shows the results for Replay-Attack and CASIA
datasets, considering that training and testing is performed on the same dataset. The
VGG network was able to detect all kinds of attempted attacks present in the Replay-
Attack dataset, and also to detect two methods of attempted attacks (hand-based and
fixed-support attacks), which were confirmed by the perfect classification result (HTER
of 0.0%). Considering the CASIA dataset, the proposed method obtained an HTER
of 6.67%. The performance achieved by the proposed method on this dataset can be ex-
plained by the high degree of variability present in the CASIA dataset (e.g., different kinds
of attack and resolution) that makes this dataset more challenging. In both datasets, we
use the k-fold cross-validation technique (k = 10) to built a classification model using the
training set, and also the development set whether it is available. Figures 5.3 and 5.4
present empirical distributions of the difference between two CNN output nodes and the
corresponding ROC curves.
Cross-dataset results. Table 5.3, Fig. 5.5 and Fig. 5.6 show the results obtained in
cross-dataset evaluation protocol. We can clearly see a dramatic drop in the performance
when we train and test on different datasets. Several sources of variability between the
datasets may contribute to this result. The first one is that the datasets contain dif-
ferent kinds of attack. The Replay-Attack dataset contains three kinds of attacks (high
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Table 5.2: Performance results obtained in the same-dataset evaluations of the face
PAD. Pointers to plots presenting Receiver Operating Characteristics (ROC) and empir-
ical Probability Distribution Functions (ePDF) are added in the last column.
APCER (%) BPCER (%) HTER (%) ROC and ePDF
Replay-Attack 0.00 0.00 0.00 Fig. 5.3
CASIA 0.00 13.33 6.67 Fig. 5.4
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Figure 5.3: Left: Empirical probability distributions (ePDF) of the difference between
two CNN output nodes (after softmax) obtained separately for authentic and spoof face
samples. Right: ROC curve. Variant: training on Replay-Attack, testing on Replay-
Attack. The threshold shown in blue color on the left plot and the blue dot on the ROC
plot correspond to the approach when the predicted label is determined by the node with
the larger output.
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Figure 5.4: Same as Fig. 5.3 except the variant: training on CASIA, testing on CASIA.
definition-based, mobile-based and video-based attacks) while the CASIA dataset includes
additional two kinds of attack (warp-based and cut-based photo attacks). Another source
is the fact that data comes from different sensors, which potentially produce samples
with different resolutions, color distributions, backgrounds, etc. The VGG architecture
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finds very specific features and even when it is tuned to the specific problem, it does not
generalize well to be agnostic to specific properties of data acquisition process.
Table 5.3: Performance results obtained with the cross-dataset evaluations of face PAD
and using the overall testing set of each dataset.
Training Test APCER (%) BPCER (%) HTER (%) ROC and ePDF
Replay-Attack CASIA 42.67 51.67 47.16 Fig. 5.5
CASIA Replay-Attack 89.44 10.0 49.72 Fig. 5.6
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Figure 5.5: Same as Fig. 5.3 except the variant: training on Replay-Attack, testing on
CASIA (cross-dataset testing).
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Figure 5.6: Same as Fig. 5.3 except the variant: training on CASIA, testing on Replay-
Attack.
5.5.2 Fingerprints
This section presents how our VGG-based approaches perform in detection of fingerprint
attack presentation. As for experiments with face benchmarks, we used the training
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subsets (as defined by dataset creators) to make a cross-validation-based training, and
separate testing subsets in final performance evaluation. Fingerprint benchmarks are
composed of subsets gathering mixed attacks (for instance glue, silicone or gelatin arti-
facts) and acquired by different sensors (cf. Table 5.1).
Same-sensor results. In this scenario, samples acquired by different sensors are not
mixed together. That is, if the classifier is trained with samples acquired by sensor X,
only sensor X samples are used in both the validation and final testing. As in previous
experiments, 10 statistically independent estimation-validation pairs of non-overlapping
subsets were created, and the solution presenting the lowest HTER over ten validations
was selected for testing. Table 5.4 as well as Figures 5.7 and 5.8 show the same-sensor
testing results averaged over all sensors (used to build a given dataset) and presented for
each benchmark separately. These results suggest that the older benchmark (LivDet2009)
is relatively difficult since almost 20% of spoofing samples were falsely accepted in a
solution that falsely rejects only 3.45 % of authentic examples.
Table 5.4: Performance results obtained in same-dataset evaluations of fingerprint
PAD using a part of testing samples acquired by the same sensor as in the training
procedure. Results are averaged over all subsets representing different sensors.
Training Testing APCER (%) BPCER (%) HTER (%) ROC and ePDF
LivDet2009 LivDet2009 19.37 3.45 11.4 Fig. 5.7
LivDet2013 LivDet2013 6.8 2.79 4.795 Fig. 5.8
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Figure 5.7: Left: Empirical distributions of the difference between two CNN output nodes
(after softmax) obtained separately for authentic and spoof fingerprint samples. Right:
ROC curve. Variant: training on LivDet2009, testing on LivDet2009. As in previous
plots, the threshold shown in blue color on the left plot and the blue dot on the ROC plot
correspond to the approach when the predicted label is determined by the node with the
larger output.
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Figure 5.8: Same as Fig. 5.7 except the variant: training on LivDet2013, testing on
LivDet2013.
Cross-sensor results. For cross-sensor analysis, the newer benchmark (LivDet2013)
was selected. Each subset (estimation, validation and testing) was divided into two dis-
joint subsets of samples: a) acquired by ItalData and Swipe sensors, and b) acquired by
Biometrika and CrossMatch sensors. Table 5.5 shows that, as with the other modalities,
we can observe serious problems with recognition of both artifacts or genuine samples
(two first rows of Table 5.5). Figures 5.10 and 5.9, illustrating these results, suggest that
a better balance between APCER and BPCER can be found if there is a possibility to
adjust the acceptance threshold.
Table 5.5: Performance results obtained in cross-dataset evaluations of fingerprint
PAD using a part of testing samples acquired by different sensor as in the training
procedure. All data comes for LivDet2013 fingerprint benchmark. IS = Italdata+Swipe,
BC = Biometrika+CrossMatch.
Training Testing APCER (%) BPCER (%) HTER (%) ROC and ePDF
IS BC 24.9 4.01 14.1 Fig. 5.9
BC IS 2.8 75.6 39.18 Fig. 5.10
IS IS 3.4 2.37 2.88 Fig. 5.11
BC BC 2.65 13.1 7.87 Fig. 5.12
For completeness, same-sensor results are also presented on this dataset in two last
rows of Table 5.5, and in Figs. 5.12 and 5.11. As expected, a solution based on deep
network achieves much better accuracy when the type of sensor in known.
5.5.3 Iris
This last section presents the results of iris presentation attacks detection. Two iris PAD
benchmarks were used, as described in Section 5.4), and both same-dataset and cross-
dataset experiments were carried out. Each dataset (Warsaw LivDet2015 and AVTS) are
already split by their creators into training and testing subsets. We followed this split and
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Figure 5.9: Same as Fig. 5.7 except the variant: training on Italdata+Swipe, testing
on Biometrika+CrossMatch.
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Figure 5.10: Same as Fig. 5.7 except the cross-sensor that training is realized on samples
composed Biometrika+CrossMatch, testing on Italdata+Swipe.
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Figure 5.11: Same as Fig. 5.7 except the variant: training on Italdata+Swipe, testing
on Italdata+Swipe.
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Figure 5.12: Same as Fig. 5.7 except the variant: training on
Biometrika+CrossMatch, testing on Biometrika+CrossMatch.
used the testing subset only in final performance evaluation. The training subset, used
in method development, was randomly divided 10 times into estimation and validation
disjoint subsets used in cross-validation when training the classifiers.
The average HTER’s over 10 splits calculated for validation subsets were approx.
0.0001 and 0.0 for Warsaw and AVTS datasets, respectively. HTER = 0.0 for 5 out of
10 splits of Warsaw training dataset. This means that the VGG-based feature extractor
followed by a classification layer trained on our data was perfect on the AVTS dataset,
and also it was perfect on half of the splits of the Warsaw benchmark. Since there is no
“best split” for either of two datasets, we picked one trained solution presenting perfect
performance on the training subsets to evaluate them on the test sets.
Same-dataset results. Table 5.6 presents the testing results obtained in the scenario
when both training and testing sets come from the same benchmark. APCER and BPCER
refer to classification task, that is each sample belonging to the testing set was classified
to one of two classes (authentic or presentation attack) based on posteriori probabilities
of class membership estimated by the softmax layer of the trained network. Hence, single
APCER and BPCER (point estimators) are presented since this protocol is equivalent to
a single acceptance threshold. The results obtained in this scenario are astonishing: the
classifiers trained on disjoint subsets of samples originating from the same dataset are
either perfect (ATVS benchmark) or close to perfect (a perfect recognition of spoofing
samples of Warsaw benchmark with only 0.15% of authentic samples falsely rejected).
Figures 5.13 and 5.14 present empirical distributions of the difference between two CNN
output nodes and the corresponding ROC curves. The distributions are well separated
for both benchmarks, suggesting high performance of the VGG-based solution applied for
known spoofing samples.
Cross-dataset results. Table 5.7 shows how catastrophically bad this method may be
if tested on cross-dataset samples. ATVS and Warsaw samples differ significantly in
terms of image properties such as contrast and visibility of iris texture. Especially, all the
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Table 5.6: Performance results obtained in same-dataset evaluations of iris PAD using
the overall testing set of each dataset.
Training Testing APCER (%) BPCER (%) HTER (%) ROC and ePDF
Warsaw Warsaw 0.0 0.15 0.075 Fig. 5.13
ATVS ATVS 0.0 0.0 0.0 Fig. 5.14
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Figure 5.13: Left: empirical distributions of the difference between two CNN out-
put nodes (before softmax) obtained separately for authentic and spoof iris samples.
Right: ROC curve. Variant: training on Warsaw LivDet2015, testing on Warsaw
LivDet2015. The threshold shown in blue color on the left plot and the blue dot on the
ROC plot correspond to the approach when the predicted label is determined by the node
with the larger output.
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Figure 5.14: Same as Fig. 5.13 except the variant: training on ATVS, testing on ATVS.
printouts used to produce Warsaw fake samples were able to spoof an example commercial
iris recognition system, which is not the case in the ATVS benchmark. Hence, due to
non-accidental quality of Warsaw samples, this database seems to be more realistic and
more difficult to process than the ATVS. Indeed, training on Warsaw (the “difficult”
benchmark) and testing on ATVS (the “easier” benchmark) yields good results. Figure
140
5.15 presents well separated empirical distributions of the difference between the output
nodes of the network obtained for authentic samples and spoofs.
Table 5.7: Performance results obtained in cross-dataset evaluations of iris PAD using
the overall testing set of each dataset.
Training Testing APCER (%) BPCER (%) HTER (%) ROC and ePDF
Warsaw ATVS 0.0 0.625 0.312 Fig. 5.15
ATVS Warsaw 99.9 0.0 49.99 Fig. 5.16
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Figure 5.15: Same as Fig. 5.13 except the variant: training on Warsaw LivDet2015,
testing on ATVS.
However, training on ATVS and testing on Warsaw yields almost null abilities to
detect spoofs (APCER = 99.9%). This may suggest that exchanging a single layer put on
top of the VGG-based feature extraction (trained for a different problem than spoofing
detection) is not enough to model various qualities of iris printouts prepared independently
by different teams and using different acquisition hardware. Fig. 5.15 confirms that almost
all scores obtained for spoofing samples are on the same side of the threshold as for
authentic samples. Certainly, if the threshold can be adapted (which is not typically done
in the tests), one can find other proportion between APCER and BPCER, for instance a
threshold shifted from 0 to -21.9 results in the EER 13.2%.
5.6 Conclusions
In this chapter, we proposed a PAD solution for three modalities widely employed for
designing biometric systems (i.e., face, iris and fingerprint) based on VGG network ar-
chitecture, a deep network architecture originally proposed for object recognition. We
showed a methodology to adapt the VGG network to the two-class spoofing classification
problem, which was evaluated using six benchmarks available for scientific purposes. The
experiments were conducted taking into account the main challenges existing in this re-
search field such as classification across different types of attempted attacks, biometric
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Figure 5.16: Same as Fig. 5.13 except the variant: training onATVS, testing onWarsaw
LivDet2015.
sensors, and qualities of samples used during attack. In this section, we discuss two main
takeaways observed after the analysis presented in this chapter.
The first conclusion is that deep learning is an astonishingly powerful approach to
detect image-based presentation attacks in three considered modalities. Note that the
final solution is a subtle modification of the VGG network, trained for a different task,
not related to presentation attack detection. In the case of iris and fingerprints, the
starting network is not even related to the same object recognition task. The results
showed that we can use deep learning to detect spoofing attacks in some cases (AVTS iris
benchmark) even perfectly. In this simple approach, we have changed only the last layer,
connected strictly to the classification task performed by the VGG network. However,
one can consider replacing two or all fully connected layers and utilize the output of the
convolutional part of the network more efficiently.
The second takeaway comes from the cross-dataset and cross-sensor experiments.
These exceptionally poor results seem to be related to the flexibility that characterizes
convolutional networks. The flexibility allows them to “decide” which discovered proper-
ties of the input data they use in the classification task. But if they are not trained on
data that contains a reasonable sampling of the situations present during testing, then
they fail terribly, since most of the features no longer correspond to the new data.
This, however, is not a surprising result and simply calls for solutions that take prior
knowledge about the modeled phenomenon into account. Apparently the current fasci-
nation with deep learning has brought back an old debate: should we use models that
are based on our understanding of the problem, which is neither full nor accurate (called
feature engineering or “hand-crafted” solutions) or rather flexible models that learn ev-
erything from the data (called feature learning or “data-driven” solutions)? It seems that
a reasonable mixture of both approaches should present the best reliability. We firmly
believe the solution to this problem is in taking the best of both worlds.
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Chapter 6
Leveraging Shape, Reflectance and
Albedo from Shading for Face
Presentation Attack Detection
“The true work of art is but a shadow of the divine perfection.”
—Michelangelo, Italian sculptor, painter, architect and poet (1475–1564)
“We can easily forgive a child who is afraid of the dark; the real tragedy of life
is when men are afraid of the light.”
—Plato, Greek author & philosopher in Athens (427 BC–347 BC)
Abstract
Presentation attack detection is a challenging problem in the biometrics that aims at
exposing an impostor user that seeks to deceive the authentication process by showing to
the acquisition sensor a synthetic sample containing the biometric data of a genuine user
previously enrolled in the authentication system. In facial biometrics systems, this kind
of attack is performed with a photograph, video, or 3D mask containing the biometric
information of a genuine identity. In this paper, we investigate a novel approach to
detecting face presentation attacks based on intrinsic properties of the scene such as
albedo, depth, and reflectance properties of the facial surfaces, which were recovered
through a shape-from-shading (SfS) algorithm. In other to extract meaningful patterns
from the different maps obtained with the SfS algorithm, we designed a novel shallow
CNN architecture for learning features useful for the presentation attack detection (PAD).
We conduct the experimental results considering the intra- and inter-dataset evaluation
protocol. The former protocol aims to test a PAD system under a scenario in that the
acquisition sensor and the identities are known during the training phase, whereas the
latter protocol aims to test a PAD system in a completely unknown scenario, which
includes the identities, sensors, and the presentation attack instruments (PAI) used to
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generate the attempted attacks. Experimental results showed the effectiveness of the
proposed method considering several types of the photo- and video-based presentation
attacks, and in the cross-sensor scenario, besides achieving competitive results for the
inter-dataset evaluation protocol.
6.1 Introduction
B IOMETRICS is an active research field whose today’s challenges go far beyond themaking of a high precision system. Nowadays, the security aspects of a biometric
system are essential for a successful authentication mechanism due to the vast possibility
that an impostor user has for attacking a biometric system. Among different possibilities,
presentation attack is the easiest way to deceive such systems since this kind of attack
can be performed directly on the acquisition sensor without any previous knowledge of
the internal components of the system. It is characterized by the action of presenting
a synthetic biometric sample of some valid user to the acquisition sensor in order to
authenticate itself as a legitimate user. In this kind of attack, the impostor user does
not need any advanced information about internal components of the system, and the
minimum requirement for a successfully accomplished presentation attack is a trustworthy
copy of the biometric data of a target user such as photographs, digital video, or even a
3D mask [158].
Although several advances have been reported in the literature, face presentation
attack problem is still an open problem. According to the IJCB 2017 competition on
generalized face presentation attack detection (PAD) in mobile [30], the best algorithm
for detecting this kind of attack presented an error detection rate about 10.0%, which
means that ten out of every hundred attempted attacks were successfully accomplished,
giving to an impostor user unauthorized access to the biometric system. Considering a
system with hundreds of thousands of users, this detection rate makes the authentication
process unfeasible in practice.
The major problem with the current solutions for PAD is the lack of ability to work in
an uncontrolled environment. In fact, the PAD solutions available in the literature present
impressive accuracy rates, with near-perfect classification results, for isolated datasets, i.e.,
in one specific domain. However, when we consider challenging evaluation scenarios, those
algorithms present extremely low performance, sometimes becoming worse than random.
For this reason, researchers have promoted efforts to report their results considering two
evaluation protocols known as intra- and inter-datasets. Intra-dataset evaluation protocol
consists of testing a PAD algorithm using data that came from the same source as the
training data with training and testing sets being collected using the same acquisition
sensor or in the same environment. Inter-dataset protocol consists of testing a PAD
algorithm using data from a different source as the training data, which means we have
data from a different domain (i.e., different sensor and environment). Such evaluation
protocol is more challenging and more suitable for reflecting a real operating scenario.
According to recent results reported in the literature, the Half Total Error
Rates (HTER) can increase drastically taking into account these evaluation protocols.
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Pinto et al. [189] proposed a PAD method based on analysis of the noise and artifacts
left in the synthetic biometric sample during its manufacture such as blurring, printing
effect, banding effect among others. Although the authors achieved a low HTER value
for the intra-dataset evaluation protocol (2.8%), the HTER of this technique increases
significantly, considering the inter-dataset protocol (34.4%). Even in the state-of-the-art
techniques, values for error rates are still too high. Boulkenafet et al. [28] reported an
HTER of 2.9% and 16.7% considering the intra- and inter-dataset protocols, respectively,
which means a degradation of about 4×, in terms of HTER, which is far from an accept-
able value in practice.
In this paper, we present a novel approach to distinguishing a synthetic face from real
ones, taking into account the optical and physical properties of the scene captured by the
acquisition sensor. Our method takes advantage of the depth information, associating
it with light properties of the scene to detect an attempted attack, using a classic tech-
nique in computer vision known as shape-from-shading (SfS). SfS was firstly proposed
by Horn et al. [97] and aims to estimate the shape of an object based on the shade in-
formation present in its surface. In contrast with the photometric stereo techniques, SfS
techniques require only one image of the object under analysis. Moreover, the estimation
of the shape using SfS does not require any additional hardware, which makes possible
the application of our technique in devices equipped with only an RGB camera such as
smartphones and webcams. Fig. 6.1 illustrates a face surface reconstruction using the
Tsai’s algorithm [188], which will be described in details in Section 6.3.
(a) RGB image (b) Depth map (c) Reflectance map (d) Albedo map
Figure 6.1: Example of a facial surface reconstruction using an SfS algorithm for presen-
tation attack video frame.
6.1.1 Optical Properties of the Light and Rationale of Proposed
Approach
According to the law of refraction [249], the physical mechanism of the light refraction can
be characterized in terms of absorption and irradiation of the light incident in a surface.
Complementary, the reflection’s law governs the reflection of the incident light and states
that the incident ray, the reflected ray, and the normal to smooth conducting surfaces
(e.g., mirror or polished metal) all lie in the same plane [249]. Basically, the beam of light
that affects a flat surface may be absorbed, transmitted, and reflected, and that, the light
146
reflected can be mathematically understood by Snell and reflection laws, which predict
the directions of the light refracted and reflected, respectively, taking into account the
refraction index of the material and the roughness of its surface, that is, the smoothness
or texture of the surface.
understanding of the physical mechanism of the light refraction, in terms of absorption
and irradiation of the light incident on a surface, while the reflection’s law governs the
reflection of the incident light. According to refraction and reflection laws, the beam
of light that affects a flat surface may be absorbed, transmitted, and reflected, and the
directions of the reflected and refracted light can be predicted considering the refraction
index of the material and the roughness of its surface, i.e., the smoothness or texture of
the surface.
When a beam of light affects a truly flat surface, each incident ray is reflected at
the same angle that we have between the surface normal and such incident ray, but
on the opposite side of the surface normal. In contrast, when a beam of light affects
rough surfaces, the incident light is reflected in several different directions. An ideal
diffuse reflecting surface that reflects the incident light in all directions is said to exhibit a
Lambertian reflection. These two processes are known as specular and diffuse reflection,
respectively. Although many materials can exhibit both types of reflection, some materials
reflect the light more diffuse than specular way (e.g., paper fibers, non-absorbing powder
such as plaster, poly-crystalline material such as white marble, among others) [70, 116,
165,252].
The reflecting power of the material is another interesting physical property that we
believe to be useful for the presentation attack detection problem. This property is also
known as surface albedo and can be defined as a measure of how much light incident on
a surface is reflected without being absorbed. In other words, this property measures the
reflectivity of a material and gives an estimate of the level of the diffuse reflection [103,275].
Thus, the objects that appear white reflect most of the incident light, indicating a high
albedo, whereas the dark objects absorb most of the incident light, indicating a low albedo.
Finally, the last physical property we investigate in this work is the depth information
associated with an object in the scene. Considering the presentation attack instruments
known in the literature (e.g., photograph, video replay, mask), we clearly have a significant
loss of depth information, excepting the mask-based presentation attacks. In fact, several
works published in the literature have successfully investigated features able to charac-
terize the depth information of face regions to point out an attempted attack [66,67,84].
Basically, these approaches propose to use depth sensor, such as Microsoft’s Kinetic sen-
sor, to find an accurate depth map of the scene.
6.1.2 Contributions and Organization
In light of these remarks, we propose a novel method for detecting face presentation
attacks using an SfS technique, which is used for recovering the surface details of the
faces captured by the acquisition sensor. Our hypothesis is that the reconstructed surface
from the presentation attack samples might contains strong evidence of synthetic patterns
in comparison to the RGB images. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first attempt
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at using this kind of algorithm for the PAD problem. In summary, the main contributions
of this paper are:
• a new method for face presentation attack detection based on intrinsic properties of
the surfaces reconstructed with an SfS algorithm;
• a new shallow CNN network able for learning discriminant features from the albedo,
reflectance, and depth maps for the PAD problem, which achieved competitive re-
sults for the intra- and inter-dataset evaluation protocol;
• an investigation of a new data-driven PAD algorithm, where the depth maps are
recovered without any extra hardware, which allows the use of the proposed method
in systems equipped with a single RGB sensor;
• an evaluation of the proposed approach considering challenging protocols such as
inter-dataset protocol and the cross-sensor scenario; and
• the investigation of using an SfS technique in a challenging problem upon hundreds
of thousands of real images.
We organize the remaining of this paper as follows. Section 6.2 presents some rele-
vant related approaches to face presentation attack detection. Section 6.3 describes the
proposed method. Section 6.4 presents the datasets and evaluation protocols used in this
paper, besides the experimental results and a comparison with methods available in the
literature. Finally, Section 6.5 presents the conclusions and possible directions for future
work.
6.2 Related Work
Texture analysis is undoubtedly an important and promising line of investigation that
made possible many progress in this research field toward finds good PAD algorithms.
Back to the First Competition on Counter Measures to 2D Facial Spoofing Attacks [36],
the best proposed algorithms [151, 214] explored different texture descriptors, such as
Local Binary Patterns (LBP), Gray-Level Co-Occurrence Matrix (GLCM), Histogram
of Oriented Gradients (HOG), among others, for detecting printed-based attempted at-
tacks [8].
In order to push the state-of-the-art to past the breaking point, the Second Competi-
tion on Counter Measures to 2D Face Spoofing Attacks [42] presented to the community a
novel dataset (Replay-Attack dataset) [41] containing three different attacks types, print-,
photo-, and video-based attacks, where the winner teams addressed the problem through
a feature-level fusion of texture- and motion-based features. The Replay-Attack was quite
challenging at that time, making a possible further interesting investigation of other cues
for detecting face presentation attacks.
Erdogmus and Marcel [65–67] explored depth information for detecting face presenta-
tion attacks by analyzing both color and depth data obtained by Microsoft’s Kinect sensor.
The authors proposed to use the Local Binary Patterns (LBP) descriptor in both color
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and depth images to produce feature vectors, which were used to feed a Linear Discrimi-
nant Analysis (LDA) classifier to reveal an attempted attack. Pinto et al. [189, 190, 193]
also brought alternatives for detecting face presentation attacks exploiting the residual
noise presents in the fake biometric sample left during their recapture and reconstruction
such as blurring effect, printout artifacts, Moiré patterns, among others. Similar, Gar-
cia and Queiroz [77] and Wen et al. [260] explored these and other artifacts related to
image distortions caused mainly by the recapture process of the original biometric signal.
Another cue that has been an object of investigation in the literature is regarding
the reflectance of the objects. Although skin reflectance presents great variation due
to different tonalities of human skin [49, 161], researchers have successively used it in
several applications [55, 92, 144]. In these cases, however, the reflectance is measured
through extra-devices, for instance, thermal infrared imagery and near-infrared imagery.
Alternatively, some computational methods for estimating the reflectance map of a scene
from RGB images [5, 48, 98] have been proposed in the literature to decompose an RGB
image into their reflectance and illumination components [128].
CNN-based techniques also have been considered in the literature. Menotti et al. [162]
proposed a framework for optimizing CNN architectures for PAD problem considering
different modality, include face biometrics. The authors also proposed a shallow CNN
network was applied for detecting iris, fingerprint, and face presentation attacks. Al-
though the authors achieved good results using this technique, this work did not con-
sider more challenging protocols such as inter-dataset protocol and cross-sensor scenario.
Atoum et al. [11] combines a patch- and depth-based CNN for face PAD, in which the
authors also achieved good results for the intra-dataset evaluation protocol. However,
this works also reported their results only in the intra-dataset protocol.
Several works in the literature presented a fine-tuning of existing deep architectures
such as AlexNet, VGG, VGG-Face, and GoogleLeNet [142, 180, 192, 269]. However, in
general, these architectures achieved near-perfect classification results for the intra-dataset
and, at same time, very poor results (close to random) for the inter-dataset protocol.
Recently, Rehman et al. [208] proposed a new CNN-based anti-spoofing technique using
the VGG-11 architecture, in which the authors reported impressive results for the intra-
and inter-dataset scenario. However, a serious methodological failure described by the
authors in Sec. 4.2.2 of the original paper [208], made any comparison unfeasible. As
mentioned by the authors, part of the testing dataset was used to estimate the threshold
τ , which was used for computing the APCER, BCPER, and HTER values. More precisely,
considering the inter-dataset protocol, in which we have a training dataset and a testing
dataset, the authors used the training partition contained in the test dataset for estimating
the threshold τ , which obviously biased the reported results. In contrast to Rehman et al.,
this paper and the other ones published in the literature use the testing dataset only to
report the performance results.
Differently from the previous works in the literature, in this work, we propose a PAD
technique that takes advantage of depth, albedo, and reflectance information from RGB-
images, without the necessity of any extra-device such as Microsoft’s Kinect or an infrared
sensor. Instead of using different methods for computing each one of these components, we
propose to use a shape-from-shading algorithm, which enables us to estimate these three
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representations from a single RGB image. We also propose a new CNN architecture able
to work in the intra- and inter-dataset scenario. To the best of our knowledge, our work is
the first one to deal with these three schemes simultaneously using a shape-from-shading
technique for detecting face presentation attacks.
6.3 Proposed Method
In this section, we present our proposed method for face PAD which is based on intrinsic
properties of the surface such as reflectance, albedo, and shape. As previously described,
we propose the use of SfS for measuring these properties and use them as input for
a Convolutional Neural Network (CNN) method which learns discriminative features for
detecting presentation attacks. The advantage of using an SfS method, instead of using an
extra-device sensor, is two-fold: (i) a shape-from-shading method gives us an estimation
of these three properties at once, and (ii) we came up with a completely data-driven
method, which enables our method for use in biometric systems equipped with only an
RGB camera such as smart-phones.
The human ability for perceiving the shape of the objects from its shading is one
of the most important aspects of the human visual system. This ability is essential
for the human understanding of the world under a three-dimensional perspective [201].
Studies have been published showing that human can accurately use shading cues to
infer changes in the surface orientation [183, 201, 261]. In computer vision, there are two
main classes of methods for estimating the shape from shading: photometric stereo and
shape-from-shading methods. An essential difference between them is that photometric
stereo methods require two or more images of the same object under different lighting
conditions, whereas shape-from-shading methods require only one image of the object to
estimate its normal surfaces, making SfS methods very attractive to our problem [240].
We believe that some SfS methods are more appropriate to be applied in our problems
than others approaches found in the literature, according to assumptions and restrictions
imposed during the formulation of the problem. For instance, methods that add a smooth-
ness constraint to the surface might be inadequate to be used in our problem because such
constraint is not contemplated when recovering the shape of faces due to some cavities.
Our work is based on Tsai’s approach [188], which does not impose any restriction
that could render its use improper for the PAD problem. Fig. 6.2 illustrates our proposed
method, which is explained in details next.
6.3.1 Surface Reconstruction: Recovering the Depth, Reflectance
and Albedo maps
The Tsai’s algorithm [188] uses a linear approximation of reflectance function R to es-
timate the depth function Z from a single image. The main idea is to apply a discrete
approximation for the surface normal using the finite differences method in order to lin-
earize the reflectance function R in terms of Z, and then to solve the linear system through
the Jacobi iterative method [220].
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Figure 6.2: Overview of the proposed method for face presentation attack detection.
First, we reconstruct the face surfaces by using the SfS method, which produces estimates
for the albedo, reflectance, and depth maps. Then, we use a representation learning
techniques based on CNN to learn discriminative features from these maps estimated
from the training samples, which give us a classification model to decide if a given testing
sample is a bona fide presentation or a presentation attack.
Let us, for instance, suppose that a point at position (x, y, z), in camera coordinates,
is at a distance z from the image plane and there is a mapping between points in camera
coordinates onto the image plane created using the parallel projection (not taking into
account any sort of distortion). Assuming that depth information is a function of image
plane coordinates Z = Zx,y, then the change in depth δz of the point related to the change
in image plane coordinate (x, y) can be expressed by using the Taylor series expansion of
the function Z about point (x, y) as:
δz ≈ ∂z
∂x
δx+
∂z
∂y
δy (6.1)
The gradient of the surface at point (x, y, z) is the vector (p, q) = ( ∂z
∂x
, ∂z
∂y
) and, there-
fore, the normal of a surface patch is related to the gradient by n = (p, q, 1), since the
gradient vector is orthogonal to the level surface Zx,y.
Now, suppose a Lambertian surface, which has only diffuse reflectance and the bright-
ness is proportional to the energy of the incident light. In this case, the amount of light
energy falling on a surface is proportional to the area of the surface as seen from the light
source position, which can be expressed as:
Ex,y = R(p, q) = ρI(n · s)
⇒ R(p, q) = ρ (−p,−q, 1)√
1 + p2 + q2
· (−ps,−qs, 1)√
1 + p2s + q
2
s
(6.2)
where Ex,y is the intensity at pixel (x, y), I is the illuminance (or strength of light),
n = (−p,−q, 1) is the surface normal, s = (−ps,−qs, 1) is the light source direction, and
ρ is the albedo of the surface.
The SfS method employed in this work uses a discrete approximation for p and q as
shown in Equation 6.3 and performs a linear approximation of Equation 6.4 based on
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Taylor series expansion considering the first order terms of the function f about a given
depth map Zn−1, which give us a linear system of equations (Equation 6.5).
p =
∂z
∂x
= Zx,y − Zx−1,y
q =
∂z
∂y
= Zx,y − Zx,y−1
(6.3)
0 = f(Ex,y, R(∂z/∂x, ∂z/∂y))
0 = Ex,y −R(Zx,y − Zx−1,y, Zx,y − Zx,y−1)
(6.4)
0 = f(Zx,y)
≈ f(Zn−1x,y ) + (Zx,y − Zn−1x,y )
d
dZx,y
f(Zn−1x,y )
(6.5)
When we consider the Zx,y = Znx,y, that is, the depth at n-th iteration, the Equation 6.5
can be rewritten (Equation 6.6) and solved by using the Jacobi iterative method [220],
considering an initial estimate of the depth map Z0x,y = 0.
Znx,y = Z
n−1
x,y +
− f(Zn−1x,y )
df(Zn−1x,y )
dZx,y
(6.6)
The reflectance and albedo maps also can be obtained directly from the Equation 6.2.
After find the depth map Znx,y at point (x, y), the reflectance map can be computed by
using the Equation 6.7, while the albedo map can be found through the Equation 6.8.
R(p, q) = max
(
0, ρ
pps + qqs + 1√
1 + p2 + q2
)
(6.7)
ρ(n)x,y =
Ix,y
n
(n)
x,y · s
(6.8)
6.3.2 Convolutional Neural Network for Learning Intrinsics Sur-
face Properties
Convolutional Neural Networks (CNNs) [133] is a well-known machine learning technique
designed to learn discriminative features from input data and also a mapping function for
classification purpose. Their ability to learn an efficient and effective representation space
from data has been extensively reported by the scientific community, producing impres-
sive results in many applications such as object recognition [239], video analysis [185],
presentation attack detection [30,162], among others.
Inspired by Menotti et al. [162] and He et al. [95] approaches, our CNN architecture is
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composed of a variant of SpoofNet followed by one residual block. The original SpoofNet
is a shallow CNN architecture composed of two convolutional layers, containing 16 and
64 filters, respectively, with a kernel size of 5 × 5. Each convolutional layer is followed
by a max-pooling layer, with a kernel size of 3 × 3 and a stride of 2, and by a local
normalization layer with a kernel size of 9× 9.
In contrast to SpoofNet, our new CNN architecture for face presentation attack de-
tection is described in Fig.6.2. Essentially, we propose an ensemble of two shallow CNN
architectures (Fig. 6.2(a) and Fig. 6.2(b)) containing an identity shortcut link used to
connect the output of these two blocks. Finally, we use two dense layers followed by a
soft-max classifier with two units (Fig. 6.2(c)).
6.4 Experimental Results
In this section, we present the experimental results of our proposed approach. Section 6.4.1
describes the datasets used in the experiments, whereas Section 6.4.2 describes the ex-
perimental protocols used to validate our approach. Section 6.4.3 shows the experimental
setup of the proposed method regarding its parameters, and Sections 6.4.4 and 6.4.5 show
the obtained results using the maps obtained with the shape-from-shading algorithm and
feature learning process. The remaining sections describe the performance results con-
sidering the intra- and inter-dataset evaluation protocol and a comparison among the
proposed method and other approaches reported in the literature.
6.4.1 Datasets
We evaluated the proposed method in three datasets freely available in the literature for
scientific purpose, which is described in details in the following sections:
Replay-Attack dataset
This dataset contains videos of presentation attacks and bona fide presentations of 50
identities, which were recorded with a webcam with a pixel resolution of 320× 240. This
dataset provides three types of presentation attacks: print-, mobile- and video- attacks
with high definition resolution, which were split into three subsets: the training set with
360 videos; the development set containing 360 videos; and testing set with 480 videos,
totaling 1, 000 videos of presentation attacks and 200 videos of bona fide presentation.
CASIA dataset
This dataset comprises 600 videos of presentation attacks and bona fide accesses of 50
identities. The authors recorded both presentation attack and bona fide presentation
videos in three different qualities: (i) low-quality videos captured by an old USB camera
with 480× 640 pixel resolution; (ii) normal-quality videos, which were recorded by a new
USB camera with 480× 640 pixel resolution; and (iii) high-quality videos captured with
a Sony NEX-5 camera with 1, 920 × 1, 080 pixel resolution. The types of presentation
attacks contained in this dataset include warped photo attacks, cut photo attacks, photos
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and video attacks. Finally, this dataset provides 240 videos for training and 360 videos
for testing, totaling 150 videos of bona fide presentations and 450 videos of presentation
attacks.
UVAD dataset
This dataset contains bona fide presentation and presentation attack videos of 404 identi-
ties, all created at Full HD quality. The videos were recorded in two sections considering
different illumination conditions and environments. In total, this dataset provides 16, 268
presentation attack videos and 808 bona fide presentation videos, which were recorded
through six acquisition sensors of different manufacturers (Sony, Kodak, Olympus, Nikon,
Canon, and Panasonic). The video attacks were simulated with seven different display
devices, also with HD and Full HD quality. The authors recommend using the videos
from Sony, Kodak and Olympus sensors for training, and the videos from Nikon, Canon
and Panasonic sensors for testing. This evaluation protocol provides 3, 872 for training
and 6, 416 for testing, totaling 404 bona fide presentation videos and 9, 884 presentation
attack videos.
6.4.2 Experimental Protocols
The performance of the proposed method is measuring by using two metrics recommended
by ISO/IEC 30107-3 [106], Attack Presentation Classification Error Rate (APCER) and
the Bona fide Presentation Classification Error Rate (BPCER), wherein the APCER
is the proportion of presentation attack incorrectly classified as bona fide presentations
and the BPCER is the proportion of bona fide presentations incorrectly classified as
presentation attack. Although, the ISO/IEC does not define measures that aggregate
these two measures, in this work we additionally use two measures for that, the Equal
Error Rate (EER) and Half Total Error Rate (HTER), since the evaluation protocol for
some datasets recommends to use them. The EER value is defined by the threshold in
that the APCER and BPCER rates are equals, and the HTER is the average of APCER
and BPCER measures computed in a threshold τ , which must be defined in a development
set.
We evaluated our approach upon the two experimental protocol, the intra- and inter-
dataset protocols. In the intra-dataset scenario, we validate the proposed method into
each dataset separately, and we follow the official protocols defined in each dataset consid-
ered in this work. Therefore, the Replay-Attack dataset is comprised of three subsets: the
training set, which was used to fit a classification model; the development set used to find
the EER threshold; and the test set, which was used only to report the APCER, BPCER,
and HTER values. For the datasets composed of two subsets (CASIA and UVAD), we
use the training set to fit a classification model and to find the EER threshold, and the
test set to report the final results in terms of APCER, BPCER, and HTER. We also
reported the EER value obtained in the test set for the CASIA dataset, as suggested by
the dataset’s authors. In the inter-dataset scenario, we use one dataset for training the
proposed method and a a different dataset to test it .
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6.4.3 Experimental Setup
This section describes the parameter configurations and implementation details of the
proposed method for reproducibility purposes of the results presented in this paper.
Regarding the shape-from-shading algorithm used in this work, the only parameter
required by this algorithm is the light source direction, whose value has been set to coor-
dinate (0, 0, 1). Therefore, we considered that the primary light source is perpendicular
to the faces during the acquisition, which is a reasonable choose taking into account the
datasets used in our experiments. As the shape-from-shading algorithm works upon im-
ages, we subsample the videos to have about 61 frames per video (≈ 2 seconds). Moreover,
we apply the shape-from-shading algorithm to each channel of the RGB frames cropped
in the face regions, whose locations were provided by the datasets’ authors. Finally, we
resize the maps found by the algorithm to (150× 150), which were used to feed the CNN
networks.
We conducted the training process of the CNN networks using 150 epochs and batches
of 64. We used the Adadelta solver for minimizing the categorical cross-entropy objective
function using a learning rate of 1e−2 without the learning decay strategy. Finally, we use
an L2 regularization in the soft-max classifier, whose value was configured to 1e−4. The
seeds were pre-defined in order to obtain reproducibility of our results. Finally, the class
decision (bona fide presentation vs. presentation attack) for an input video was taken
considering the fusion scores of its 61 frames by computing the median. We use the Keras
(version 2.1.3) and Tensorflow (version 1.4.1) frameworks 1 to implement the proposed
CNN network and the source code of all proposed methods will be freely available 2.
6.4.4 Evaluation of the Proposed CNN Architecture
In this section, we evaluate the CNN network proposed in this work, which was inspired by
the SpoofNet [162], a shallow network designed for the presentation attack problem and
by the Residual Networks (ResNet) [95]. Here, we show the effectiveness of the proposed
SpoofNet-based residual block for detecting presentation attacks by comparing our CNN
network with the SpoofNet and ResNet, besides of Xception network [43], a relative new
CNN architecture that outperforms Inception V3 on the ImageNet dataset [133]. For
both Xception and ResNet networks, we performed a fine-tuning of a pre-trained version
trained upon the ImageNet dataset since we do not have much data for training them
from scratch. Thus, after loading the pre-trained weights, we remove the top layer and we
freeze the remain layers to indicate that such layers will not be trained. Thereafter, we
add a fully connected layer with 1, 024 units followed by a soft-max layer with 2 outputs.
Table 6.1 depicts a comparison among these CNN networks for the CASIA dataset us-
ing the intra-dataset protocol. Both the SpoofNet and the proposed network outperforms
the ResNet and Xception networks. We believe that shallow networks are more suitable
for the PAD problem due to nature of the patterns to be learned by the networks, which
came from the artifacts added in the synthetic samples such as blurring, banding effect,
1https://keras.io and https://www.tensorflow.org
2The source code will be public and freely available for scientific purposes on GitHub, upon acceptance
of this paper.
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Moiré patterns, among others. Noticeably, such patterns can be better understood as
low-level features and deeper networks are suitable for learning high-level features such
as part of complex objects.
Table 6.1: Performance results (in %) for the CASIA dataset considering the intra-dataset
evaluation protocol.
Architecture Map Type APCER BPCER HTER Mean HTER
Albedo 68.89 68.89 68.89
ResNet Depth 34.81 48.89 41.85 58.21
Reflectance 65.56 62.22 63.89
Albedo 8.52 78.89 43.70
Xception Depth 18.15 55.56 36.85 38.08
Reflectance 29.63 37.78 33.70
Albedo 8.15 14.44 11.30
SpoofNet Depth 14.44 11.11 12.78 11.11
Reflectance 8.52 10.00 9.26
Albedo 6.67 8.89 7.78
Proposed Method Depth 11.11 5.56 8.33 8.64
Reflectance 15.19 4.44 9.81
6.4.5 How to Feed the Proposed CNN Network with the Different
Maps?
Table 6.2: Performance results (in %) for the Replay-Attack and CASIA datasets consid-
ering the intra-dataset evaluation protocol.
Dataset Map Type HTER
Albedo 8.00
Depth 2.62
Replay-Attack Reflectance 3.87
Majority Vote 3.38
Concatenated Maps 3.12
Albedo 7.78
Depth 8.33
CASIA Reflectance 9.81
Majority Vote 5.37
Concatenated Maps 2.41
In this section, we evaluate two strategies to extract meaningful information from
the different maps using the proposed CNN network. The experiments presented in this
section were performed using the intra-dataset evaluation protocol. The first strategy
consists of training a CNN network for each one of the three types of maps available
(albedo, reflectance and depth maps), which give us three CNN-based classifiers. After,
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the fusion approach based on the majority vote is employed in order to have a final score
to decide if a testing sample is a presentation attack or a genuine access. The second
approach consists of giving to the network the concatenated maps in order to have an
input tensor of 150× 150× 9. Table 6.2 shows the obtained results considering these two
strategies.
According to obtained results, the concatenated maps outperforms the majority fusion
strategy with a relative error reduction of 7.69% for the Replay-Attack dataset and more
than 50.0% for the CASIA dataset. Besides of having a significant reduction in the
overall time consuming for providing the final decision score, once we need to train only
one model, the concatenated maps strategy also facilitate the training of our CNN-based
classifier. This is because different maps may behave as a data augmentation approach
towards avoiding possible problems regarding over-fitting.
6.4.6 Intra-dataset Evaluation Protocol
In this section, we present the performance results of our approach for the datasets con-
sidered in this work. Here, we followed the evaluation protocol defined for each dataset
and we also reported the performance results using the metrics suggested by the datasets’
authors.
Replay-Attack Dataset
Fig. 6.3 shows the obtained Detection Error Tradeoff (DET) curves for the different maps
obtained by the shape-from-shading algorithm and for the three type of presentation
attacks contained in this dataset. The aims of this experiment are investigating the
discriminability of these maps for detecting the different attack types. The results indicate
that mobile-based presentation attacks were the most easily detected by the proposed
algorithm. Considering the depth map (Fig. 6.3(b)), the proposed approach achieved an
HTER of 2.62% considering the overall test set and perfect BPCER rates for all attack
types. Table 6.3 shows the performance results for the network trained using the depth
maps.
Table 6.3: Performance results (in %) for the Replay-Attack dataset considering the
presentation attacks simulations individually.
Attack Type APCER BPCER HTER
Hight-Def 4.37 0.00 2.19
Mobile 3.12 0.00 1.56
Print 11.25 0.00 5.63
Overall test 5.25 0.00 2.62
CASIA Dataset
Fig. 6.4 illustrates the obtained DET curves considering the different presentation attack
simulations. Here, the network trained with the concatenated maps achieved the best
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Figure 6.3: Results obtained on Replay-Attack dataset for the three attack types and for
the different maps obtained with the shape-from-shading algorithm.
performance results for all categories of attack present in this dataset. Furthermore, the
warped- and cut-based attacks were detected easier than video-based attempted attacks.
We also notice that network trained with the concatenated maps showed a more robustness
to deal with the different types of presentation attack. Table 6.4 shows the error rates for
this network, which achieved an HTER of 2.41%. For the warped attack simulations, we
achieved an APCER rate of 0.00%, which means the network detected all warped photo
attack simulations.
Table 6.4: Performance results (in %) for the CASIA dataset considering the presentation
attacks simulations individually.
Attack Type APCER BPCER HTER EER
Warped photo 0.00 3.33 1.67 2.22
Cut photo 1.11 3.33 2.22 3.33
Video 3.33 3.33 3.33 3.33
Overall test 1.48 3.33 2.41 3.33
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Figure 6.4: Results obtained on CASIA dataset for the different attack types and for the
different maps obtained with the shape-from-shading algorithm.
UVAD Dataset
In this section, we evaluate the proposed method in a challenging scenario with presen-
tation attacks and bona fine presentations, both captured with different sensors, which
is named in the literature as a cross-sensor scenario [265]. Table 6.5 shows the obtained
results for the different maps, which indicates that network trained using the depth maps
is the most discriminative network for detecting the presentation attack in this dataset.
Although the HTER of 14.51% obtained in this dataset is higher than previous datasets,
this result is the lowest achieved in the literature as shown in Section 6.4.8.
Table 6.5: Performance results (in %) for the UVAD dataset considering the different
maps obtained with the shape-from-shading algorithm.
Map Type APCER BPCER HTER
Albedo 24.58 20.00 22.29
Depth 10.68 18.33 14.51
Reflectance 22.07 31.67 26.87
Concatenated Maps 12.40 21.67 17.03
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6.4.7 Inter-dataset Evaluation Protocol
Here, we present the obtained results for the inter-dataset evaluation protocol, which is the
most challenging evaluation protocol nowadays. The difficulty of this evaluation protocol
raises up from the fact that we have a training and testing scenarios quite different in
terms of acquisition sensors, light conditions, and environment (e.g, different background).
Table 6.6 shows the obtained results of the proposed method trained with the CA-
SIA dataset and tested upon the other ones. Surprisingly, the proposed method achieved
an outstanding performance result for the Replay-attack dataset when we consider only
the video-based attempted attack videos for training our CNN network, with an HTER
of 9.75%. On the other side, our method achieved an APCER, BPCER, and HTER of
34.81%, 24.44%, and 29.63%, respectively, by using the Replay-Attack dataset for training
and the CASIA dataset for testing and considering the reflectance maps. Finally, con-
sidering the UVAD dataset for training and the CASIA dataset for testing, the proposed
method achieved an APCER, BPCER, and HTER values of 66.67%, 12.22%, and 39.44%,
respectively, using the depth maps.
Table 6.6: Results (in %) obtained with the cross-dataset protocol considering both pre-
sentation attacks simulations individually and the overall test sets of each dataset.
Training Set Testing Sets
CASIA Replay-Attack UVAD
APCER BPCER HTER APCER BPCER HTER
Video 10.75 8.75 9.75 57.93 21.67 39.80
Overall 8.25 51.25 29.75 34.79 36.67 35.73
Warped 65.75 27.50 46.62 36.75 30.00 33.38
Cut 92.00 2.50 47.25 58.07 23.33 40.70
Concatenated Maps Depth Maps
6.4.8 Comparison with State-of-the-Art Methods
In this section, we compare the proposed method with other method available in the
literature. We select the most effective CNN networks designed for the PAD problem,
include the networks specifically designed to estimate depth maps from the RGB images
without using any kind of extra device [11]. We notice that most effective methods that
take into account the intra-dataset evaluation protocol achieved poor performance results
in the inter-dataset protocol, as shown in Table 6.7. The proposed method achieved the
lowest HTER for the inter-dataset protocol and competitive results for the intra-dataset
evaluation protocol, which demonstrates the potential of the proposed method. Consid-
ering the complexity of the existing networks, i.e. the number of convolutional layers,
the proposed CNN architecture provides a reasonable trade-off between performance and
hardware requirement, which can be directly translated into memory consumption and
training timing of the network.
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6.4.9 Visual Assessment
In this section, we show a visual assessment of the albedo, reflectance, and depth maps
generated by the Tsai’s algorithm, the shape-from-shading algorithm used in this work.
Fig. 6.5 depicts these maps computed from a bona fide presentation and from a presen-
tation attack video frame. These examples illustrate how the artifacts affect the recon-
struction of the surface, specially, in this example, of the depth and reflectance maps.
We believe that the way how the Tsai’s algorithm computes the depth might improve the
highlighting of the artifacts present in the presentation attack images. As mentioned in
the Section 6.3.1, this method performs the estimation of the depth locally, which means
that each point (x, y) is reconstructed interdependently. When the algorithm tries to
compute the first and second order derivative of outliers (e.g., noise or printing artifact),
we came up with a situation where the approximation could not be applied, which pro-
duces the white spots in the reconstructed maps. Moreover, the first and second order
derivative computations can potentially highlight the printing artifacts, i.e., horizontal
and vertical lines. Fig. 6.4.9 shows the details of the reconstructed surface considering a
video frame of both classes of the PAD problem, in which we evidence natural pattern for
the genuine access (e.g., skin roughness) and synthetic patterns for presentation attack
image (e.g., horizontal and vertical lines).
(a) Original frame (b) Depth map (c) Reflectance map (d) Albedo map
(e) Original frame (f) Depth map (g) Reflectance map (h) Albedo map
Figure 6.5: Example of a bona fide presentation video frame (first line) a presentation
attack video frame (second line). First column illustrate original frames captured by the
acquisition sensor, whereas the other columns show their respective maps.
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(a) Reconstructed surface of the nose region of a
bona fide presentation
(b) Reconstructed surface of the nose region of a
presentation attack
Figure 6.6: Details of the reconstructed surface for the video frames showed in Fig. 6.5
from a genuine access (a) and an attempted attack (b), in which we found strong evidence
of a natural (skin roughness) texture pattern and of a synthetic (horizontal and vertical
lines) texture pattern for these respective classes.
6.5 Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper, we proposed an algorithm for detecting presentation attacks based on
intrinsic properties of the scene such as albedo, reflectance, and depth of the scene. We
showed that these properties are useful for detecting different types of presentation attacks
with satisfactory results in terms of error rates. We also proposed a novel CNN network
specially designed for learning features from these different maps. The ability of CNN
networks in learning from data was crucial for our method to achieve the reported results,
since the hand-crafting feature engineering of these different maps could take much work
effort.
The experimental results corroborated the effectiveness of our CNN networks trained
using these different maps. Particularly, the network trained with the depth maps and
with the concatenated maps presented a more robustness for detecting presentation at-
tacks taken into account the inter-dataset evaluation protocol. For the intra-dataset eval-
uation protocol, the depth map achieved the best performance results for the UVAD and
Replay-Attack datasets, whereas the concatenated maps achieved the best performance
results for the CASIA dataset. We believe there could be some complementarity between
these maps, which would allow our CNN network to learn good features and deal with
this complex dataset that contains several kinds of photo and video presentation attacks.
Unquestionably, the inter-dataset evaluation protocol was the hardest scenario for
the proposed method, even considering the cross-sensor scenario, in which we achieved
better results than the state-of-the-art, as confirmed through the results obtained for
the UVAD dataset. We believe our work could help the community to have a better
understanding about this challenging problem, since the proposed method was able to
spot strong evidences of presentation attacks considering the photographs- and video-
based attempted attacks in the reconstructed surface of the faces.
Future research efforts include the investigation of alternative approaches to combining
the albedo, reflectance, and depth maps toward extracting complementary patterns. This
is useful for detecting presentation attacks, as well as the investigation of new approaches
to recovering the surface properties from shading by taking into account a reflectance
model more suitable for our problem, such as Bidirectional reflectance distribution func-
tion (BRDF). The study of methods for finding the light source detection that operate in
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a real scenario (not with synthetic images) could also be a promising investigation path
toward improving the facial surface reconstruction.
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Chapter 7
Conclusions and Future Work
“Take delight in the Lord, and he will give you the desires of your heart.”
—Bible, Psalm 37:4
“In questions of science, the authority of a thousand is not worth the humble
reasoning of a single individual.”
—Galileo Galilei, Italian astronomer, mathematician, physicist, philosopher and
professor (1564–1642)
“Science knows only one commandment – contribute to science.”
—Bertolt Brecht, German theatre practitioner, playwright, and poet (1898–1956)
7.1 Final Remarks
IN this thesis, we proposed a set of algorithms and methodologies for detecting pre-sentation attacks in biometric systems based on face, iris, and fingerprint traits. The
hypotheses presented in Chapter 1 were investigated throughout the other chapters,
where we also showed the specific contributions achieved in each work and a discussion
regarding the visual assessments of the main approaches presented in this thesis.
The results presented in Chapters 2 and 3 corroborate the Hypothesis 1 in which
we showed strong evidences of how artifacts affect frequency components of the Fourier
spectrum. The Fourier analysis was a powerful tool to recognize strong evidences of these
artifacts and our proposed method for collecting such evidences presented results superior
to or competitive with traditional image analysis approaches, such as texture and motion
analyses. Moreover, the modeling of artifacts collected over time described in Chapter 3
demonstrated to be a more effective approach than the visual rhythm-based techniques,
presented in Chapter 2.
Regarding the Hypothesis 2, we showed that supervised feature learning techniques
based on Convolutional Neural Networks (CNN) were able to learn meaningful telltales
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of presentation attacks for different modalities and attack types. In Chapter 4, we
presented performance results of two methodologies for building convolutional networks,
architecture optimization and filter optimization. The architecture optimization method-
ology was used to investigate a set of shallow CNN architectures, i.e., number of convolu-
tional layers ranging from one to three, whose weights were randomly defined through a
uniform distribution. On the other hand, the filter optimization was used to investigate
the behavior of these shallow CNNs when operating with filter weights defined through
the back-propagation mechanism. The results achieved in this work suggest us that the
interplay between these two approaches is a promising strategy for deploying CNN archi-
tecture for the PAD problem, which led us to build a promising convolutional network,
the SpoofNet, which has inspired several other studies in the literature. In Chapter 5, we
designed a methodology to use deep neural networks to distinguish presentation attacks
from bona fide presentations, in different modalities. Our methodology empowered the
networks to deal with the small datasets available to our problem and learn useful features
for detecting attempted attacks in the intra-dataset scenario. Additionally, we showed,
in Chapter 5, the limitations of deep architectures for operating in the inter-dataset
scenario. The weakness of deep neural networks for modeling the phenomenon related to
the problem from the original image space sharpened our understanding of how to build
flexible convolutional neural networks taking into account other properties inferred from
the original data.
The findings achieved in Chapters 2 and 3, in which we presented two feature
engineering solutions (named “hand-crafted” solutions), and in Chapters 4 and 5, in
which we presented different approaches based on representation learning (named “data-
driven” solutions), have turned our attention for possibilities of how to harmoniously mix
these two approaches in an attempt of taking the best of both approaches.
Lastly, in Chapter 6, we presented a novel approach to face PAD based on intrinsic
properties of face surfaces reconstructed via shape-from-shading technique (i.e., albedo,
reflectance and depth information). Furthermore, we designed a novel shallow CNN ar-
chitecture suitable for learning meaningful telltales of presentation attacks from the esti-
mations of these properties. This solution presented outstanding results considering the
cross-sensor and inter-dataset scenarios, corroborating the Hypothesis 4. In this work,
we presented a new perspective to deal with the problem by looking more closely into
the surface properties of the skin surface, for the bona fide presentations, and synthetic
materials such as printed photographs and device screens, for the presentation attacks.
The results achieved in this work corroborate the Hypothesis 3, which give us new per-
spectives of dealing with the PAD problem since this proposed method reaches the best
performance results even considering challenging evaluation protocol and scenarios.
7.2 Directions for Future Work
We believe that the guidelines presented in this thesis have contributed to research com-
munity by providing a better understanding of how artifacts affect biometric samples and
by proposing new methods for capturing patterns and nuances related to these artifacts.
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Directions for future research include investigations of methods that better quantify
different artifacts added during the manufacture and recapture of synthetic samples. The
design of methods capable of quantifying the artifacts separately can also yield improve-
ments to detect attempted attacks, since such artifacts may change in magnitude over
time, mainly due to the interaction between the acquisition sensor and the presentation
attack instruments.
During our investigations, we noticed that we might have cases where artifacts can
potentially cancel each other. For instance, the blurring effect caused by sensor defocus
can decrease the amount of flicking or banding effects. Therefore, we believe that the
design of algorithms to quantify these artifacts individually and over time has much
potential to achieve good results, even in cross-sensor and data-set scenarios.
On the other hand, the proposed method based on the intrinsic properties of facial
surfaces can be improved by using modeling that better describes facial skin spectropho-
tometry, such as the bidirectional reflectance distribution function [57]. In addition, the
investigation of methods capable of accurately estimating the light source direction can
also improve the detection rates in the cross-sensor and inter-dataset scenarios in which
we have a test environment (e.g., illumination conditions) different from the training
environment.
Finally, we believe that the combination of methods and algorithms introduced in this
thesis, toward exploring their possible complementarity, is a promising investigation line
to build robust detectors. In this direction, the visual rhythm introduced in Chapter 2
could be used to feed the CNN networks proposed in Chapters 4, 5, and 6 toward
building robust PAD solutions. Another promising investigation path to improve the
algorithms and methodologies presented in this thesis is the adoption of patch-based
analysis [11], mainly CNN-based methods that usually require a greater amount of data
during the training phase.
7.3 Other Applications to Algorithms Presented in this
Thesis
In this section, we present some possible applications in digital forensics that could take
advantage of the algorithms presented in this thesis along with techniques developed for
solving other problem that could be explored toward improving our algorithms.
7.3.1 Detection of (Illegal) Copyrighted Video Recapture
The recapture detection problem of digital media in general can also benefit from algo-
rithms and techniques developed in this research. This is a topic of interest of the video
forensics research field, which is growing active, since recapture is often an indicator of
tampering activities [163,215].
Visentini-Scarzanella et al. [256] proposed a method to detect the recapture of videos
based on deformations of the objects in recaptured images. The authors used lens radial
distortion models [7] to extract features that are used in a threshold-based classification
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scheme. Bestagini et al. [23] proposed a method to detect recaptured images, based on the
analysis of ghosting artifacts, which are added to the images during the recapture process.
The authors proposed a ghosting artifact detector based on the analysis of peaks at high-
frequencies, in the frequency domain. The authors evaluated the proposed approach in a
dataset composed of 18 videos (nine originals and nine recaptured), in which the authors
reported an accuracy of 91%.
In recent works, Thongkamwitoon et al. [247, 248] proposed an approach to detect
recaptured images based on learned edge blurriness using the K-singular value decom-
position (K-SVD) approach [1] to learn dictionaries using edge-based features, besides
presenting an anti-forensic technique to the our previous work [193], which was designed
to detect video-based face spoofing attacks based on cues such as Moiré patterns and
aliasing artifacts.
In conclusion, the methods for recapture detection hereby presented aim at modeling
artifacts added to the signal during the recapture process. This line of investigation
matches with our works presented in Chapters 2 and 3, and further investigations
regarding the applicability of algorithms and techniques presented in this thesis could be
performed, aiming at possible contributions in this research field as well.
7.3.2 Image Tampering Detection
The image manipulation detection problem is another topic in digital forensic research
field that can also benefit from the developed algorithm presented in Chapter 6, or
vice-versa. The analysis of intrinsic properties of light is a great source of inspiration for
several algorithms and techniques for detecting image tampering, especially, splicing and
copy-move manipulation [54,212,213]. Riess et al. [212] presented a method for detecting
image manipulation, namely intrinsic contour estimation, that use the reflectance map
computed by the algorithms proposed in [78,231] to normalize the images under analysis
and so exposing the manipulated candidate regions. Carvalho et al. [54] and Riess [213]
proposed algorithms for detecting image tampering based on intrinsic properties of light
present in a digital photography under analysis considering the dichromatic reflectance
model [230], which are more suitable for computing intrinsic properties of human skin
and, therefore, the algorithm presented in Chapter 6 could be improved by using this
reflectance model.
7.4 Publications During this Doctoral Research
The results obtained during the doctoral period were published in important scientific
communication vehicles dedicated to academic and scientific communities related to digi-
tal forensics, biometrics and image analysis. We divided the publications into related and
non-related with the thesis subject:
Publications Related with the Thesis Subject
1. Using visual rhythms for detecting video-based facial spoof attacks
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We presented this work in Chapter 2, which was published in a peer-reviewed
Journal, with an impact factor of 5.824;
Reference
Pinto, A., W. Robson Schwartz, H. Pedrini, and A. de Rezende Rocha. Using visual
rhythms for detecting video-based facial spoof attacks. IEEE Transactions on Information
Forensics and Security (T-IFS), 10(5):1025–1038, May 2015
2. Face Spoofing Detection Through Visual Codebooks of Spectral Temporal Cubes
We discussed about this work in Chapter 3 and it was also published in a peer-
reviewed Journal, with an impact factor of 5.071;
Reference
Pinto, A., H. Pedrini, W. Robson Schwartz, and A. Rocha. Face spoofing detection through
visual codebooks of spectral temporal cubes. IEEE Transactions on Image Processing (T-
IP), 24(12):4726–4740, Dec 2015
3. Deep Representations for Iris, Face, and Fingerprint Spoofing Detection
We presented this work in Chapter 4 and it was published in a peer-reviewed
Journal, with an impact factor of 5.824. Especially, my personal contributions
for this work include: (1) implementation and execution of experiments involv-
ing face and fingerprint modalities; (2) contributions with ideas toward improving
the performance results of the method during the experiments, based on exper-
tise acquired in our previous works; and (3) article writing and execution of extra
experiments during the revisions;
Reference
D. Menotti, G. Chiachia, Pinto, A., W. Robson Schwartz, H. Pedrini, A. Xavier Falcao,
and A. Rocha. Deep representations for iris, face, and fingerprint spoofing detection. IEEE
Transactions on Information Forensics and Security (T-IFS), 10(4):864–879, April 2015
4. Counteracting Presentation Attacks in Face Fingerprint and Iris Recognition
We presented this work in Chapter 5, which was published in as a Book Chapter.
Especially, my personal contributions for this work include : (1) ideas in attempt of
improving the performance results of the method during the experiments, based on
expertise acquired in our previous works; (2) article writing and text revision. The
experiments were performed by the undergraduate students Michael Krumdick and
Benedict Becker. This work was developed during my one-year doctoral internship
at the University of Notre Dame, USA;
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Reference
Allan Pinto, Helio Pedrini, Michael Krumdick, Benedict Becker, Adam Czajka, Kevin W.
Bowyer, and Anderson Rocha. Deep Learning in Biometrics, chapter Counteracting Pre-
sentation Attacks in Face Fingerprint and Iris Recognition, page 49. CRC Press, 2018
5. Leveraging Shape, Reflectance and Albedo from Shading for Face Presentation Attack
Detection
We presented this work in Chapter 6 and it was submitted in a peer-reviewed
Journal, with an impact factor of 7.982;
Reference
Allan Pinto, Siome Goldenstein, Alexandre Ferreira, Tiago Carvalho, Helio Pedrini, and
Anderson Rocha. Leveraging shape, reflectance and albedo from shading for face presen-
tation attack detection. IEEE Transactions on Neural Networks and Learning Systems
(T-NNLS), pages 1–11, 2018 (submitted)
6. Ensemble of Multi-View Learning Classifiers for Cross-Domain Iris Presentation
Attack Detection
This work does not appear in this thesis, but was partially inspired by the work
discussed in Chapter 4 and it was published in a peer-reviewed Journal, with
an impact factor of 5.824. Especially, my personal contributions for this work
include: (1) implementation, execution of experiments, and suggestions of exper-
imental protocols involving the meta-classification step; (2) Adjusts of SpoofNet
architecture (Chapter 4) to learn artifacts related to iris presentation attack de-
tection problem from Binarized statistical image feature (BSIF) maps [114], instead
of raw data; (3) contributions with ideas toward improving the performance results
of the method during the experiments, based on expertise acquired in our previous
works; and (4) writing and revision of the article. This work was partially developed
during my one-year doctoral internship at the University of Notre Dame, USA;
Reference
A. Kuehlkamp,A. Pinto, A. Rocha, K. W. Bowyer, and A. Czajka. Ensemble of multi-view
learning classifiers for cross-domain iris presentation attack detection. IEEE Transactions
on Information Forensics and Security (T-IFS), pages 1–13, 2018 (To appear)
Publications Non-Related with the Thesis Subject
7. Provenance filtering for multimedia phylogeny
This work does not appear in this thesis and it was published in a peer-reviewed
Intl. Conference. This work was developed during my one-year doctoral intern-
ship at the University of Notre Dame, USA;
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Reference
A. Pinto, D. Moreira, A. Bharati, J. Brogan, K. Bowyer, P. Flynn, W. Scheirer, and
A. Rocha. Provenance filtering for multimedia phylogeny. In IEEE International Conference
on Image Processing (ICIP), pages 1502–1506, Sept 2017
8. Spotting the difference: Context retrieval and analysis for improved forgery detection
and localization
This work does not appear in this thesis and it was published in a peer-reviewed
Intl. Conference. This work was developed during my one-year doctoral intern-
ship at the University of Notre Dame, USA;
Reference
J. Brogan, P. Bestagini, A. Bharati, A. Pinto, D. Moreira, K. Bowyer, P. Flynn, A. Rocha,
andW. Scheirer. Spotting the difference: Context retrieval and analysis for improved forgery
detection and localization. In IEEE International Conference on Image Processing (ICIP),
pages 4078–4082, Sept 2017
9. U-Phylogeny: Undirected provenance graph construction in the wild
This work does not appear in this thesis and it was published in a peer-reviewed
Intl. Conference. This work was developed during my one-year doctoral intern-
ship at the University of Notre Dame, USA;
Reference
A. Bharati, D. Moreira, A. Pinto, J. Brogan, K. Bowyer, P. Flynn, W. Scheirer, and
A. Rocha. U-phylogeny: Undirected provenance graph construction in the wild. In IEEE
International Conference on Image Processing (ICIP), pages 1517–1521, Sept 2017
10. Image Provenance Analysis at Scale
This work does not appear in this thesis and it was published in a peer-reviewed
Journal, with an impact factor of 5.071. This work was partially developed
during my one-year doctoral internship at the University of Notre Dame, USA;
Reference
D. Moreira, A. Bharati, J. Brogan, A. Pinto, M. Parowski, K. W. Bowyer, P. J. Flynn,
A. Rocha, and W. J. Scheirer. Image provenance analysis at scale. IEEE Transactions on
Image Processing (T-IP), 27(12):6109–6123, Dec 2018
Publications by Type of the Scientific Communication Vehicle
Peer-Reviewed Journal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Book Chapters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Papers in Proceedings of Peer-Reviewed Conferences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3
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7.5 Source Code Available Along with this Thesis
The dataset and source codes of the algorithms and methodologies presented in this thesis
are freely and publicly available on GitHub 1 2 and Reasoning for Complex Data (RE-
COD) laboratory 3 websites. Please do not hesitate to contact me (allansp84@gmail.com)
if you have any trouble or questions about using these codes.
Table 7.1: Source code developed during this thesis and freely available for reproducibility
purposes.
Technique Source
UVAD dataset (Chapter 2) https://tinyurl.com/ho3ozhx
Visual Rhythms (Chapter 2) https://github.com/allansp84/visualrhythm-antispoofing
Spectral Cubes (Chapter 3) https://github.com/allansp84/spectralcubes
SpoofNet (Chapter 4) https://github.com/allansp84/simple-hp
† These links were visited on November 6th, 2018.
1http://repo.recod.ic.unicamp.br/public/projects
2https://github.com/allansp84
3http://recod.ic.unicamp.br
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Termo de Consentimento Livre e Esclarecido (TCLE)
Responsável: Prof. Dr. Anderson de Rezende Rocha
Objetivo da pesquisa: A presente pesquisa tem como objetivo a construção de uma
base de dados contendo vídeos da face de pessoas adultas para uso científico. Esses dados
serão utilizados no desenvolvimento e na avaliação da eficácia de novas metodologias
que visam detectar procedimentos que tentam burlar o mecanismo de controle de acesso
a um sistema de computação, realizado por um sistema de biometria de face. Os dados
também poderão ser utilizados no desenvolvimento de novos métodos para reconhecimento
e detecção de face de humanos por computador.
Justificativa: Embora existam algumas bases de dados destinadas à avaliação de
metodologias que visam burlar sistemas biométricos faciais, como a Print-Attack1, do
Instituto de Pesquisa IDIAP, e a o benchmark NUAA2, da Universidade de Aeronáutica e
Astronáutica Nanjing, os seus proprietários não permitem a divulgação, feita por terceiros,
de dados gerados durante experimentos científicos que utilizam tais bases, o que dificulta
a geração e a disseminação de novos conhecimentos adquiridos em pesquisas científicas.
Adicionalmente, a existência de bases de dados de vídeos disponíveis para o estudo de
possíveis ataques a sistemas de biometria de faces são ainda mais escassos e não temos
conhecimento de uma base livre para esse fim.
Procedimentos: Os participantes serão filmados por uma câmera digital, por um
período de aproximadamente 2 minutos, em três locais dentro da universidade, com difer-
entes condições de iluminação e pose.
Para que a filmagem seja realizada de maneira organizada, diminuindo, ao máximo,
o desconforto ou riscos aos participantes, uma fila circular será organizada com a finali-
dade de capturar três vídeos de cada participante, com aproximadamente 40 segundos de
duração para cada vídeo.
Os locais escolhidos serão internos e externos ao prédio do Instituto de Computação
(IC/Unicamp), de modo a permitir a aquisição de vídeos com diferentes condições de
iluminação e pose. Tais locais serão arejados, livres de circulação de veículos automotivos,
distantes de construções em andamento ou eventos de outra natureza que possam colocar
em risco a segurança e a integridade física dos participantes.
As filmagens dos participantes poderão ocorrer durante o dia ou à noite, sendo que,
no período diurno, os participantes não ficarão expostos diretamente aos raios solares
durante a realização da pesquisa.
1A. Anjos and S. Marcel, “Counter-Measures to Photo Attacks in Face Recognition: A Public Database
and A Baseline,” in International Joint Conference on Biometrics (IJCB’11), 2011.
2X.Tan, Y.Li, J.Liu, and L.Jiang. “Face Liveness Detection from A Single Image with Sparse Low
Rank Bilinear Discriminative Model,” In Proceedings of 11th European Conference on Computer Vision
(ECCV’10), 2010.
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Desconfortos e riscos: Durante a realização da pesquisa, poderá haver um certo
cansaço ou fadiga dos participantes, visto que eles ficarão em uma fila aguardando a
sua vez de participar na coleta em andamento. No entanto, como a duração dos vídeos é
curta para cada participante, problemas dessa natureza não deverão trazer desconfortos
mais sérios aos participantes. Não há riscos previsíveis.
Benefícios: O participante contribuirá com informações úteis para o desenvolvimento e
a avaliação de novos métodos que visam melhorar a segurança dos sistemas de computação,
como por exemplo, sistemas que possuem mecanismos de controle de acesso por biometria
facial.
Métodos alternativos: Não há métodos alternativos para a obtenção das informações
desejadas, pois a única forma para obtenção de vídeos da face dos participantes é por
meio de filmagem com uma câmera digital.
Acompanhamento e assistência: Não se aplica.
Esclarecimentos: Em caso de dúvidas, o participante poderá entrar em contato, a
qualquer momento, com Prof. Dr. Anderson de Rezende Rocha, pelo telefone (19) 3521-
5854 ou pelo e-mail anderson.rocha@ic.unicamp.br, responsável por essa pesquisa.
Possibilidade de inclusão em grupo controle ou placebo: Não se aplica.
Possibilidade de desistência: É assegurado ao participante o direito de poder aban-
donar a pesquisa a qualquer momento e sem aviso prévio. O participante que assim o
fizer não sofrerá penalidade alguma, constrangimento ou represália de qualquer natureza.
Critérios de Inclusão e Exclusão dos Participantes: Os participantes serão convi-
dados a participar da pesquisa por meio da divulgação de comunicados que serão afixados
nos quadros de avisos do Instituto de Computação da Unicamp. Adicionalmente, esses
comunicados serão enviados por e-mail para os alunos de graduação, pós-graduação e para
os docentes do mesmo instituto. Dado o caráter voluntário da pesquisa, caso o número
de participantes não seja suficiente para a realização da mesma, comunicados serão envi-
ados às listas de e-mails dos alunos de graduação e pós-graduação dos outros institutos
pertencentes à Unicamp. Para participar da pesquisa, o candidato deverá atender aos
seguintes critérios: (1) ser maior de 18 anos; e (2) residir na Região Metropolitana de
Campinas. Ressalta-se que a participação é voluntária e o interessado pode desistir sem
prejuízos às partes em qualquer momento sem necessidade de justificativa prévia. Em
caso de desistência de um candidato, o candidato subsequente será chamado sem maiores
prejuízos à pesquisa ou às partes envolvidas.
Sigilo de dados confidenciais: Não se aplica.
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Despesas decorrentes da participação: Os participantes não terão nenhuma despesa
com a pesquisa, dessa forma, não está previsto ressarcimento decorrente da participação
na pesquisa.
Riscos previsíveis: A pesquisa não envolve riscos previsíveis, visto que o participante
será apenas filmado com um câmera digital comum, procedimento simples que não oferece
risco ou dano à integridade física, psíquica, moral ou de outra natureza.
Ao participante: O participante receberá uma cópia deste Termo de Consentimento
Livre e Esclarecido (TCLE) para posteriores consultas ou esclarecimentos de dúvidas,
contendo a assinatura do responsável pela pesquisa na última página deste termo, bem
como a sua rubrica em todas as páginas.
Autorização para uso de imagem: O participante autoriza a utilização de sua im-
agem apenas para o uso em pesquisas científicas, incluindo a confecção e divulgação de
trabalhos científicos em todo o território brasileiro e no exterior. É assegurado ao partici-
pante que seus dados capturados não sofrerão nenhuma manipulação que possa lhe causar
eventuais constrangimentos ou danos morais e psíquicos. As imagens dos participantes
serão armazenadas em dispositivos acessíveis apenas pelos pesquisadores envolvidos na
pesquisa. Caso outros pesquisadores ou grupos de pesquisa tenham interesse em utilizar
esses dados em seus trabalhos, os mesmos terão que assinar um termo de responsabilidade
sobre a utilização e proteção de tais dados. Ao concordar com este Termo de Consen-
timento Livre e Esclarecido (TCLE), o participante estará cedendo permanentemente os
direitos de sua imagem para os fins descritos neste parágrafo.
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Sobre o responsável: O participante poderá entrar em contato, a qualquer momento,
com o responsável pela pesquisa, Prof. Dr. Anderson de Rezende Rocha, por meio dos
seguintes canais de comunicação:
Prof. Dr. Anderson de Rezende Rocha
Endereço profissional: Av. Albert Einstein, 1251, Sala 40,
Cidade Universitária, Campinas-SP, 13083-852
Telefone: (19) 3521-5854
e-mail: anderson.rocha@ic.unicamp.br
Comitê de ética em pesquisa: Caso o participante tenha alguma denúncia ou recla-
mações referentes aos aspectos éticos da presente pesquisa, este deve entrar em contato
com o Comitê de Ética em Pesquisa (CEP) da Faculdade de Ciências Médicas (FCM) da
Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP), por e-mail, telefone ou pessoalmente,
no seguinte endereço:
Comitê de Ética em Pesquisa (CEP/ FCM/ UNICAMP)
Endereço: Rua Tessália Vieira de Camargo, 126
Cidade Universitária, Campinas-SP, 13083-887
Telefone: (19) 3521-8936 ou (19) 3521-7187
e-mail: cep@fcm.unicamp.br
Sendo assim, eu, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .,
declaro ter lido as cláusulas acima e concordo em participar da pesquisa referente a este
Termo de Consentimento Livre e Esclarecido (TCLE), que está sob a responsabilidade
do Prof. Dr. Anderson de Rezende Rocha, pesquisador e professor do Instituto de Com-
putação (IC) da Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP).
Participante
Responsável: Prof. Dr. Anderson de Rezende Rocha
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Appendix B
Convolutional Network Operations
Our networks use classic convolutional operations that can be viewed as linear and non-
linear image processing operations. When stacked, these operations essentially extract
higher level representations, named multiband images, whose pixel attributes are concate-
nated into high-dimensional feature vectors for later pattern recognition.1
Assuming Iˆ = (DI , I) as a multiband image, where DI ⊂ Z2 is the image domain and
I(p) = {I1(p), I2(p), . . . , Im(p)} is the attribute vector of am-band pixel p = (xp, yp) ∈ DI ,
the aforementioned operations can be described as follows.
Filter Bank Convolution
Let A(p) be a squared region centered at p of size LA × LA, such that A ⊂ DI and
q ∈ A(p) iff max(|xq − xp|, |yq − yp|) ≤ (LA − 1)/2. Additionally, let Φ = (A,W ) be a
filter with weights W (q) associated with pixels q ∈ A(p). In the case of multiband filters,
filter weights can be represented as vectorsWi(q) = {wi,1(q), wi,2(q), . . . , wi,m(q)} for each
filter i of the bank, and a multiband filter bank Φ = {Φ1,Φ2, . . . ,Φn} is a set of filters
Φi = (A,Wi), i = {1, 2, . . . , n}.
The convolution between an input image Iˆ and a filter Φi produces a band i of the
filtered image Jˆ = (DJ ,J), where DJ ⊂ DI and J = (J1, J2, . . . , Jn), such that for each
p ∈ DJ ,
Ji(p) =
∑
∀q∈A(p)
I(q) ·Wi(q). (B.1)
Rectified Linear Activation
Filter activation in this work is performed by rectified linear units (RELUs) of the type
present in many state-of-the-art convolutional architectures [130,194] and is defined as
Ji(p) = max(Ji(p), 0). (B.2)
1This appendix describes convolutional networks from an image processing perspective, therefore the
use of terms like image domain, image band, etc.
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Spatial Pooling
Spatial pooling is an operation of paramount importance in the literature of convolutional
networks [135] that aims at bringing translational invariance to the features by aggregating
activations from the same filter in a given region.
Let B(p) be a pooling region of size LB × LB centered at pixel p and DK = DJ/s
be a regular subsampling of every s pixels p ∈ DJ . We call s the stride of the pooling
operation. Given that DJ ⊂ Z2, if s = 2, |DK | = |DJ |/4, for example. The pooling
operation resulting in the image Kˆ = (DK ,K) is defined as
Ki(p) = α
√ ∑
∀q∈B(p)
Ji(q)α, (B.3)
where p ∈ DK are pixels in the new image, i = {1, 2, . . . , n} are the image bands, and
α is a hyperparameter that controls the sensitivity of the operation. In other words, our
pooling operation is the Lα-norm of values in B(p). The stride s and the size of the
pooling neighborhood defined by LB are other hyperparameters of the operation.
Divisive Normalization
The last operation considered in this work is divisive normalization, a mechanism widely
used in top-performing convolutional networks [130, 194] that is based on gain control
mechanisms found in cortical neurons [79].
This operation is also defined within a squared region C(p) of size LC ×LC centered at
pixel p such that
Oi(p) =
Ki(p)√∑n
j=1
∑
∀q∈C(p)Kj(q)
2
(B.4)
for each pixel p ∈ DO ⊂ DK of the resulting image Oˆ = (DO,O). Divisive normalization
promotes competition among pooled filter bands such that high responses will prevail even
more over low ones, further strengthening the robustness of the output representationO.
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